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Preface 
The generous financial support provided by the Touche Ross Foundation 
has once again made this auditing symposium possible. We wish to acknowl­
edge the encouragement and personal support for the symposium provided by 
David Hunerberg, partner in charge of the Kansas City office of Touche Ross & 
Co. 
The 1988 Auditing Symposium was the ninth in the series of biennial 
auditing symposia to be held at the University of Kansas. Topics for the 
symposium, as well as the individuals to serve as presenters and discussants, 
were selected by us after consultation with other members of the accounting 
faculty at the University of Kansas. We are indebted to our colleagues in the 
Division of Accounting at Kansas, especially to Bruce Bublitz and Allen Ford, 
for their assistance in planning and administering the symposium. Dorothy 
Jones, Administrative Assistant for the Division of Accounting, provided 
valuable assistance both with the organization of the symposium and with 
typing part of the proceedings. Special thanks are due to Viswanathan 
Subramaniam for his assistance with editing the proceedings. We also wish to 
thank Howard Stettler, who once again was always there when we needed him. 
In selecting papers for presentation at the symposium, the primary 
considerations were that the paper be relevant and of current interest to both 
academicians and practitioners. Papers presented by academicians were 
assigned a practitioner discussant, and vice versa. With the exception of the 
paper presented following the evening dinner, all papers were distributed to 
participants in advance. This opportunity for advance preparation by partici­
pants allows us to organize the symposium so that presenters have ten minutes 
to summarize the paper, while discussants have 20 minutes to comment on the 
paper. One hour is then available for an open discussion of each paper. As 
anticipated, the ensuing discussion and debate among the many distinguished 
auditing practitioners and academicians in attendance was both interesting and 
informative. 
The approximately fifty academicians and practitioners who participated in 
the two-day symposium are listed prior to the contents page. Many others such 
as faculty members from accounting and other disciplines, doctoral students, 
and practitioners from the Kansas City area attended parts of the symposium 
as observers. If you would like to participate in a future symposium, we would 
be pleased to receive an indication of your interest. 
The proceedings of each of the symposia, except the first, are still in print 
and may be purchased from the Kansas Union Bookstore, University of 
Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045. Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid 
basis. The prepaid price covers mailing costs with the exception of orders from 
outside the United States and Canada, in which case an additional $2.00 should 
be included for surface transportation. The papers included in each of the 
available proceedings and the prepaid price of each volume from the Kansas 
Union Bookstore are given below. 
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Using and Evaluating Audit Decision Aids1 
Robert H. Ashton 
Duke University 
John J. Willingham 
Peat Marwick Main & Co. 
This paper is intended to stimulate discussion among auditing practitioners 
and researchers about the use of audit decision aids. While audit decision aids 
have a long history, they are presently assuming greater importance as the 
auditing profession is in a period of transition from experience-based to 
research-based audit approaches. The issues raised in this paper may be of 
interest to auditing practitioners concerned with managing that transition, and 
to auditing researchers concerned with the scientific evaluation of audit 
decision aids. 
The types of audit decision aids we discuss are designed to assist auditors 
in making decisions required in the collection and evaluation of evidence for the 
purpose of expressing an audit opinion or rendering other audit-related client 
services. Today's audit decision aids are based increasingly on the implications 
of research studies, typically rooted in disciplines other than auditing, that 
examine audit decision making in a controlled, rigorous manner. In saying this, 
we do not mean to imply that the trend toward research-based audit tools is 
restricted to the types of decision aids discussed in this paper, nor do we mean 
to suggest that this is a trend of recent origin. Consider, for example, earlier 
work in statistical sampling based on the disciplines of mathematics and 
statistics (e.g., Arkin [1957]), or in systems-based approaches to auditing 
which relied on the discipline of systems analysis (e.g., Skinner and Anderson 
[1966]). 
The decision aids discussed in this paper are linked to an extensive body of 
research known as "human information processing" or "behavioral decision 
theory," which is explicitly concerned with understanding, evaluating, and 
improving decision making. In auditing, maintaining and improving the quality of 
decision making has been reinforced recently by governmental activities 
emphasizing audit effectiveness and by competitive pressures emphasizing 
audit efficiency. Proponents of decision aids based on the decision research 
literature maintain that audit efficiency and effectiveness can potentially be 
improved by employing such aids. 
The paper is organized in three major sections. First, we present an 
1 We are grateful to Alison Ashton, Lisa Koonce, Jim Loebbecke, Bill Messier and Ira Solomon for 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
1 
overview of audit decision research and the decision-aid development efforts to 
which it is linked. Second, we argue that the effectiveness of audit decision aids 
should be evaluated, instead of being accepted on faith alone. Topics discussed 
include: (1) the issue of choosing whether to use audit decision aids or, 
alternatively, to train auditors to improve their decision making, (2) various 
claims made by developers and proponents of decision aids (in auditing and 
elsewhere), and (3) specific considerations involved in the validation of audit 
decision aids. The final section of the paper outlines some potential effects 
(both positive and negative) of using decision aids in audit practice. There we 
examine possible effects on both individual auditor judgment and the auditing 
firm that employs decision aids. 
Research & Development in Audit Decision Making 
This section provides an overview of (1) contemporary research in audit 
decision making, and (2) development efforts, in the form of audit decision aids, 
which are closely linked to this research. We do not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive review of audit decision research (see, e.g., Ashton [1982a,b; 
1983], Libby [1981], Mock and Turner [1981], and Ashton et al. [1989] for 
reviews). Moreover, by restricting our focus to audit decision aids we do not 
mean to imply that this is the only area in which audit decision research has had 
an impact on practice or policy making (see, e.g., Elliott and Jacobson [1987], 
Kinney [1981], and Ward [1987] for additional discussion). Instead, the 
purpose of this section is to provide some perspective for the later discussion 
of audit decision aids. 
Research in audit decision making is based on the theoretical perspectives 
and research methods of cognitive psychologists, economists, decision theo­
rists and others concerned with how people do (and should) make decisions. 
The ultimate goal of the research is to provide a scientific basis for improving 
audit decisions, thus favorably impacting the efficiency and/or effectiveness of 
audits. More proximate goals are to evaluate audit decision making in order to 
know whether (or in what respect) decisions might need improvement, and to 
understand audit decision making in order to be able to evaluate it. Thus, the 
research is concerned with how audit decisions are made, with how well they 
are made, and with ways of making them better. 
While some audit decision research might be considered basic, most of it 
has a strong applied flavor. Applied and basic research can be distinguished in 
that applied research concerns the scientific discovery of knowledge having 
applicability to specific, identifiable problems in the short run, while problem 
specificity and a short-run perspective are not necessary features of basic 
research. Both applied and basic research can be distinguished from develop­
ment in that development concerns the practical use or implementation of 
knowledge—often by designing and producing new processes, systems or 
other devices—but does not involve the discovery or production of new 
knowledge [Ashton, 1981; Kaplan, 1977]. 
Research 
Audit decision making research has addressed several phases of the audit, 
including evaluation of analytical review results, preliminary estimates of 
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planning materiality, internal control evaluation, decisions about compliance and 
substantive testing, evaluations of the work of internal auditors, going-concern 
evaluations, the choice of audit opinions, and reviews of financial forecasts. 
Most of the research has focused on issues that relate to the "tactical 
planning" of evidence collection activities, i.e., planning an appropriate mix of 
compliance and substantive tests to support an opinion on financial statements 
at a reasonable cost [Felix and Kinney, 1982]. 
One way of viewing the dominant focus of audit decision research is via the 
Cushing and Loebbecke [1986] framework depicted in Table 1. This framework 
outlines five major stages of audit activities which typically are performed in a 
roughly sequential fashion, as well as a sixth category, called "continuous" 
activities, which typically are performed at any of several stages of the audit 
process. Most audit decision research has addressed audit activities in stages 2 
through 4 of this framework. Particular emphasis has been placed on 2.0 (i.e., 
all of stage 2) and on 4.5, with less emphasis on 3.0, and some on 5.1 through 
5.3. Loebbecke [1983] provides examples of audit activities in all six stages of 
the framework to which decision research could contribute. 
The existing research in audit decision making has been concerned with 
two broad, but related, issues—evaluating the quality of audit decision making 
and exploring ways of improving audit decision making. Three standards for 
evaluating audit decisions have been employed. First, decision accuracy has 
been used for situations in which an independent, external criterion of 
"correctness" has been available. Second, statistical rationality has been 
employed by focusing on whether auditors interpret and use audit evidence in a 
logically consistent manner. This is done by comparing audit decisions with 
those prescribed by normative models or statistical principles of decision 
making. Finally, the consistency of decisions—both over time and across 
auditors—has been assessed. 
Some typical examples of results from audit decision research are as 
follows: (1) while auditors often are relatively accurate in repetitive decision 
situations, room for improvement exists because they do not always (a) 
perceive correctly the relevance of information used in decision making or (b) 
use relevant information in a consistent fashion; (2) auditors are often 
insufficiently sensitive to certain types of information (e.g., base rates of 
occurrence of certain events), and often do not fully appreciate the inverse 
relationship between sample size and sampling variability; (3) although individ­
ual auditors have been found to make reasonably consistent decisions over 
time, different auditors using the same evidence often tend to make decisions 
that disagree markedly. While this lack of consensus among auditors may be 
considered problematic per se, it also means that the accuracy and statistical 
rationality of audit decisions are likely to be poor for some auditors [Ashton, 
1985]. 
This summary of typical results suggests that research in audit decision 
making tends to focus on the shortcomings of "unaided" decision making. In 
particular, much of the research has sought to identify systematic errors, 
biases, and inconsistencies in audit decision making. It is important to realize 
that this research focus describes the entire field of decision research, not just 
that in auditing. However, as von Winterfeldt and Edwards [1986, p. 530] point 
out in a broader context, " A research focus on systematic errors and 
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Table 1 
A Comprehensive Outline of the Audit Process 
(From Cushing and Loebbecke [1986, pp. 6-7]) 
1.0 PRE-ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
1.1 Accept/Reject New Client 
1.2 Establish Terms of Engagement 
1.3 Assignment of Staff 
2.0 PLANNING ACTIVITIES 
2.1 Obtain Knowledge of the Business 
2.11 Preliminary Analytical Review 
2.12 Appraisal of Risk 
2.2 Preliminary Estimation of Materiality 
2.3 Review of Internal Accounting Control 
2.31 Preliminary Phase 
2.32 Completion Phase 
2.4 Develop Overall Audit Plan 
2.41 Determine Optimal Reliance on Internal Accounting Control 
2.42 Design Compliance Testing Procedures 
2.43 Design Substantive Procedures 
2.44 Write Audit Program 
3.0 COMPLIANCE TESTING ACTIVITIES 
3.1 Conduct Tests 
3.2 Make Final Evaluation of Internal Accounting Control 
3.21 Make Evaluation 
3.22 Modify Audit Plan 
4.0 SUBSTANTIVE TESTING ACTIVITIES 
4.1 Conduct Substantive Tests of Transactions 
4.2 Conduct Analytical Review Procedures 
4.3 Conduct Tests of Details of Balances 
4.4 Post Balance Sheet Review Procedures 
4.5 Evaluate Results of Substantive Procedures 
4.51 Aggregate Findings 
4.52 Make Evaluation 
4.53 Modify Audit Plan 




5.0 OPINION FORMULATION AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES 
5.1 Review Financial Statements 
5.2 Review Audit Results 
5.3 Formulate Opinion 
5.4 Draft and Issue Report 
6.0 CONTINUOUS ACTIVITIES 
6.1 Supervise Conduct of Examination 
6.2 Review Work of Assistants 
6.3 Consider Appropriateness of Continuing Relationship with Client 
6.4 Make Required Special Communications 
6.41 Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control 
6.42 Material Errors or Irregularities 
6.43 Illegal Acts by Client 
6.5 Consult With Appropriate Persons in Connection With Special Problems 
6.6 Document Work Performed, Findings, and Conclusions in Appropriate 
Working Papers 
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inferential biases can lead those who read the research with an uncritical eye to 
the notion that such errors and biases characterize all human thinking." 
Common sense and informal observation suggest that this is not the case, in 
auditing or in the rest of life. On the other hand, it would be naive to think that 
human decision making is perfect, or that the shortcomings that exist will go 
away if ignored. Fischhoff [1982, p. 442] concluded a review of the "decision 
biases" literature as follows: 
An elusive summary from the present review is that people's reservoir 
of judgmental skills is both half empty and half full. People are skilled 
enough to get through life, unskilled enough to make predictable and 
consequential mistakes; they are clever enough to devise broadly and 
easily applicable heuristics that often serve them in good stead, 
unsophisticated enough not to realize the limits to those heuristics. 
Development 
Along with the emphasis on research that documents and evaluates the 
shortcomings of human decision making is a corresponding emphasis on the 
development of tools, or decision aids, that may help people to compensate for 
those shortcomings. The development of decision aids for improving unas­
sisted decision making is perhaps the most direct practical result of audit 
decision research, as well as of decision research in general. A review of 
decision research in several fields observed: "The existence of biases and 
errors in unaided judgments is part of the motivation for aiding the judgment 
process; the assumption is that aided judgments are less subject to error. The 
aid is based on a prescriptive formulation that decomposes the problem into its 
separate elements and presumably helps the decision maker to overcome the 
limitations of unaided judgments. Thus the development of decision aids 
requires an understanding of the processes involved in performing the task, 
together with a suitable prescriptive theory that can serve as a normative 
formulation for the problem" [Pitz and Sachs, 1984, p. 155]. 
Following Rohrmann [1986, p. 365], we define a decision aid as 
" . . . any explicit procedure for the generation, evaluation and selection 
of alternatives (courses of action) that is designed for practical applica­
tion and multiple use. In other words: a [decision aid] is a technology, 
not a theory." 
Auditing firms have always used decision aids. Examples are audit programs, 
internal control questionnaires, and various types of checklists [Elliott and 
Kielich, 1985]. Such aids are simply tools based on the accumulated experience 
of generations of auditors. In this sense, audit tools are analogous to the tools 
of everyday life, as experience is the earliest basis for tool development. The 
archaeological scholar Childe [1954, p. 9] noted that 
Even the simplest tool made of a broken bough or a chipped stone is the 
fruit of long experience—of trials and errors, impressions noticed, 
remembered, and compared. The skill to make it has been acquired by 
observation, by recollection, and by experiment. It may seem an 
exaggeration, but it is yet true to say that any tool is an embodiment of 
science. For it is a practical application of remembered, compared, and 
collected experiences of the same kind as are systematized and 
summarized in scientific formulas, descriptions, and prescriptions. 
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Such tools are based on organized knowledge, not on the results of 
research in decision making. In contrast, many of today's audit decision aids 
are research-based, and it appears that the trend toward the use of research-
based audit tools will accelerate. Examples of research-based audit decision 
aids are paper-and-pencil worksheets and quasi-statistical formulas for deter­
mining non-statistical sample sizes [AICPA, 1983; Elliott, 1983], multiple 
regression and discriminant models for predicting going-concern problems 
(e.g., Altman and McGough [1974], Kida [1980]), and time series and 
regression models for identifying unusual fluctuations in analytical review 
[Arlington et al. 1983; Kinney, 1983]. Audit decision aids of this type are 
discussed by Ashton [1983] and Libby [1981]. 
The most elaborate (and costly) form of audit decision aid is knowledge-
based expert systems. We rely on Rauch's [1984, p. 55] definition: 
. . . a class of computer programs intended to serve as consultants for 
decision making. These programs use a collection of facts, rules of 
thumb, and other knowledge about a limited field to help make 
inferences in the field. They differ substantially from conventional 
computer programs in that their goals may have no algorithmic solution, 
and they must make inferences based on incomplete or uncertain 
information. They are called expert systems because they address 
problems normally thought to require human specialists for solution, 
and knowledge based because researchers have found that amassing a 
large amount of knowledge, rather than sophisticated reasoning tech­
niques, is responsible for the success of the approach. 
Essentially, a knowledge-based expert system is a computational method of 
performing a decision task which uses an explicit representation of an expert's 
knowledge, generally in the form of a series of "if-then" rules instead of in the 
form of a statistical formula such as multiple regression or discriminant analysis 
[Chignell and Smith, 1985b]. Expert systems have received substantial 
attention from researchers in the field of artificial intelligence (e.g., Bobrow et 
al. [1986], Chignell and Smith [1985a], Davis [1982], Duda and Shortliffe 
[1983], Michie [1980], Stefik et al. [1982]), and the accounting profession is 
currently exploring their potential applications in auditing, taxation, and 
management advisory services [AICPA, 1987]. Abdolmohammadi [1987] and 
Messier and Hansen [1987] provide reviews and discussions of expert systems 
in auditing. 
Evaluating Audit Decision Aids 
Even though decision research may demonstrate errors, biases and 
inconsistencies in audit decision making, it does not necessarily follow that 
decision aids should be developed and used. Lewis et al. [1983] point out that 
the expected benefits of using decision aids must exceed their costs, and that 
the reasons for biases and inconsistencies must be understood before appropri­
ate aids can be identified. Moreover, using decision aids may not be the only 
way to reduce biases and inconsistencies. An alternative is to train auditors to 
improve unassisted decision making. 
Decision Aids vs. Training 
Under what conditions is the development of audit decision aids preferable 
6 
to training? In a more general context, Fischhoff [1982, p. 424] provides some 
insights into the question of aids vs. training by discussing "whether responsi­
bility for biases is laid at the doorstep of the judge, the task, or some mismatch 
between the two." Fischhoff argues that the appropriate "debiasing" strat­
egies depend on the source of the bias, as summarized in Table 2. 
The strategies listed in part 1 of Table 2 address potential methodological 
problems of the research studies which have demonstrated biases. Although of 
considerable importance in the design of future studies, they need not concern 
us here. Assuming that current research results in audit decision making can be 
validly interpreted as indicating biases and inconsistencies, as we believe they 
can, parts 2 and 3 of the table are relevant to the present discussion. 
If the source of the problem is thought to be faulty judges (auditors), 
Fischhoff argues that the appropriate debiasing strategies depend on whether 
the judges are considered "perfectible" or "incorrigible." If they are 
considered "perfectible," then some type of training, ranging from a simple 
Debiasing Strategies According to Underlying Assumption About the Source of 
the Bias (From Fischhoff [1982, p. 424]) 
Table 2 
Assumption 
1. Faulty tasks 
a. Unfair tasks 
Strategies 




Use better response modes 
Ask fewer questions 
Demonstrate alternative goal 
Demonstrate semantic disagreement 
Demonstrate impossibility of task 
Demonstrate overlooked distinction 
2. Faulty judges 
a. Perfectible individuals Warn of problem 
Describe problem 
Provide personalized feedback 
Train extensively 
Replace them 
Recalibrate their responses 
Plan on error 
b. Incorrigible individuals 
3. Mismatch between judges and tasks 
a. Restructuring Make knowledge explicit 
Search for discrepant information 
Decompose problem 
Consider alternative situations 
Offer alternative formulations 
Rely on substantive experts 
Educate from childhood 
b. Education 
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warning that judgment biases may exist to an extended training program aimed 
at controlling particular biases, is suggested. In this case, having auditors 
participate in "decision exercises" such as those discussed by Ashton [1984] 
might be useful. However, if the judges are considered "incorrigible," then 
Fischhoff suggests replacing people with "some superior answering device" 
(p. 426), adjusting their responses if the direction and magnitude of their biases 
are predictable, or somehow allowing for their biases when planning actions 
based on them. Thus, according to Fischhoff, if individual decision makers are 
considered "perfectible," training is suggested, while if they are considered 
"incorrigible," some type of decision aid may be more appropriate. 
On the other hand, if the source of bias and inconsistency is thought to be a 
mismatch between the judge and the task (part 3 of Table 2), then either a 
restructuring of the "person-task system" is needed to increase their 
compatibility, or extensive education is needed for developing general capabili­
ties (as opposed to training for developing specific skills). Restructuring, which 
is closely allied with the use of decision aids, can involve "(a) forcing 
respondents to express what they know explicitly rather than letting it remain 
'in the head'; (b) encouraging respondents to search for discrepant evidence, 
rather than collecting details corroborating a preferred answer; (c) offering 
ways to decompose an overwhelming problem to more tractable and familiar 
components; (d) suggesting that respondents consider the set of possible 
situations that they might have encountered in order to understand better the 
specific situation at hand; and (e) proposing alternative formulations of the 
presented problem. . . . " [Fischhoff, 1982, p. 427]. 
In summary, Fischhoff is essentially arguing that using decision aids is likely 
to be preferable to training when it is possible to restructure the decision task 
to a form more compatible with the decision maker's information-processing 
capabilities, or when the success of training efforts is considered highly 
uncertain. While Fischhoff does not explicitly consider either the costs of 
training or the costs of developing decision aids, the relative costs of these two 
alternatives are obviously important. What do we know about the relative costs 
(or effectiveness) of training and decision aids in auditing? Under what 
conditions, or for which types of decisions, is one likely to be more effective or 
less costly than the other? Which specific form of training, or of decision aid, is 
likely to be most effective for particular types of decisions? While the present 
paper deals with decision aids instead of with training, it is important to realize 
that audit decision aids are but one of a larger class of "decision improvement 
options" [Libby, 1981] that could be pursued. 
Claims About Decision Aids 
Suppose the option of developing decision aids has been chosen over 
training, at least for certain types of audit decisions. What benefits can decision 
makers expect from using these aids? Rohrmann [1986, p. 368] observes that 
"Decision makers above all ask for 'good' decisions that solve their problems, 
but they also want quick and cheap and comprehensible procedures." Devel­
opers and proponents of decision aids claim that such aids offer all of these 
features. As Rohrmann notes, "The developers claim [that decision aids] make 
decisions easier and better because they decompose the decision process into 
comprehensible parts, reveal goals and preferences, guide information search 
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and integration, and are based on a rational concept . . . for the comparison, 
evaluation and selection of alternatives" (p. 363). In a similar vein, Hammond 
et al. [1980] identify six sets of claims that are often made about the value of 
decision research for aiding decision makers. These claims are summarized in 
Table 3. 
Some of the claims identified by Hammond et al. [1980] are (implicitly or 
explicitly) made about decision aids in auditing. The principal claims, at least for 
relatively simple aids involving discriminant and regression models and "struc­
tured" paper-and-pencil aids, relate to the accuracy and consistency of audit 
decisions (e.g., Ashton [1983], Libby [1981]). It is often claimed that (1) when 
correct answers exist, aided audit decisions will, over a series of decisions, be 
more accurate than unaided audit decisions, and (2) whether or not correct 
answers exist, aided audit decisions will be more consistent, i.e., less variable, 
both over time and across auditors, than will unaided audit decisions. 
The claims for expert systems are similar but, like the systems them­
selves, are more elaborate. In addition to aiding audit decision making by 
structuring problems, indicating pertinent information sources, and combining 
information to reach a preliminary recommendation [Wright, 1984], it is also 
claimed that expert systems will (1) enable expertise to be distributed 
throughout the audit firm (e.g., to personnel at multiple locations) and, 
particularly, to be "pushed down" to lower organizational levels, (2) facilitate 
Table 3 
Claims About the Value of Decision Research for Aiding Decision Makers 
(Adapted from Hammond, McClelland and Mumpower [1980, pp. 108-110]) 
1. Clarifies thinking 
2. Educates the decision maker 
a. Makes hidden assumptions and implicit tradeoffs explicit 
b. Forces consideration of the consequences of actions 
c. Identifies what is important for making decisions and where more information 
is needed 
d. Identifies what is not important for making decisions (a by-product of 2c) 
e. Forces explicit recognition of uncertainty 
f. Facilitates understanding of the complete problem 
3. Promotes improved communication 
a. Helps decision maker communicate, defend, and justify decisions and actions 
b. Helps resolve conflicts among decision makers 
c. Facilitates training of new decision makers 
d. Facilitates intellectual, nonemotional discussion of important issues 
4. Promotes a policy perspective 
a. Saves time, money, and unhappiness 
b. Facilitates adaptation to new information or changing values 
c. Facilitates the "passing on" of policy to future decision makers (similar to 3c) 
d. Facilitates dissemination of policy to those affected 
5. Helps distinguish preferences for consequences from beliefs about whether conse-
quences will occur 
6. Creates new solutions, insights, and alternatives 
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staff training by focusing on simulated audit problems and the knowledge 
needed to solve them, (3) ease documentation efforts by printing out a record 
of the process used by the system to make a recommendation, (4) improve the 
consistency of decisions over time and across auditors, and (5) result in less 
time devoted to decision making by eliminating time that is wasted on factors 
irrelevant to the decision (e.g., Elliott and Kielich [1985], Wright [1984]). 
Validation of Decision Aids 
While the importance of validating decision aids has been recognized (e.g., 
Gaschnig et al. [1983], O'Leary [1987], Pitz and Sachs [1984]), it has often 
been noted that few attempts at systematic evaluation have been made, 
particularly by independent evaluators [Fischhoff, 1980; Hammond et al. 1980; 
Rohrmann, 1986]. Instead, evidence about the effectiveness or efficiency of 
aided decision making is largely anecdotal, having been acquired on a trial-and-
error basis in the field. However, aided decision making should be evaluated 
scientifically for the same reasons that unaided decision making should be 
evaluated—to understand the conditions under which it is effective, and to 
provide a sound basis for improving it when needed. An additional reason for 
evaluating aided decision making is that decision aids are not costless. 
How should one evaluate decision aids? Two broad approaches are to 
evaluate the process embodied in the aid or to focus on the outcomes generated 
by it. Process-oriented evaluations, which may be particularly germane for 
expert systems, focus on the mechanism by which outputs are generated from 
inputs, and may include examination of information search, information process­
ing, and the interaction between the aid and the user (e.g., problem clarifica­
tion, explanation capability, and documentation). The major drawback of 
process-oriented evaluations is that evidence about improved decisions is only 
indirect. In contrast, outcome-oriented evaluations focus explicitly on the 
quality of decisions made with benefit of the aid, but only provide information on 
whether an aid is effective or ineffective, not why [Jungermann, 1980; 
Rohrmann, 1986]. 
While we recognize that multiple approaches to decision aid evaluation are 
likely to be necessary, and that different evaluation standards are likely to be 
most appropriate at different points in the development and use of an aid, more 
attention to outcome-oriented evaluations seems desirable. The reason is that 
outcome-oriented evaluations are more direct and meaningful than process-
oriented evaluations in terms of discovering how well the aid "really works." 
With a few exceptions (e.g., bankruptcy or insolvency predictions), it is likely 
to be impossible to evaluate the performance of a decision aid against 
observable, empirical outcomes since unassailable "correct answers" are 
seldom known in auditing. This does not mean, however, that all types of 
outcome-oriented evaluations are impossible. One alternative, which has been 
used occasionally, is to compare aided decisions with those prescribed by 
normative models or statistical principles of decision making. 
Another possibility, which seems to have gone largely unnoticed in 
discussions of decision aids, is to compare decisions aided by one type of 
decision aid with those aided by some other type of decision aid. Such an 
evaluation might be especially informative in the case of expert systems, 
particularly if decisions aided by expert systems are compared with those aided 
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by simpler tools such as multiple regression or discriminant analysis. In many 
situations, of course, it will not be possible to construct regression or 
discriminant models based on relationships among environmental data because 
correct answers are not known. However, "policy-capturing" models, based 
on relationships among observable input variables and a series of actual 
decisions, can still be used. Much research has shown that simple policy-
capturing models consistently outperform unaided human judgment in re­
petitive decision situations (see, e.g., Ashton [1982a], Libby [1981]), and it is 
an open question as to how well policy-capturing models would fare against 
complex expert systems. A conceptual (nonempirical) analysis by Carroll 
[1987] concludes that expert systems are unlikely to achieve the performance 
level of policy-capturing models. (See Hammond [1987; 1988] for related 
discussions.) 
Even if an expert system performs better than a policy-capturing model or 
some other relatively simple decision aid in the same decision task, the 
difference in the costs of the two alternatives must be considered. The high 
cost of expert systems in auditing—related to development, knowledge 
acquisition, maintenance, updating, and preparation of user guides and training 
manuals (see Elliott and Jacobson [1987])—suggests that the cost difference 
between these two alternatives could be substantial. Obviously, if the cost 
difference between any two types of decision aids is sufficiently large, the one 
that performs better on such criteria as accuracy and agreement with experts is 
not necessarily the one that should be used. Of course, a similar statement can 
be made about comparing any type of aided decision making with unaided 
decision making: the increased cost associated with an aid could more than 
offset the benefits in terms of improved decision quality. Conversely, if the aid 
results in net cost savings, for example, by reducing the number of staff 
personnel required, then some decrease in decision quality associated with the 
aid might be acceptable. The point is that both costs and benefits of decision 
aids are important. 
The most common standard against which the outputs of decision aids are 
compared is unaided decision making. The unaided decisions are sometimes 
those of the experts whose knowledge was used in developing the aid, and are 
sometimes those of experts, novices, or other individuals who are independent 
of the development of the aid. While such comparisons are subject to all of the 
problems inherent in using consensus as a decision-evaluation criterion (e.g., 
people's decisions may agree perfectly yet all be wrong [Ashton, 1985]), in 
some situations this approach to "validation" may be the only one available. 
However, a standard that may be preferable to an individual's decision is a 
composite, or average, of the decisions made by several individuals. Research 
has shown repeatedly that composite decisions are more likely to be correct 
than are individuals' decisions (e.g., Ashton and Ashton [1985], Ashton 
[1986]). 
As noted earlier, little evidence is available about the impact of decision aids 
on outcome-oriented decision variables. Most of the research in this area 
involves complex decision support systems in non-auditing settings. Sharda et 
al. [1988] review 24 such evaluations and report an additional study of their 
own. The studies reviewed are grouped into four types, according to research 
method: case studies (4), field studies (6), field tests (3), and laboratory studies 
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(11). Field studies are distinguished from field tests in that the former typically 
involve no experimental control, while in the latter, the evaluator tries to 
manipulate some aspect(s) of the decision aid and control for other factors that 
could influence the study's results. 
Sharda et al. [1988, p. 140] point out that most claims regarding the 
effectiveness of decision support systems are based on case and field studies 
instead of on field tests or laboratory studies, which they maintain "is 
unfortunate as the latter two methods . . . allow for stronger inferences to be 
drawn." Their review of field tests and laboratory studies finds that the 
evidence is inconclusive, as evaluations have uncovered positive effects, no 
effects, and negative effects of decision support systems on various output-
oriented measures of decision quality (e.g., average profit per period, vari­
ability of profit over periods, cost, and decision time). Aldag and Power [1986] 
review several additional studies of computer-assisted decision making with 
similarly inconclusive results. 
Two studies have focused on the use of simple decision aids in auditing. 
Butler [1985] had 18 auditors from five firms of varying sizes make an 
assessment of sampling risk when evaluating the sample results of accounts 
receivable confirmations. Prior to making their risk assessments, 11 of the 
auditors had to answer four questions that were intended to remind them of 
factors relevant to an assessment of sampling risk, while the remaining seven 
auditors were not exposed to these questions. This "attention directing" 
device was considered a decision aid for the purposes of this study. A 
statistically-determined measure of sampling risk, based on a multinomial 
dollar-unit sampling program, constituted a normative criterion against which 
the aided and unaided risk assessments were compared. The results showed 
that the auditors who were exposed to the decision aid made risk assessments 
that were closer to the normative criterion, and also made more correct accept/ 
reject decisions about the account balance, than the auditors who were not 
exposed to the aid. 
While Butler [1985] focused on the evaluation of sample results, Ka-
chelmeier and Messier [1988] studied the choice of sample sizes by auditors. In 
a supplies inventory context, 180 auditors from two Big Eight firms (1) 
provided sample sizes without the availability of a decision aid (the "intuitive" 
group), (2) calculated sample sizes using a formal decision aid (the "aid" 
group), or (3) provided only the input parameters required by the aid (the 
"parameters" group) which the researchers then used to calculate sample 
sizes. The decision aid employed was the formula and tables contained in the 
SAS 39 Guide [AICPA, 1981; 1983]. Since a normative criterion for evaluating 
the auditors' sample sizes was not available, the analysis focused on differences 
in sample sizes for the three groups. 
The results showed that, on average, the "intuitive" group chose smaller 
sample sizes than the "aid" group, which chose smaller sample sizes than the 
"parameters" group. The difference in sample sizes between the latter two 
groups was interpreted as indicating a "working backward" effect; that is, the 
"aid" group's desired sample sizes might have affected their choice of input 
judgments for use in the decision aid. Additional analyses found, contrary to 
expectation, that the "parameters" group showed greater variability (less 
consistency) across auditors in sample sizes than the "aid" group, which 
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showed greater variability than the "intuitive" group. (A study in a non-
auditing context by Peterson and Pitz [1986] found that the availability of a 
decision aid (a multiple regression equation) was associated with greater 
consistency over time, as well as greater accuracy of individuals' decisions.) 
Effects of Audit Decision Aids 
In this section, we discuss several possible effects of using decision aids in 
audit practice. Some of these effects are "positive" in the sense of leading to 
improvements in audit decision making; others are "negative" in the sense of 
representing problems that must be controlled. Some of the effects are 
suggested by research studies; others are more speculative. These potential 
effects of audit decision aids are divided into two main categories: effects on 
individual judgment and effects on the auditing firm. We also discuss the 
potential importance of the initial implementation or introduction of decision 
aids. 
Effects on Judgment 
Increased emphasis on judgment: Instead of decreasing the importance of 
professional judgment in the audit process, as is sometimes feared, the use of 
decision aids might increase the importance of judgment. Note that a major role 
of audit decision aids is to combine several input judgments to reach a decision 
or recommendation, while it is the auditor's responsibility to supply those input 
judgments. For example, Elliott and Jacobson [1987] argue that, although the 
guidance on audit sampling adopted in 1981 added structure to the audit 
process, it also increased the number of judgments required of the auditor 
(pertaining to, e.g., the effect on sample size of control reliance, evidence from 
related tests, audit risk, and tolerable error). One implication of this shift from 
holistic to decomposed judgments may be the need for firms (and researchers) 
to pay more attention to training auditors in the proper formulation of input 
judgments for decision aids. A corollary issue, noted by both Elliott and 
Jacobson [1987] and Ashton [1983], is the possibility that auditors who provide 
such inputs will view their task as "mechanical" and not exercise their 
judgment carefully. Another issue of potential concern is the question of who is 
authorized to override the recommendations made by audit decision aids (and 
under what conditions, and to what extent). 
Structuring judgment inputs: The use of decision aids will likely require an 
increase in the structure of the input information. Prior research in other fields 
suggests that information processing is facilitated when the decision model 
employed and the information presentation structure are congruent (e.g., 
Bettman and Kakkar [1977], Bettman and Zins [1979]). Note that structured 
information differs from a structured decision aid, in that the former refers to 
inputs to decisions while the latter concerns the process by which inputs are 
combined. Structured input information may lead to greater decision consis­
tency, perhaps because structure makes it easier for people to use decision 
aids [de Hoog and van der Wittenboer, 1986], or perhaps because it facilitates 
unassisted information processing even in the absence of decision aids. 
Justifying decision aid outputs: Decision aids not only require auditors to 
execute a logical sequence of procedures and decisions, but also to document 
that they have done so. Documentation is one aspect of the broader area of 
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justifying, and being held accountable for, one's decisions [Staw, 1980; Tetlock, 
1983; 1985]. The potential importance of the justifiability of a decision is often 
noted by decision researchers (e.g., Tversky [1972], Adelbratt and Montgom­
ery [1980], Gibbins [1984]), but the effects of justification have not been 
systematically explored. However, some research suggests that one effect of 
having to justify decisions is an increase in the consistency of those decisions 
(e.g., Cvetkovich [1978], Hagafors and Brehmer [1983]). An important issue 
for research and practice is the extent to which increased consistency is due to 
using the aid as opposed to the accompanying emphasis on justification. A 
related question is the extent to which consistency could be increased by 
emphasizing justification in the absence of a decision aid. These issues may be 
particularly important when one considers that the cost of an increased 
emphasis on justification is likely to be considerably less than the cost of 
developing and maintaining decision aids. 
Increasing vs. decreasing consistency: As noted earlier, increasing the 
consistency of audit decisions—both over time and across auditors—is a major 
rationale for using audit decision aids. It is possible, however, that consistency 
could be decreased by the use of audit decision aids. Consider, for example, the 
sample size equation and tables described in the SAS 39 Guide [AICPA, 1981; 
1983]. Use of this decision aid requires that one judgment (sample size) be 
replaced by three judgments (tolerable error, degree of desired assurance, and 
error expectation). If sufficient variability exists across auditors in specifying 
these three inputs, then the resulting sample sizes computed by the formula 
could be more variable across auditors than the sample sizes determined by 
unaided judgment. Variability in input specification may explain Kachelmeier 
and Messier's [1988] finding of less agreement in aided than in unaided sample 
size decisions, as well as Bamber and Snowball's [1988] finding of no 
relationship between agreement in sample size decisions and the degree of 
structure of firms' audit methodologies. Thus, while decision aids are capable 
of "amplifying expertise" [Davis, 1984], they also are capable of amplifying 
judgment biases and inconsistencies. 
This possibility is discussed in a general setting by Slovic et al. [1977], and 
in an audit setting by Jiambalvo and Waller [1984], Slovic et al. [1977, p. 27] 
warn of "the risk of grinding through highly sophisticated analyses on inputs of 
very little value," and argue that " 'garbage in—garbage out' applies to 
decision aiding—with the particular danger that undue respect may be given to 
garbage produced by high-powered and expensive grinding." Thus, while the 
decomposition, or "divide-and-conquer" strategy on which many decision aids 
rely can lead to greater decision consistency and accuracy (e.g., Armstrong et 
al. [1975], Cornelius and Lyness [1980], Lyness and Cornelius [1982]), results 
such as those of Burns and Pearl [1981] and Chakravarti et al. [1979] suggest 
that "one should approach the 'divide and conquer' ritual with caution; not 
every division leads to a conquest . . . " [Burns and Pearl, 1981, p. 379]. As 
noted earlier, auditors might benefit from training in the proper formulation of 
input judgments. 
Circumventing the aid: Perhaps one of the more troublesome aspects of 
audit decision aids is the extent to which they might allow the user to 
circumvent their intent. For example, the intent of the sample size determina­
tion worksheet described by Elliott [1983], as well as the sample size equation 
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and tables described in the SAS 39 Guide, can be circumvented by "working 
backward." That is, an auditor could first select the sample size he or she 
desires and then provide input values which would yield this sample size. In that 
case, the judgmental inputs provided by the auditor could be determined in part 
by the chosen sample size, not vice versa as intended. As noted earlier, 
Kachelmeier and Messier [1988] found results consistent with this possibility. 
Ensuring the proper use of decision aids provides an interesting challenge for 
auditing firms. 
Effects on the Firm 
Increased structure of audit methodologies: A major way in which the use of 
audit decision aids is likely to impact audit firms is by increasing the degree of 
structure of the audit process [Willingham, 1986]. Cushing and Loebbecke 
[1986, p. 32] define a structured audit methodology as "a systematic approach 
to auditing characterized by a prescribed, logical sequence of procedures, 
decisions, and documentation steps, and by a comprehensive and integrated set 
of audit policies and tools designed to assist the auditor in conducting the 
audit." The similarity between this definition and our earlier definition of 
decision aids should be apparent. 
The potential advantages and disadvantages of structured audit meth­
odologies are topics of debate (e.g., Mullarkey [1984], Sullivan [1984]), and the 
correlates of structure are becoming topics of research. For example, Kinney 
[1986] found an association between the voting patterns of members of the 
Auditing Standards Board and the degree of structure of the members' firms. 
Morris and Nichols [1988] found an association between audit firm structure 
and the predictability of firm-level materiality judgments. Bamber et al. [1987] 
found an association between firm structure and audit seniors' perceptions of 
their firms' organizational characteristics related to role conflict and role 
ambiguity. Bamber and Snowball [1988] found that auditors from structured 
firms were more likely to consult with peers and superiors as the uncertainty of 
their decision tasks increased than those from unstructured firms. Williams and 
Dirsmith [1987] found that in the U.S., clients of more structured audit firms 
announced earnings on a more timely basis than did clients of less structured 
firms. In contrast, Newton and Ashton [1988] found that in Canada, there was a 
positive relationship between audit firm structure and clients' "audit delay," 
i.e., the time from fiscal year-end to the audit report date. Whatever the effects 
of structured audit methodologies, they are likely to be amplified by the 
increased use of audit decision aids. 
Substitution of capital for labor: One implication of increased audit structure 
and increased use of decision aids is a greater investment in capital such as 
hardware and software, with possible impacts on pricing and management 
strategies within auditing firms. A corollary effect is a potential decrease in staff 
time required because of the automation of certain tasks traditionally per­
formed at the staff level. This could translate into decreased Wring for auditing 
jobs (with attendant consequences for accounting educators) and decreased 
turnover [Elliott and Kielich, 1985]. The base of the traditional pyramid in the 
organization of auditing practice could be narrowed. 
Accepting error: There is no doubt that the recommendations of audit 
decision aids will sometimes be in error (or at least will be judged to have been 
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in error in the light of subsequent information). While this is not a compelling 
reason to abandon such aids (people make errors too), auditors and auditing 
firms might have great difficulty accepting the error inherent in imperfect 
decision aids. However, the following example (adapted from Einhorn [1986; 
1988]) illustrates that accepting error can be wise. 
Imagine that you are placed in front of a panel that displays a red light 
and a green light. Your job is to predict which of the two lights will be 
illuminated on each of a series of trials. Each time your prediction is 
correct, you are given a cash payoff; if your prediction is wrong, there is 
no payoff. However, unknown to you, the lights are programmed to go 
on according to a random process with a given proportion of red and 
green, say 60% red and 40% green. 
If you approach this decision task like most people do, you will respond 
to the lights in the same proportion as they occur. For example, in this 
case people predict "red" 60% of the time and "green" 40% after 
they have had some experience with the task. Your expected payoff for 
such a strategy can be calculated as follows. Since you predict red on 
60% of the trials and red occurs on 60%, you will be correct (and 
receive the payoff) on 36% (.60 X .60) of the trials. Similarly for green; 
you predict green on 40% of the trials and green occurs on 40%. 
Hence, 16% (.40 x .40) of the trials will be correctly predicted. 
Therefore, over both red and green predictions, you will be correct on 
36% + 16% = 52% of the trials. 
Now consider how well you could do by using a decision aid that said: 
always predict the most likely color. Note that such a strategy accepts 
error; however, it also leads to 60% correct predictions (you always 
predict red, and red occurs 60% of the time). Since 60% is greater than 
52%, you would make more money if you accepted error and consist­
ently used the decision aid. However, most people try to predict 
perfectly . . . 
This example suggests that the relative amount of error inherent in aided 
versus unaided decision making is the important factor, not the absolute 
amount of error associated with the imperfect decision aid. It is not clear, 
however, that errors made by auditors and by audit decision aids would be 
equally acceptable (to either the auditor or the firm), or would result in the 
same amount of "regret" [Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982] for not 
having made a different decision. The same is true for errors made by different 
types of decision aids; for example, it is conceivable that errors made by expert 
systems would be more acceptable and result in less regret than errors made 
by multiple regression models because the former type of aid may seem more 
"human" than the latter. The choice among complex expert systems, simpler 
models, and unaided human judgment could amount to a choice among living 
with the consequences of different types of error (cf. Carroll [1987, p. 289]). 
Increased competition from non-accountants: One benefit often mentioned 
for expert systems in auditing is the dissemination of expertise throughout the 
firm. The negative side of this benefit is that such dissemination will not 
necessarily remain within the firm's boundaries. As Elliott and Kielich [1985, p. 
134] note, "anyone with the capability to develop or purchase such systems 
will become a potential competitor." Since the consulting and tax areas are not 
subject to as much regulation as auditing, they could be especially prone to this 
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possibility. (Michaelsen and Messier [1987] provide a review of expert systems 
in taxation.) 
Security considerations: Related to such competition is the possibility that 
decision aids, particularly expert systems, could be copied and passed along to 
competitors [O'Brien, 1985]. This could be particularly problematic for expert 
systems that contain confidential information about long-range firm strategies, 
and for expert systems or other types of decision aids developed for sensitive 
areas like fee determination. 
Legal liability: Ellis [1983, p. 4] suggests that expert systems "will be a 
minefield for professional bodies, especially over the question of legal account­
ability.'' If this is correct, then a possibility of some concern to auditors is that 
of being held liable for failure to follow the recommendations of expert systems 
or other aids. Under some circumstances, overriding a decision aid's recom­
mendations might be taken, prima facie, as evidence of "a lack of prudent 
regard for the rights of shareholders, employees, and other publics" [O'Brien, 
1985, p. 296]. 
Implementation of Decision Aids 
To this point, we have concentrated on the evaluation of audit decision aids, 
and on some possible effects of using them in practice. We conclude by drawing 
attention to the potential importance of the manner in which such aids are 
initially introduced or implemented. Although this topic has been virtually 
ignored by decision researchers in auditing, it is likely to be of great practical 
importance. However, some literature exists on the implementation of manage­
ment science models, computer-based information systems, and other types of 
managerial technology, and it may provide useful insights into preferred ways of 
implementing audit decision aids. A sample of this literature is contained in the 
Appendix. 
The literature on implementation has a strong how-to-do-it (or h o w - n o t - t o -
do-it) flavor. As Lichtenstein et al. [1977, p. 317] said in a different context: 
"The most striking aspect of [this literature] is its 'dust-bowl empiricism.' 
Psychological theory is largely absent, either as motivation for the research or 
as explanation of the results." Nevertheless, the references contained in the 
appendix may provide clues about successful implementation for practitioners, 
and they may suggest testable hypotheses about implementation for research­
ers. Implementation research based on some theory or model of the implemen­
tation process, or at least on some systematic body of empirical data, could 
have substantial practical benefit. 
Conclusion 
A basic tenet of professional auditing is that independent auditors should 
maintain an attitude of "professional skepticism" about their clients' financial 
statements. Research in audit decision making suggests that some skepticism 
about professional audit judgment might also be appropriate. The reason is not 
because audit judgment is poor, but because a skeptical attitude may lead to 
ways of making it better. Auditing practitioners prize their judgment and tend to 
emphasize its strong points. Auditing researchers explore the limitations of 
judgment and tend to emphasize its weak points. More importantly, both 
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parties recognize that strong and weak points exist, and that it may be possible 
to capitalize on the strengths while compensating for the weaknesses. To the 
extent that this is effected through decision aids, it becomes important to 
validate decision aids and to understand the effects of using them in practice. 
While we believe that the shift from experience-based to research-based 
auditing and the related emphasis on decision aids will continue, it must be 
remembered that the purpose of such aids is to augment rather than replace 
human judgment. Moreover, since many audit decision aids are built upon 
human judgment and require judgmental inputs for their operation, research 
that improves our understanding of auditors' knowledge, expertise, and 
decision making skills will be even more important in the future than it is today. 
At the very least, cost-effective resource allocation will require an understand­
ing of which decisions need aiding and which do not [Ashton et al. 1989]. As 
Fischhoff [1982, p. 444] said in a more general context, "Good practice will 
require better theory about how the mind works. Good theory will require 
better practice, clarifying and grappling with the conditions in which the mind 
actually works." In audit decision making, we believe that both better theory 
and better practice can be achieved by efforts at all points along the research/ 
development continuum and, especially, by sharing the results of those efforts 
among researcher and practitioner members of the auditing community. 
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Appendix 
A sample of "implementation studies" is included in this Appendix. Most of 
these studies involve computer-based information and decision support sys­
tems, or operations research/management science models. Similarities may 
exist between the problems encountered in introducing or implementing 
information systems or management science models and those likely to be 
encountered in implementing audit decision aids. Almost all of the articles listed 
here have an extremely "practical" orientation, focusing on factors claimed to 
affect the successful or unsuccessful introduction of an information system or a 
management science model. The articles describe surveys of developers and 
users of systems or models, as well as personal experiences of the authors 
with successful and unsuccessful implementation efforts. Eighteen articles are 
briefly annotated, and the references for another 26 are provided without 
comment. We regard the annotated articles as potentially more promising for 
auditing practitioners and researchers; the others tend to be less comprehen­
sive or somewhat redundant with those that are annotated. 
1. Adelman [1982]: Presents the author's view that unsuccessful imple­
mentation of decision aids is caused largely by lack of user involvement in the 
development process; offers the argument that user involvement enhances 
understanding of, and commitment to, the aid and enables the aid to be tailored 
to the user's needs. 
2. Elam and Konsynski [1987]: Argues that decision support systems are 
not being used as interactive problem solving vehicles as originally envisioned; 
offers advice on how this situation might be rectified. 
3. Fuerst and Cheney [1982]: Reviews a large amount of research 
literature on the implementation and use of computerized decision support 
systems. Factors found to affect the use of such systems are discussed under 
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three headings: characteristics of the decision maker, characteristics of the 
implementation process, and characteristics of the decision support system. 
4. Ginzberg [1978]: Discusses types of implementation research that have 
been conducted and concludes that the only firmly-established research result 
is the importance of management support and user involvement; offers advice 
about successful implementation, including the importance of recognizing that 
several users may be involved and that they are likely to have different goals 
and expectations about the model or system being implemented. 
5. Ginzberg [1981]: Analyzes the role of users' unrealistic expectations as a 
factor in the failure of management information systems and decision models; 
has some suggestions about bringing expectations in line with the capabilities of 
the system/model, and vice versa. 
6. Green, Newsom and Jones [1977]: The principal findings relate to 
potential barriers to the use of quantitative techniques. While a lack of 
knowledge of such techniques by management is the most important barrier, 
lack of useful training, difficulty of quantifying data, and cost are also important 
barriers. 
7. Gupta [1977]: Offers advice based on the author's personal experience; 
advises not threatening the user's authority, among other things. 
8. Huber [1983]: Reviews research on the relationship between the use of 
decision support systems and the "cognitive styles" of users; concludes that 
cognitive style is not related to the use of decision support systems; suggests, 
among other things, that it is better to train users in the appropriate use of such 
a system than to try to design the system to fit particular cognitive styles. 
9. Ives and Olson [1984]: Reviews research on the effects of user 
involvement in the development of computer-based information systems; 
concludes that because of poor grounding in theory and methodological 
problems, a positive relationship between user involvement and system 
success has not been convincingly demonstrated. 
10. Leonard-Barton and Kraus [1985]: Discusses obstacles that must be 
overcome in the implementation of new technology; suggests strategies for 
successful implementation, with particular attention to the composition of the 
implementation team. 
11. Little [1970]: Provides an excellent discussion, distilled from the 
author's own experience, of why managers often do not use models that have 
been developed for them; also discusses six characteristics that a model should 
possess in order to be useful (and used). Several worthwhile points are made. 
12. McArthur [1980]: Based on personal experience, the author discusses 
three reasons for the gap between development and use of management 
science models: (1) technical elegance vs. "people factors"; (2) reluctance of 
decision makers to admit they sometimes need help with decisions; (3) 
confidentiality of certain types of important decisions. 
13. Mohan and Bean [1979]: Four case studies of implementation efforts 
are described, and several implications for successful implementation are 
derived. These implications fall into three broad categories, with a number of 
useful points made within each: (1) preconditions for successful introduction, 
(2) introductory period requirements, and (3) on-going period requirements. 
14. Robey and Zeller [1978]: Analyzes the successful adoption and use of an 
information system in one department of a company, and the rejection and 
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failure of the same system in a similar department of the same company; makes 
a number of points about the organizational and human factors that were 
important in the success (and in the failure). 
15. Urban [1974]: Based on the research literature and the author's 
experiences with actual companies, an eight-point plan for building useful 
models is presented. Several relevant points are made. 
16. Watson and Marett [1979]: A survey of management scientists, 
disclosing ten major reasons for implementation problems; lack of understand­
ing by users is most important, but other reasons are also discussed. 
17. Wolek [1975]: Views the adoption of models and other quantitative 
technology in terms of the theory of adoption/diffusion of innovations, on which 
there is a substantial literature; a useful perspective on the factors that are 
important in successful adoptions. 
18. Zand and Sorensen [1975]: Applies a general theory of social change, 
proposed in 1947 by psychologist Kurt Lewin, to the problem of implementing 
management science methods/models; oriented toward an "academic" re­
search audience; contains a useful overall perspective on change, as well as 
several specific ideas. 
Other references that may be helpful are Alavi and Henderson [1981], Alter 
[1977], Anderson and Narasimhan [1979], Annino and Russell [1981], Argote 
et al. [1983], Ashton and Ashton [1988], Bell [1985], Cain [1979], Carter 
[1984], Emshoff [1978], Evan and Black [1967], Glen and James [1980], 
Grayson [1973], Hammond [1974], Hayes and Nolan [1974], Lawless [1987], 
Lucas [1981], McInnes and Carleton [1982], Meredith [1981], Richels [1981], 
Schultz and Slevin [1975], Schultz et al. [1987], Sheil [1987], Vazsonyi [1978], 
Wagner [1981], and Zmud [1979]. 
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Discussant's Response to "Using and Evaluating 
Audit Decision Aids" 
Stephen J. Aldersley 
Clarkson Gordon 
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on a paper dealing with 
a subject which has occupied a considerable portion of my time during the past 
few years—Audit Decision Aids. It should, therefore, not come as too much of 
a surprise that I agree with much of what is in the Ashton-Willingham paper. 
Throughout the paper I found myself nodding in agreement with the points 
being made. However, there are still a number of areas where I think the 
authors' efforts at organizing and categorizing the issues have led to unwar­
ranted oversimplification. I will direct my commentary to these areas. I intend 
to follow the basic outline of the Ashton-Willingham paper and will conclude my 
comments with some observations on what I perceive to be a couple of 
particularly difficult audit areas that just might lead to important decision aids. 
The theme of this paper can probably be stated along the following lines: 
Decision aids have a role, . . . but they need a cost benefit justification. The 
theme for my comments is related to the definition of decision aids adopted in 
this paper, i.e., "any explicit procedure for the generation, evaluation and 
selection of alternatives (courses of action) that is designed for practical 
application and multiple use.'' When you read the rest of the paper you wonder 
whether the authors have used a complete decision aid definition. They appear 
to have set up several straw men that are subsequently criticized and 
discredited. Would it not be appropriate to include some evaluative criteria in 
the definition of the decision aid? My contention is that if you don't, you may 
have a decision anti-aid instead. The courses of action should be "towards 
some well-defined objective" in a more complete definition of a decision aid. 
Development Issues 
One oversimplication in the paper is the distinction made between 
research-based as opposed to experience-based development approaches. The 
paper implies a dichotomy whereas, in practice, things are not nearly as simple. 
Although a decision aid may use a research base during development, it will not 
evolve into a tool solely from that perspective. The reason decision aids are 
often even considered is usually experience-based. Although one might argue 
that this is empirical research, the empiricism tends to be anecdotal rather than 
based on any research design. There are many examples from the past 20 or 
30 years. For instance, analytical auditing and the related flow-charting 
technique grew out of our audit practice needs for concise system descriptions. 
Statistical sampling was implemented because of actual deficiencies encoun­
tered in the use of non-statistical techniques. Regression-based analytical 
review was introduced because of dissatisfaction with the quality of judgmental 
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results and we implemented assertion-based auditing to clarify the link 
between internal control work and the primary audit objectives. In all of these 
cases the initial need for the technique arose out of common problems 
encountered in practical application of audit techniques. I imagine other firms 
have had similar experiences. 
However, it would be an oversimplification on my part if I were to 
completely discount the importance of a research base behind any one of these 
audit techniques. The development of any decision aid is not a static process. It 
is highly iterative. Initial stages of the decision aid may be built on prototypes, 
whether or not the decision aid is computer based. Field testing will play an 
important role in the initial stages, but practical application is the principal 
source of many refinements and the future evolution of the decision aid. 
None of this should come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the practical 
application of decision aids, particularly in the context of an audit practice. 
Decision Aids and Training 
Decision aids are presented almost as an exclusive alternative to training. 
But the reality in an audit practice situation is that decision aids are often a part 
of training. 
The entire discussion ignores the nature of the auditing business. Our new 
staff are well educated, intelligent and motivated, but they have no practical 
experience. Despite university courses, their practical knowledge of the audit 
process is limited. In many cases, at least in the Canadian environment, they do 
not even have an accounting or auditing education. All of this is exacerbated by 
the need for our staff to develop it extremely rapidly. We fully expect our staff 
to act as senior on most, if not all, of our small audits at the start of their second 
year. They quickly become seniors on very large audits and then managers in 
charge of a staff together with a reasonable portfolio of clients. In this 
environment, decision aids are not as important as training aids particularly in 
view of the fact that a significant amount of learning occurs on the job. This is an 
important aspect of the auditing business because training is one of the largest 
costs in a public accounting practice. The overlap between decision aids and 
training aids is, therefore, considerable. 
Claims about Decision Aids 
Ashton-Willingham list a number of claims made about decision aids (e.g., 
accuracy improvement and consistency, communication, distribution of exper­
tise, staff training, ease of documentation effort, and time savings) in the 
context of their evaluation. From the practice point of view, many of these 
claims are assessed on a specific basis. In some cases, e.g., statistical sampling 
and regression analysis, the accuracy can be established through analytical 
means whereas empirical methods are necessary in other areas. For example, 
one of the major benefits of decision aids is the common language they 
introduce for technical matters so that professional staff who encounter 
problems are able to communicate the problem and then understand the 
response. The evidence for this is the high degree of consultation between staff 
members on technical matters; something which we observe in our internal 
quality control reviews. 
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A primary objective of decision aids is often time savings and this can be 
evaluated very directly using year-to-year comparisons with, and without, use 
of particular techniques. Although in some cases the learning curve confounds 
the results, it is still possible to get a reasonable estimate of time savings from 
this approach. Thus, although many decision aid benefits are not measured 
with a design-based approach, there are often semi-formal measures taken to 
determine whether or not a particular decision aid has achieved its objective. 
Effects on Judgment 
The observation that a decision aid increases rather than decreases the 
emphasis on judgment is entirely consistent with our experience. So often we 
find that our staff recognize that they have a problem simply because we have 
structured the issue for them. This permits a much more rational, consensus-
based approach to resolving difficult situations. It also raises the issue of 
structuring the judgment inputs to a decision aid. As I mentioned at the outset, 
a complete decision aid should be capable of achieving a well-defined objective, 
and therefore some structuring of the judgmental inputs to the decision aid will 
often be necessary before one can consider the decision aid complete in any 
practical sense. 
The illustration dealing with increasing versus decreasing consistency is not 
entirely pertinent to the critical issue here. The possibility that sample extents 
(sizes) vary more when a decision aid is employed may result from an 
incomplete or improperly defined decision aid. Although within the context of 
the particular task, consistency is desirable, there will be cases when the 
consistency requirement is with respect to a more general objective. For 
example, if one restricts consideration to the sample extent issue, using a 
sample size of 60 all the time is certainly consistent but, from the more 
important audit objective, it may be like a broken watch—correct only twice a 
day. If the consistency is not with respect to the correct objective, then the 
benefits of the decision aid may be foregone. 
I can illustrate the consistency issue somewhat further by drawing on one of 
the decision aids used in our audit practice, our "source of assurance plan," 
which we use to document our risk analysis for a particular financial statement 
assertion. Using four categories for the major sources of assurance, our 
auditors would begin with an assessment of inherent assurance and follow with 
an assessment of internal control assurance. Figure 1 presents three quite 
different approaches to the source of assurance analysis which result in quite 
different audit strategies. In Case 1, there is no reliance placed on internal 
control and very limited reliance placed on analytical review since the majority 
of the audit assurance is obtained through substantive tests of details. This can 
be contrasted with Case 2 in which a regression-based analytical review is 
performed but is also supplemented by a preliminary review and evaluation of 
specific assertion-related internal controls. The 3rd case represents an 
approach that would involve a dual purpose test on specific internal controls 
together with re-performance of the control procedures. 
The important thing in all three cases is that the total assurance is the same. 
Because each of the factor limitations are set on a firm-wide basis, we have a 
very high degree of consistency with the applied audit effort in terms of the 
overall assurance objective. 
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STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES FOR AN ASSERTION 
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Figure 1 
While presumably the staff will choose the approach which is the least 
costly in their particular circumstance, other factors may enter into their 
decision. For example, some of our auditors simply aren't comfortable with 
relying on internal controls and will prefer to take a substantive audit approach. 
Others are not comfortable with regression analysis techniques and will prefer 
either the substantive testing or the internal control approach. It is important 
to recognize that, in any situation, the assessment of the cost involved is not a 
simple procedure and can vary quite significantly from one situation to the next, 
even though they may appear similar. 
Some idea of the degree of variability in the situation can be seen in the box 
plot in Figure 2 which shows the distribution of assurance factors for various 
source of assurance analyses from a number of representative sampling 
situations. An important objective of the source of assurance decision aid is to 
control any undesirable variability, i.e.,we attempt to make sure that the audit 
effort is of a relatively consistent level across our audit practice. However, 
within that constraint, we permit a considerable amount of variability in order to 
accommodate specific needs of the situation (you could argue that this is just 
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The above box plots show the distribution of assurance factors for the source of assurance 
analysis on 485 representative samples from 60 randomly selected audit engagements. 
Figure 2 
Effects on the Firm 
One of the realities of modern day auditing is the increased structure of 
audit methodologies. This is clearly a necessary response to the increased 
complexity of the business environment that we face. Not only are our clients 
becoming more complex, but our own auditing standards are becoming more 
and more prescriptive as they gradually evolve into a form of decision aid. For 
example, SAS 47 makes explicit requirements for planning audits and evaluat­
ing their results and the new "expectation gap" SASs contain some very 
explicit recommendations with respect to audit approach. This trend is unlikely 
to abate in the foreseeable future. 
Automation is often viewed as a potential substitute for labor, even in the 
auditing profession. An important prerequisite for effective audit automation is 
the increased structure of audit methodologies. There is a direct relationship 
between the degree of structure in an audit approach and its amenability to 
automation. Without structure, you will probably develop an expensive printing 
press if you automate an audit task. 
Although it is an important factor, one must recognize that automation of an 
existing manually performed process requires a significant time saving in order 
to offset the automation cost. True substitution is often possible only by 
developing a new process. There are significant limits here in the audit 
profession. The auditor acts as an interface between the client's business 
environment and his audit objectives. The primary practice skill is adaptability 
due to the wide range of clients and the constantly changing business 






















factors introduce limitations on the extent to which the substitution of capital 
for labor can be effective in an audit practice situation. 
Decision Aids and the Art of Auditing 
Decision aids have been used by auditors for decades, ever since the first 
auditing textbooks were published. While these early decision aids were often 
limited to a listing of audit steps, they were the forerunners of the computer­
ized decision support/expert systems in use today. I predict that we will see 
more use of decision aids in the future. Our environment will only become more 
complex, yet the basic raw material of our business, the people we hire and 
train, are not going to be inherently more intelligent than in the past. However, 
because of their environment they are probably going to be better able to make 
the best use of the decision aids we provide them. Ashton-Willingham have 
provided a timely overview of the important issue of audit decision aid 
evaluation and I think they will most surely have achieved their objective of 
"stimulating discussion among auditing practitioners and researchers." 
I would like to leave you now with two of my favorite "chestnut'' problems, 
concerning the "art" of auditing. Perhaps they may someday be amenable to a 
decision aid approach. 
One of the most interesting morsels of audit folklore is that legendary 
technique demonstrated by the experienced auditor who walks into a client, 
looks around, and decides that the inventory is wrong based on what he has 
seen. The "smell test" is a mysterious and unexplainable procedure applied by 
the auditing profession. When it works, we all admire the auditor who 
performed the feat, but when it fails, no one seems to notice. How does the 
smell test work? How does an experienced auditor determine that a particular 
transaction is sufficiently unusual to warrant further investigation? We have a 
lot of audit staff who would like to be able to duplicate this feat. 
A possibly more difficult problem is the issue of auditing accounting 
estimates. The real problem here is what constitutes a best estimate? The 
mean? The median? The mode? Even if we were all well calibrated Bayesians 
we would often still be in trouble if the range of acceptable values was ten times 
materiality. Part of the solution may be to increase disclosure when the range of 
acceptable values is unacceptably large. But one of the interesting paradoxes of 
auditing is that when the range of acceptable values is several times materiality, 
the chance of the estimate disagreeing materially with the eventual outcome 
turns out to be extremely high but the chance of an accounting error is actually 
considerably less. The paradox lies in the fact that all auditors believe and say 
the opposite. Can we solve this problem with a decision aid? 
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Audit Theory Paradigms 
Jack C. Robertson* 
C. T. Zlatkovich Centennial Professor 
University of Texas at Austin 
"Quoth the Professor: 'Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will 
never work in theory' " (Warren E. Buffett, 1985) 
The goal of this paper is to present several candidates for the theory of 
auditing. Herein, there is no pretension to formulate a "new" audit theory, nor 
is there any effort to elevate one expression of theory over another. However, 
toward the end of this paper, a distinction is made between "macrotheory" (a 
global or all-encompassing perspective) and "microtheory" (models for dealing 
with specific decisions) along with an assertion that the two, taken together, 
can be very useful for research and practice. 
The first sections of the paper are an excursion through literature that 
promises some attention to "a theory of auditing.'' A search for such literature 
produces only a few pieces that have such pretensions. The broad conclusion 
from this review is that all the existing expressions of audit theory fall short. 
As the title suggests, this paper deals with "paradigms" that give rise to 
audit theories. A paradigm is taken in the same context as it was in the 
Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance [Committee on Con­
cepts and Standards for External Financial Reports, 1977] as introduced by 
Kuhn [1970] and defined in the plural as "conceptual and instrumental 
frameworks that provide modes from which spring particular coherent tradi­
tions of scientific research.'' In this context, a paradigm is a "world view'' that 
enables researchers, theorists, and practitioners to discern audit phenomena in 
terms of input—specification of the problems of interest, setting—the empirical 
domain over which the audit work/research is applied, and process—the kinds of 
tests and standards used to adjudicate contradictory propositions. A paradigm, 
when shared by all concerned, may lead to a single prevailing theory—a broad 
view and focus for research and practice. This context of "paradigm" is much 
broader than that used by some researchers when they refer to a particular 
model or algorithm used in research data analysis. 
Nevertheless, the exposition on paradigms herein suffers from the limita­
tion of this author's and others' perceptions of the world of audits. Specifically, 
perceptions of audit theory paradigms are influenced by existing literature and 
* I gratefully acknowledge the contributions and insights provided in the reviews and comments by 
my colleagues Kermit Larson, Urton Anderson, William Kinney, Michael Granof, and Chitoshi 
Koga. 
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thought that begin with a focus on financial statement audits. This biases our 
"world view" in the direction of quantifiable assertions instead of more 
subjective subject matter and toward the audit report output instead of the 
audit process. Anderson [1983] put these biases in focus when he explained the 
context of internal audit department peer review in terms of being similar to, 
but more than, an audit. Many theorists infer that a general definition of 
auditing (e.g., ASOBAC, 1972) can be stretched to encompass all manner of 
assertions, but Anderson maintains that differences in purpose and subject 
matter distinguish peer reviews from other activities that are considered 
"auditing." Indeed, Anderson characterizes most audit theory as being based 
on "the financial audit paradigm." 
Theory and Theory Acceptance 
An accumulation of literature, thought, and practice has not yet led to the 
acceptance of a unique audit paradigm. The search continues for a compelling 
basis for (a) specifying the activities that collectively constitute "auditing," and 
(b) resolving controversies about audit activities. Auditors are not alone in this 
regard. Our brethren in financial accounting have already reached this conclu­
sion about the content of external financial reports [Committee on Concepts 
and Standards for External Financial Reports, 1977]. In both cases, one is 
tempted to conclude that even the possibility of an acceptable normative theory 
is denied. Perhaps the possibility of an acceptable positive theory is likewise 
denied. 
Even if a generally accepted audit theory were proclaimed by a duly 
constituted committee, the search for a "better theory" no doubt would 
continue. No matter what issues someone apparently resolves, someone else 
will raise a case or counter-example to show that the resolution does not work. 
Such is the fate of modern social science. Consider a "theory of materiality'' as 
an example—one that applies equally to both accounting and auditing. People 
have struggled with it for a long time, finally pronouncing this truism [FASB, 
1980, paragraph 132; Leslie, 1985, paragraphs 2-9]: "The omission or 
misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of 
surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable 
that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have 
been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.'' This 
statement does not appear to be a sufficient product for a theory of materiality. 
Yet, some would argue: "That's as good as it gets. Practitioners and 
researchers/theorists just need to grapple with materiality in each and every 
case, depending on the facts and circumstances." 
Turning to auditing, the search for a generally accepted audit theory 
appears to be equally difficult and unsatisfying. Nevertheless, the benefits to 
practice and research may be in the journey, not at the final destination. 
Role of Theory 
An audit theory paradigm—a perceptive "world view"—should first enable 
people to recognize "audit phenomena." Audit theory should then facilitate 
description, explanation, and prediction of these phenomena in research and 
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professional practice. Such a theory might possess elements both of positive 
theory and of normative theory. 
However, an anonymous commentator (not an auditor) raised this issue: 
The meaning of "audit phenomena" is not clear to me, therefore I do not 
understand what is meant by "audit theory." In light of this kind of comment, 
one must try to capture at least the rudiments of a paradigm in a concept or 
definition that differentiates audit phenomena from other phenomena. The most 
general definition appears to be this: "Auditing is a human evaluation process 
to establish the adherence to certain norms, resulting in an opinion or 
judgment" [Schandl, 1978]. The central features of this definition are (a) 
human judgment process, and (b) norms. With this beginning, "auditing 
phenomena" can at least be distinguished from such things as physics, 
pharmacy, and singing (although not from the truly "auditory" process of 
judging singing performances). It is no surprise that the Committee on Basic 
Auditing Concepts [1972] sought to express a definition that would narrow the 
field of "audit phenomena," producing a definition that relied heavily on 
"assertions about economic actions and events" and "communication of the 
results of evidence evaluation to interested users," thus adding to the central 
features (c) emphasis on economic data, and (d) communication. 
Even though these definitions may be widely accepted, in whole or in part, 
they are clearly not sufficient to lead everyone to a common paradigm or a 
generally accepted theory of auditing. While many people have little trouble 
recognizing most "audit phenomena," people still look to different empirical 
domains for evidence, and they frequently apply differing tests, standards, and 
research methods. Something is missing. Too many auditors lament the lack of 
theory to go unacknowledged. (See the Appendix for a sample of theory 
complaints.) However, most of these complaints can be traced not to differing 
paradigm starting places—the audit phenomena—but to desires for theory 
closure within an audit paradigm. 
Theory Closure 
Whenever people agree on a theory, the agreement is always achieved 
within the social context of the time, accommodating the then-current 
perceptions of cost and benefit, technology, and socio-political factors. Times 
change and so does knowledge of the field. The history of science is replete 
with discarded theories, most of which deserved to be discredited and tossed 
by the wayside. When they were overthrown, new directions took their place. 
So it is with audit theory. Conformity with a single world view that presents 
a complete identification of all possible audit phenomena, a complete enumera­
tion of empirical domains, and a complete inventory of research tests and 
standards has not been accomplished. In fact, it may not be desirable. 
Pretending to achieve such closure would invite intellectual and practical 
stagnation. While complaints about audit theory (Appendix) may be astute or 
ignorant, objective or self-serving, on point or off target, or some other 
characterization depending on one's own paradigm, they are all nonetheless 
expressions of "demand" for audit theory to provide the comfort of a rational 
basis for research and practice activity. 
Theories die a long, slow, and painful death. Their decline is asymptotic— 
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seldom reaching complete extinction. For example, part of the audit theory 
extant eighty or more years ago described audits in terms of their fraud-
detection purpose and activity. This fraud detection view of the world was later 
suppressed in the auditing literature for several decades, and now it seems to 
be rising to prominence again. As theory elements fall into decline, they are 
accompanied by the people who accepted a particular paradigm. Even so, the 
people and their theories can never be completely discarded. As quoted from 
Kuhn by the Committee on Concepts and Standards for External Financial 
Reports [1977]: 
Still more men, convinced of the new view's fruitfulness, will adopt 
the new mode of practicing normal science, until at last only a few 
elderly holdouts remain. And even they, we cannot say, are wrong 
[Kuhn, 1970, p. 159]. 
While a diversity of theories is welcome for the development of the field, 
proponents should not denigrate prior theoretical efforts. The "elderly 
holdouts" have no doubt contributed a platform for the new theorists (next 
elderly holdouts), and their contribution should be honored. After all, they may 
turn out to have been "right" in the first place. Perhaps the "elderly 
holdouts" for a fraud detection tint to the audit world view will yet turn out to 
be "right." 
Paradigm Candidates 
Very few titles make pretensions to a general theory of auditing, so the 
search for paradigm candidates included a perusal of research, symposium 
presentations, and other sources. In numerous cases, authors presented some 
aspects of audit theory without attempting to knit an analysis into a whole fabric 
of auditing. An example is Toba's " A General Theory of Evidence as the 
Conceptual Foundation in Auditing Theory" [1975]. His theory of evidence, as 
presented, is not comprehensive enough to qualify as a paradigm candidate. 
Others are more amenable to conceptual expansion, as will be shown later. 
Another noticeable aspect of theory presentations is the authors' tendency 
to comment upon a very narrow band of audit interests without trying to 
comprehend the breadth of audit issues and problems. In contrast to writings 
about general theory (herein dubbed "macrotheory" signifying a comprehen­
sive treatment of auditing), these authors dealt with "microtheory"—a 
concern with a model or theory of some particular decision problem set in an 
audit context. Examples abound in research reviews such as Felix and Kinney 
[1982] and Scott [1984]. 
The paradigm candidates which follow are the ones perceived to be 
amenable to some degree of generalization to a "theory of auditing." A theory 
ought to be broad enough to encompass a wide range of audit phenomena from 
auditor characteristics like competence and independence, to field work tasks 
of evidence-gathering and decision-making, thence to communication. The 
challenge is to determine to what extent the paradigm candidates differ, if at all, 
in the central characteristics of a paradigm—specification of problems of 
interest, empirical data domains, and research method tests and standards. 
The beginning point is the classic Mautz and Sharaf Philosophy of Auditing 
[1961]. 
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The Inductive Theory of Audit Professionalism 
The theoretical core of the Philosophy of Auditing is the organization of 
concepts and postulates. Mautz and Sharaf presented inductions about auditor 
qualities, field work, and dependence on accounting principles. In abridged 
form, their theory structure, which is embedded in their postulate statements, 
is: 
Auditor Qualities 
Concepts: Ethical conduct 
Independence 
Due audit care 
Postulates: There is no necessary conflict of interest with management. 
The auditor acts exclusively in the capacity of auditor. 
Professional status imposes professional obligations. 
Technical Aspects of Audit Work 
Concepts: Due audit care 
Evidence 
Postulates: Financial statements are verifiable. 
Financial statements are free from collusive and other un­
usual irregularities. 
Internal control eliminates the probability of irregularities. 





Consistent application of GAAP results in fair presentation. 
Their theory was inductive—based on their observations of audit practice. 
For all practical purposes, part of this observation involved cognizance of the 
official auditing standards. Indeed, even though the ten audit standards already 
existed, they can be shown to "flow from" the concepts and postulates. They 
can even be perceived as the precepts Mautz and Sharaf said they did not have 
time to pursue [1961, p. 246]. The Mautz and Sharaf theory formulation is a 
product of practice leading theory—which is not a condemnation, because 
theory must get a start somewhere. 
Every theory is forever subject to examination and reformulation, and the 
Mautz and Sharaf theory is no exception. It was produced during a period of 
relative calm in the practicing profession before many other political, social, and 
economic events wrought change in the practice of auditing in the United 
States. In the light of such events, even a friend of the theory could not 
reproduce as explanations to students two of the basic assumptions (postu­
lates), namely: "There is no necessary conflict of interest between the auditor 
and the management of the enterprise under audit," and "The financial 
statements and other information submitted for verification are free from 
collusive and other unusual irregularities." A textbook chapter on auditing 
theory and standards changed the former postulate to: " A potential conflict of 
interest always exists between the auditor and the management of the 
enterprise . . . , " and the latter postulate was omitted entirely [Robertson, 
1979]. These alterations were also inductions. 
The important issue is not so much the endurance of the Mautz and Sharaf 
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formulation but whether it constitutes a paradigm supporting a useful theory of 
auditing, enabling people to generate research hypotheses and describe, 
explain, and predict audit phenomena. It has indeed been useful as a theory 
structure, but it has also failed in some respects. 
Numerous identifications of problems of interest have sprung from the 
Mautz and Sharaf theory. Many, but certainly not all, research projects can be 
traced to its roots regardless of whether the researchers acknowledged them 
[Robertson, 1984]. One should not be surprised about the facility of the theory 
to point to problems of auditing. After all, it was derived by induction from audit 
practice. Nevertheless, it was induced from observations of external audit 
practice and independent audits of financial statements—producing the bias 
toward the "financial audit paradigm." The Mautz and Sharaf theory is much 
more strained to produce identifications of problems in governmental and 
internal auditing. One can see clearly the differences and similarities in the 
management audit and performance audit definitions and objectives presented 
by Herbert [1979]. 
A great deal can be inferred from the Mautz and Sharaf theory about the 
empirical domain over which audit work and research can be applied. Various 
postulates touch the areas of auditor characteristics (e.g., independence, 
professionalism), field work (e.g., evidence-gathering, prediction), and report­
ing relative to generally accepted accounting principles. One area not empha­
sized is the economic and social forces that create demand and supply of audits. 
Mautz and Sharaf took the demand for, and the existence of, auditors largely 
for granted. 
Very little can be seen in the theory about research models and methods or 
about tests and standards, although a good deal is said about practitioners' 
work. Mautz and Sharaf apparently did not write the Philosophy with a primary 
purpose of directing academic and practical research methods. Thus, as a 
broad paradigm, Mautz and Sharaf's formulation is not complete. As shall be 
seen later, other theory statements have more to say about models and 
methods, taking the identification of audit phenomena for granted. 
Process Theory of Audits 
Schandl attempted to integrate into one system the findings of semantic 
philosophy, communication theory, and the psychology of thinking and to apply 
them to the judgment (opinion formulation) process in auditing [1978, p. ix]. 
Although published in 1978, Schandl's papers were available to members of the 
AAA Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts before its report (ASOBAC—A 
Statement on Basic Auditing Concepts) was issued in 1972. The two streams of 
thought have some points in common. They both presented broad definitions of 
auditing, purporting to encompass a wide variety of judgment activities. As 
mentioned earlier, the ASOBAC definition narrowed the field that Schandl 
opened wide. They both paid considerable attention to the investigative 
process. They brought into clear focus the importance of assertions as the 
begirining problem-recognition facet of audit decision-making. 
Schandl also proposed a system of postulates—propositions which he took 
as self-evident. Briefly, his postulates were: 
Purpose: Each audit has a purpose. 
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Judgment (opinion): Audit problems lead to decision conclusions. 
Evidence: Evidence is required in the decision-making process. 
Norms (criteria): Norms are required in the decision-making process. 
Communication: Communication exists and is meaningful. 
The difficulty with Schandl's theory is its level of generality. The postulates 
briefly stated above are not unique to auditing in terms of the independent, 
internal, governmental, operational, and other forms of auditing commonly 
practiced. Collectively, Schandl's postulates constitute the scientific method of 
inquiry developed in philosophy long ago. Significantly, Schandl truncated his 
presentation of postulates, saying: "Their number could be multiplied, as we 
could go deeper and deeper into the analysis of human mind and intellect. But 
we have to leave the rest of the postulates to the disciplines of philosophy and 
psychology.'' He left the theory of auditing at a macro level, and therein lies the 
source of complaint for many researchers who have followed. They have 
lamented the lack of theory, not about auditing, but about the applications of 
philosophy and (particularly) psychology in auditing. These are found "deeper 
and deeper in the analysis of human mind and intellect," to use Schandl's 
words. 
Schandl's formulation appears to be too general to serve well as the theory 
flowing from an audit paradigm. One can use it to specify problems of interest 
in many investigative fields, not only those widely acknowledged as auditing. 
Along with mice in the vents and corpses in the lane, he illustrated audit 
phenomena, but extracting the audit content from the generality is tedious 
through his 212 pages. In the interest of efficiency, despite Schandl's disputes 
about differences, one can study ASOBAC and derive the spirit of the 
investigative process and the science of decision-making and obtain the 
incremental contribution to audit thought. 
However, both Schandl and ASOBAC expanded the details of the empirical 
domain relevant in audits. They carved the place for assertions, norms 
(accepted criteria), and communication much more finely than did Mautz and 
Sharaf. They indeed added elements to the extant audit theory. Both works 
provided auditors/researchers more focus on the essential elements of audit 
decision-making that have now become embedded in AICPA and IIA auditing 
standards statements. 
Neither Schandl nor ASOBAC had enough to say about "microtheory"— 
the level of concern with models and methods, tests and standards for 
particular audit decisions. (Notwithstanding Schandl's explanation of psycho­
logical schema and recognition of the role of clues (similar to "cues") in 
connection with the psychology of information [1978, pp. 38-55].) As a 
complete paradigm, Schandl appears to fall short on this dimension, and 
ASOBAC never pretended to contribute beyond the definitional/investigative 
process element. 
Decision Theory View of Auditing and a Note on Game Theory 
It may be an injustice to other authors to attribute a decision theory view of 
auditing to one, but with apologies to others, Felix [1974] presented such a 
view. Since it was in a brief paper, perhaps it should be called a "glimpse" 
instead of a "view"—certainly not a full-blown theory statement. A decision 
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theory view is more like a perspective on auditing and audit theory than a 
theory in its own right, but it has a significant contribution to offer. 
In terms of a paradigm, decision theory has no global pretensions, at least 
not as presented by Felix. His presentation focused on applications in field 
work. Therefore, one will find no broad ability to specify the wide variety of 
problems of interest in auditing. Not much, if anything, is inferred about 
professionalism (e.g., independence, social responsibility) nor about communi­
cation in the context of information content for users. 
The significant contributions of the decision theory "glimpse" are the 
expansion of the specifics of the empirical domain and the exposure of the 
family of models, methods, tests, and standards which can be applied in audit 
work and research. The domain is expanded with explicit recognition of 
alternative actions, their monetary or utility payoffs, and the probabilities 
(uncertainties) associated with them. Decision theory brings the economics of 
auditing into focus, although it usually leaves hard-to-quantify considerations 
(e.g., professionalism) as an afterthought. Conceptually, however, the entire 
scope of audit problems could be treated in a decision theory framework. 
Game theory applications in auditing make contributions similar to, though 
potentially richer, than decision theory. The potential is realized in the 
recognition of the persona of the game players compared to the decision-
theoretic game against passive nature [Fellingham and Newman, 1985]. While 
game-behavioral influences of auditors upon auditees, and vice versa, are not 
new, the formality of the game theoretic algorithm lends an elegance to thought 
and research. Like decision theory, however, the game theory/strategic view 
of auditing makes its major contribution in the areas of the empirical domain 
with explicit recognition of alternative actions, interactions, payoffs, and 
probabilities, and in the utilization of a particular algorithm. The game theoretic 
algorithm, like single-person decision theory, brings the economics of auditing 
into focus at the apparent sacrifice of professionalism considerations. However, 
one must rely upon other expressions of audit theory to identify the audit 
phenomena to which game theory might be applied. Decision theory and game 
theory do not identify these phenomena. They accept them as subjects for 
attention. 
Social Mechanism Theory of Auditing 
Scott's [1984] paper on the state-of-the-art of academic research in auditing 
did not actually present an audit theory. Nevertheless, he alluded to "an 
explosion in the theory of auditing," "major theoretical approaches to 
auditing," the "wide range of relevant theories,'' and the view of the audit as a 
"social mechanism to enhance the process of contracting, thereby improving 
the operation of securities and managerial labor markets." Actually, the "social 
mechanism theory" amounts to acceptance of the basic reason audits are 
demanded. In Scott's words: 
Society's interests will be served if audits are efficient, in the sense 
of being available at least cost, and effective, in the sense of supplying 
relevant, credible information. Concern over efficiency looms large in 
the auditing literature. Formal concern over effectiveness is more 
recent, primarily because of the complexity of the topic [Scott, 1984, p. 
153]. 
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Scott was not the first to mention audits in the same breath as economics, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. (He was just more elegant with the "social 
mechanism" words.) Elsewhere, the demand for audits has been said to flow 
from the maxim of economic efficacy: "Audited information is more useful than 
unaudited information'' [Robertson, 1984]. Wallace also described auditing as 
an economic service and offered several explanations for the demand for 
auditing (agency theory—the stewardship (monitoring) hypothesis, the infor­
mation hypothesis, and the insurance hypothesis), as well as observations 
about costs and benefits and the incentives for supplying audits [Wallace, 
1980]. 
Scott's mention of a "social mechanism theory," however, was not an 
expression of an audit theory. He was setting the stage for a review of 
research. The studies he proceeded to review dealt with other theories and 
other models applied in an audit context—statistical sampling theory, Bayesian 
decision theory, single-person decision theory, Brunswick lens model, and 
others. The point is that Scott, like others, related audit theory to the 
"microtheory" applications of various models and methods and their attendant 
empirical domains. He appears to have accepted a version of "macrotheory"— 
audit theory—that had already identified the important audit phenomena. 
Notwithstanding the narrow focus of most of the studies he reviewed, Scott 
raised a "macrotheory" question at the end: "The basic theoretical question 
. . . is the extent to which firms' information production decisions should be 
regulated." As a normative matter, this issue may or may not be within the 
orbit of an appropriate audit theory paradigm. After all, not everything can be 
comprehended within "auditing." As a social endeavor, auditing is affected, if 
not controlled, by other forces represented by political science, sociology, 
macroeconomics, and others. At some point, the outer boundary of the audit 
paradigm, and, hence, of audit theory must be drawn. Given this normative 
boundary issue, theorists ought to determine whether the normative question 
of information regulation is a matter for comprehension within an audit theory 
paradigm or a matter of public policy outside the orbit of auditing. 
"Macrotheory" vs. "Microtheory" 
People can debate the usefulness of audit theory for practice, echoing an 
earlier refrain: "Auditing is a series of practices and procedures, methods and 
techniques, a way of doing, with little need for the explanations, descriptions, 
reconciliations, and arguments so frequently lumped together as 'theory' " 
[Mautz and Sharaf, 1961, p. 1], The debate and the productive activity of 
practice and research has proceeded and no doubt will continue to proceed on 
two levels. 
One is a global or all-encompassing "macrotheory" level that is very useful 
for identifying the important/interesting issues for audit practice. This level 
enables practitioners to have more than an ad hoc basis for various social-
economic and professional interactions (e.g., expansion of attestation standards 
to representations other than financial statements, provision of consulting and 
operational auditing services for external audit clients, performance of police/ 
detection work by internal auditors, interaction of public policy considerations 
with program evaluation by governmental auditors). It has little or nothing to 
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say about practice/research models, methods, tests, and standards. Mac-
rotheory (e.g, Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Schandl, 1978; ASOBAC, 1972) 
provides important insights for an audit theory paradigm. 
The other level is the more practical "microtheory" that usually is 
presented as models, methods, and explanations dealing with audit field work 
activity. This may be called the "applied" area, and it seems that much audit 
research and theory development is concentrated in it. Ashton [1981] ex­
plained the high interest in applied research (high potential for short-run 
payoffs, support for the status quo) as a direct function of the fact that the 
largest sources of research funds and resources are from practicing organiza­
tions—accounting firms and professional associations—whose goals are applica­
tion-oriented. Hence, KPMG Peat Marwick [1987] reports that fifty-nine 
percent of its Research Opportunities in Auditing (ROA) projects had prospec­
tive implementation in five years or less. Perusal of research descriptions in the 
ROA reports shows an applied/practical bias in projects whose implementation 
may be considered beyond the five-year horizon. The theory associated with 
the applied/micro level tends to be expressed as the "theory of X in an audit 
context," where X can be statistics, behavioralism, strategic games, and the 
like. 
This concern with "microtheory" and explanations of field work decision 
processes permeates audit research—in search of "theories" that explain or 
improve on-the-job techniques and behaviors. The more recent laments about 
lack of theory almost always refer to a particular area of concern for applications 
in auditing, not for auditing as a broad discipline. 
Further reflection sheds more light on the state of audit theory and the 
paradigm power of "macrotheory." The global theories (e.g., Mautz and 
Sharaf taken as a whole) are theories of auditing that set broad parameters for 
the field. They can help in many ways to channel the direction of auditing 
scholarship. Nevertheless, they are not complete paradigms because they do 
not attempt to specify empirical domains very precisely, nor do they have 
much, if anything, to say about research models, methods, tests and stand­
ards. Macrotheory sets the stage for auditing, and thus for audit research, but 
it does not specify how applied research can be guided and executed. 
Microtheory, on the other hand, appears to be most concerned with a more 
operational, practical level. Practitioners and researchers want to discern 
underlying theory for applications in auditing. Hence, applied research and 
development work starts with theory development such as applications of 
statistics in auditing, behavioral theory in auditing, decision theory in auditing, 
game theory applied in auditing, and so forth. 
All audit theories, both macrotheories and microtheories, suffer from the 
frailties of construction by induction and observation of practice. Mautz and 
Sharaf freely admitted their reliance on observations of practice. Other 
theoretical points of view, such as decision theory applied in auditing, may start 
with a normative model, but then people observe the anomalies and try to 
speculate about (a) altering the model to fit observations, or (b) indoctrinating 
the auditors to change their decision approaches to fit the model. The former 
action—altering the model—represents a beginning in normative science but a 
default to induction. No amount of induction can tell people what auditing should 
be. Such conclusions are normative matters that quickly interfere with the 
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larger worlds of public policy (politics), economics (practitioners' and com­
panies' profit motives), and sociology (user perceptions and demands). 
Audit theory, having its anchor in the practice of auditing, will probably 
always experience wide swings from times when global concerns are highly 
important to times when field applications recapture theoretical attention. The 
primary impediment to developing an audit theory paradigm, complete at all 
levels, is the fact that auditing arises only by human action. It has no 
independent existence in physical nature like gravity and friction. Hence, 
prescriptions (normative theory) about audit purposes and field activities will 
continue to be difficult, if not impossible to "prove," and certainly will be 
disputed by others' differing prescriptions. 
The "macrotheory" and microtheory" spheres of interest can coexist, and 
both can be very useful for scholarship, empirical research, practice, and audit 
policy. It may be that the current state of audit theory is that the "macrotheo-
ries" provide much of the identification of relevant audit phenomena, while the 
"microtheories" provide most of the views of empirical domains and research 
tests and standards. Taken together, they constitute the present state of the 
audit theory paradigm. 
Appendix 
Theory Complaints 
Currently, there is very little available in the professional literature that can be described as 
auditing theory [Mautz and Sharaf, 1961]. 
In their Philosophy of Auditing, Mautz and Sharaf attempt the development of a theory of 
auditing. Regrettably, this work has not produced the scholarly inquiry which the authors hoped 
would follow from it [Anderson, Giese, and Booker, 1970]. 
Events since 1969 have shown the need for a comprehensive theory of auditing, including the 
philosophical and psychological foundations. . . . In no other discipline can we find less literature in 
the last 150 years than in the field of auditing [Schandl, 1978]. 
Someone looking to the recorded auditing research should notice that a complete, logical and 
empirically defensible theory that explains the auditor's existence in an economy is not present. 
The necessary conditions for a solution to all auditing problems have not been established in a 
theoretical structure which is shown to be consistent with the data from the world around us 
[Hamilton, 1978]. 
Accountants and auditors . . . have for their work, as yet, no generally accepted conceptual 
framework or foundation by reference to which agreed objectives can be established and ordered, 
and progress towards them monitored [Kitchen, 1982]. 
Although interest in auditing research has increased substantially over the last ten years, no 
audit theory has been developed to support a coherent research effort. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
and Schandl (1978) developed theories of auditing, but their works provided little assistance in 
directing auditing research. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1976) in Research Opportunities in 
Auditing identified critical auditing areas for future research but gave no overall organizing theme 
[Bamber and Bylinski, 1982]. 
Auditing is not yet at the point where it can be conceptualized in terms of a unified theory 
[Scott, 1984]. 
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Discussant's Response to "Audit Theory 
Paradigms" 
Donald L. Neebes 
Ernst & Whinney 
The stated goal of the paper is to present several candidates for the theory 
of auditing. No attempt is made to order the candidates, although the point is 
made that all fall short of a useful audit theory. The paper distinguishes between 
"macrotheory" and "microtheory," and asserts that the two, taken together, 
can be useful for research and practice. 
As a practitioner, I found the paper difficult to read and understand. The 
following concepts are used which are foreign to most practitioners: 






Even the title is somewhat daunting. A more understandable and, perhaps, 
more descriptive title would be "Audit Theory: What Is It? How Is It 
Developed?" 
The paper states that "a paradigm is a 'world view' that enables 
researchers, theorists, and practitioners to discern audit phenomena in terms 
of input— specification of the problems of interest, setting—the empirical 
domain over which the audit work/research is applied, and process—the kinds of 
tests and standards used to adjudicate contradictory propositions." To help the 
practitioner understand the point being made, the paper should give two 
examples familiar to practitioners—one for an audit engagement and the other 
for an attestation engagement—to illustrate the meanings of the terms 
"input," "setting," and "process." 
The section of the paper entitled "Macrotheory" vs. "Microtheory" did 
not address whether macrotheory drove microtheory or vice versa. A 
discussion of this point would be helpful. 
The more restrictive auditing theory perspective is dominant rather than 
the more expansive attestation theory perspective. This focus is disappointing. 
There is only one reference to the attestation standards. And that is in a 
parenthetical comment! The attestation standards, of which generally accepted 
auditing standards can be considered a subset, are of growing importance to 
practitioners. The attestation standards are an expansion of, but faithful to, the 
theoretical core of the Mautz and Sharaf theory formulation as summarized in 
the paper. Within the last year, two interpretations of the attestation standards 
have been published, as follows: 
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Defense Industry Questionnaire on Business Ethics and Conduct1 
Responding to Requests for Reports on Matters Relating to Solvency.2 
1 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Interpretation of Statement on Standards for 
Attestation Engagements, Attestation Standards: 'Defense Industry Questionnaire on Business 
Ethics and Conduct,' " Journal of Accountancy (August 1987), pp. 152-161. 
2 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Responding to Requests for Reports on 
Matters Relating to Solvency," Journal of Accountancy (May 1988), pp. 178-181. 
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3 
Why the Auditing Standards on Evaluating 
Internal Control Needed to be Replaced 
Jerry D. Sullivan 
Coopers & Lybrand 
In February 1988, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA 
approved the issuance of nine Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The 
profession developed these statements to narrow what has been referred to as 
the "expectations gap," the gap between what the public and financial 
statement users believe auditors are responsible for and what auditors believe 
they are responsible for. Among the new standards, there is one that 
dramatically changes the auditor's responsibility for considering internal control 
in a financial statement audit. Effective for audits of financial statements 
beginning on or after January 1, 1990, SAS No. 55, Consideration of the 
Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, replaces Section 
320, The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control, of SAS No. 1. 
This new standard is by far the most complex and controversial, at least 
among academic circles, of the new auditing standards adopted by the 
profession. This paper discusses the author's perspective on why the new 
standard was issued. 
Should Section 320 Have Been Revised Rather Than Replaced? 
The ASB concluded that the minimum study and evaluation of internal 
control required by Section 320 was insufficient for audit planning. Effective 
audit planning requires the auditor to identify the types of material misstate­
ments that could occur in the financial statements and to assess the risk that 
such misstatements will occur. Because an entity's internal control significantly 
affects the possibility of misstatements in the financial statements, the ASB 
concluded that the auditor needed a better understanding of internal control 
when planning an audit. 
This is a different notion from that encompassed by the minimum study and 
evaluation required by Section 320, which stated that the purpose of the review 
of the system was to obtain sufficient knowledge and understanding about the 
accounting system and the internal accounting control system "(a) to make a 
determination of whether there are internal accounting control procedures that 
may provide a basis for reliance thereon in determining the nature, extent, and 
timing of substantive tests; or (b) to aid the auditor in designing substantive 
tests in the absence of such reliance.'' While Section 320 required the auditor 
to have a general knowledge about the control environment and flow of 
47 
transactions through the accounting system, it did not require any knowledge 
of control procedures unless the auditor planned to rely on them. 
Some may argue that Section 320 (particularly the limited knowledge about 
internal controls required for audit planning purposes) should have been 
amended rather than completely replaced. However, the basic fabric of Section 
320 was showing stress cracks, and there were compelling reasons for the 
Board's conclusion that so much of it had to go, and so many new concepts and 
principles had to be added, that it was far more appropriate to completely 
rewrite the standard than to attempt to patch it. Section 320 had evolved on a 
piecemeal basis over the past 36 years. It was a combination of three 
Statements on Auditing Procedure issued between 1949 and 1972 and was later 
amended by eight Statements on Auditing Standards. Several other SASs 
introduced or altered auditing concepts that should have been incorporated into 
Section 320, but were not. 
This combination of factors created a hodge-podge of professional require­
ments pertaining to the study and evaluation of internal control, with the result 
that many practitioners, from both small and large firms, were detouring 
around the standard in conducting audits. This was evidenced by the growing 
number of practitioners who preprinted memorandums for insertion into 
working paper binders on all of their audits that blatantly stated, in one fashion 
or another, that they "were not relying on internal controls," thereby 
disavowing any responsibility to understand the client's internal control 
procedures. 
Such statements were too often inconsistent with the auditor's substantive 
audit programs and other working papers that acknowledged the presence of 
effectively operating internal controls that affected either the nature or extent 
of specific substantive tests. For example, audit programs and working papers 
often reflected the presence of a well planned and controlled physical inventory, 
which the auditor tested for physical inventory quantities; the presence of cash 
reconciliations performed by "independent" employees, which were utilized 
by the auditor to restrict substantive tests of cash; and the existence of pre-
numbered shipping documents and customer invoices, which were matched 
and accounted for by the client to ensure the completeness of revenue and 
which the auditor often considered when deciding to restrict substantive tests 
to analytical procedures and tests of revenue transactions in the post-balance 
sheet period. 
There are probably many reasons why practitioners interpreted and applied 
Section 320 in the manner described above. This inconsistency in audit planning 
and performance avoided "relying on controls" and incurring the cost of 
applying compliance tests to specific control procedures. Compliance testing, 
to most practitioners, means re-performing a specific control procedure using 
the principles of sampling explained in SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling [AICPA, 
1981]. This notion was exacerbated by the risk model in SAS No. 47, Audit 
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit [AICPA, 1983], which directs the 
auditor's assessment of control risk to the effectiveness of internal accounting 
control procedures related to an account balance or class of transactions—not to 
the effectiveness of the accounting system or the control environment, which 
most practitioners believe do reduce control risk in most entities. And finally, if 
the practitioner compliance tests one or more specific control procedures, 
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exactly how did he or she rely on them? How were substantive tests restricted 
in either nature or extent? These problems and questions were far easier for 
the practitioner to avoid by inserting a memorandum in the working papers that 
avoided the whole morass. 
The ASB recognized these problems associated with Section 320 and 
addressed them squarely when drafting SAS No. 55. By requiring auditors to 
take a different and broader view of internal controls—from the perspective of 
control risks—SAS No. 55 will change dramatically the way audits are planned 
and performed. The new standard will require the auditor to (a) assess control 
risk associated with the control environment, which research has demonstrated 
to be a principal source of audit risk; (b) broaden his or her perspective to 
include not only the control environment but also the accounting system and 
specific control procedures; and (c) consider control risk more discriminately, 
at the assertion level rather than at the class of transactions and account 
balance level, and along a continuum ranging from the maximum to the 
minimum. 
Importance of the Control Environment 
The key elements in the ASB's response to the "expectations gap" are (i) 
to increase the auditor's responsibilities in performing an audit of financial 
statements, (ii) to require audits to be planned and performed to provide 
reasonable assurance that material financial statement fraud and error will be 
detected and, most important, (iii) to provide guidance for meeting those 
increased responsibilities. To do this, the ASB needed to understand the types 
of irresponsible, unreliable financial reporting that led to the concerns ex­
pressed by Congress, the press, and the organizations that sponsored the 
Treadway Commission. 
Research conducted at Coopers & Lybrand led to the same conclusions as 
the Treadway research on fraud: the basic, underlying source of fraudulent 
financial reporting is found at the very top of the organization—what the 
Treadway report calls the tone at the top—not in erroneous or fictitious 
transaction data used to prepare the financial statements. In other words, the 
problem is not with specific internal control procedures; rather, it is related to 
the attitude, awareness, and actions of management pertaining to financial 
reporting—what auditors call the control environment—and this emphasizes 
the need to consider the risks associated with that environment when 
performing an audit. 
That same research also told us that almost all the financial frauds that 
occurred involved improper revenue recognition methods, the overvaluation of 
assets, or incomplete information in financial statements. In each instance, the 
fraudulent behavior was motivated not by a plan to embezzle corporate assets, 
but rather by the desire to mislead financial statement users for one or more of 
a variety of reasons. Moreover, the research showed that the major frauds 
were not perpetrated by manipulating data as the transactions passed through 
the accounting system. In fact, the perpetrators almost always used complete, 
accurate financial data in creating the misstatements. 
For example, accounting estimates, such as loan loss reserves, are based 
on subjective factors, and controls over them are often more difficult to 
establish than controls over factual information. As a result, there is greater 
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potential for bias by top management. Corporate watch-dogs, top management 
and directors, are less concerned these days with the number-crunching 
aspects of an audit or with the accuracy of the accounting for transactions, and 
are more concerned with management's judgments, estimates, and valuation 
decisions. 
Thus, audit risk is not reduced by chasing financial transactions endlessly 
through the client's accounting systems in the mostly irrelevant, and certainly 
boring, quest to establish their accuracy and the absence of "transaction 
error.'' Modern computer systems have a low risk of random error (systematic 
error is a greater risk, but it is generally assessed and tested by means other 
than re-performing controls at the transaction level). Furthermore, in the 
current computer environment, today's transactions are summarized tomor­
row to assist in managing the business, which in many environments further 
mitigates the risk of systematic error. In most environments, if the financial 
data are corrupted, employees, management, and third parties are generally 
the first to know. The auditor arrives long after the need to know arises and 
corrective action is to be taken. 
While the auditor still needs to assess the risk of "transaction error'' and to 
take appropriate steps where it is other than low, he or she also needs to focus 
on control risk from a broader perspective—the control environment. Specifi­
cally, the new standard requires the auditor to obtain the following information 
about the client: 
(a) Its management philosophy and operating style, 
(b) Its organizational structure, 
(c) Whether it has an effective audit committee, 
(d) The methods it uses to communicate authority and responsibility, 
(e) The management control methods it uses, 
(f) Whether it has an internal audit function, 
(g) Its personnel policies and procedures, 
(h) External influences on its operations, and 
(i) Regulatory rules under which it operates. 
Many critics have suggested that the control environment is illusive and 
that any assessment of it would be subjective and should not be used as a basis 
to restrict substantive tests. They argue that Section 320, in its abbreviated 
discussion of the control environment, stated that the auditor's understanding 
of it should provide general knowledge to be considered in deciding whether to 
test specific control procedures and not in restricting substantive tests. 
Further, they note that specific policies and procedures in the control 
environment cannot be compliance tested by re-performing them to obtain an 
understanding of management's and the board's overall attitude, awareness, 
and actions. 
Undeniably, the auditor's assessment of the control environment involves 
judgments based on his or her observation of actions and documents. However, 
this does not mean that the auditor obtains the required understanding of the 
control environment by casual conversations with enterprise management. 
Rather, that understanding involves making judgments based on observing and 
inspecting evidence of the implementation of policies and procedures that 
demonstrate the actions taken by management related to the financial reporting 
process. 
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The practice aid developed by Coopers & Lybrand for understanding and 
assessing the control environment requires the auditor to gather, consider, and 
reach conclusions on about 60 separate factors for even the smallest clients. I 
believe that the assessment of this type of information in conducting an audit 
will aid in focusing the auditor's attention on risks that are unusually high, as 
well as in identifying opportunities for more efficient audit procedures. 
The Internal Control Structure—A Broader Concept 
SAS No. 55 replaces the concept of internal control with a broader concept, 
the internal control structure, which includes the control environment. The 
internal control structure also includes the accounting system and specific 
control procedures. This broader concept acknowledges that policies and 
procedures established within each of the three elements can be relevant to 
audit planning, since they are an important source of information about the 
types and risk of potential misstatements in the financial statements. Each of 
the three elements of the control structure also provides information about the 
recording, processing, summarizing, and reporting of financial data useful for 
designing substantive tests. 
Section 320 also discussed each of the three elements, but provided limited 
guidance about the control environment and the accounting system, and 
excluded them from the concept of internal control. SAS No. 55, in addition to 
expanding the concept of internal control, provides more guidance about the 
interrelationship of these three elements of the control structure, particularly in 
the context of audit planning. The new standard requires the auditor to obtain 
knowledge about all three elements of the internal control structure to 
determine whether policies and procedures relating to each of the elements 
have been placed in operation. 
The accounting system was distinguished in Section 320 from the system of 
internal accounting control. This is a distinction without a difference in modern 
computer systems, where thousands of programmed procedures operate 
interactively to produce reliable financial data. Identifying which individual 
programmed procedures operate as controls is not so important as identifying 
whether the architecture of the accounting system, including the controls over 
it, enables the entity to record, process, and summarize reliable financial data. 
SAS No. 55 requires the auditor to obtain sufficient knowledge of the 
accounting system to understand: 
• The classes of transactions in the entity's operations that are 
significant to the financial statements; 
• How those transactions are initiated; 
• The accounting records, supporting documents, machine-readable 
information, and specific accounts in the financial statements involved 
in the processing and reporting of transactions; 
• The process of accounting from the initiation of a transaction to its 
inclusion in the financial statements, including how the computer is 
used to process data; and 
• The financial reporting process used to prepare the entity's financial 
statements, including significant accounting estimates and dis­
closures. 
When the auditor obtains an understanding of the accounting system and 
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the control environment, he or she is also likely to obtain knowledge about 
related individual control procedures. For example, when obtaining an under­
standing of the accounting system pertaining to inventory, the auditor usually 
will become aware that physical inventory quantities are reconciled to the 
accounting records. The auditor considers the knowledge about control 
procedures obtained from the understanding of the control environment and 
accounting system in determining the additional understanding of individual 
control procedures that is necessary to plan the audit. 
SAS No. 55, however, does not require the auditor to obtain an understand­
ing of individual control procedures related to all account balances, classes of 
transactions, or assertions embodied in the financial statements. The knowl­
edge that the auditor needs about each of the internal control elements for audit 
planning purposes is affected by his or her assessment of inherent risk, 
preliminary judgments about materiality, the complexity of the entity's opera­
tions and systems, and information about the entity obtained from prior audits 
that may be relevant to the assessment of control risk. The latter item is an 
important concept that SAS No. 55 recognizes and Section 320 did not. While 
this concept is new to the authoritative literature, it is already embedded in 
some firms' auditing manuals and, in practice, all auditors, consciously or not, 
take prior years' results into account in assessing control risk. 
Assessing Control Risk Along a Broad Continuum 
SAS No. 55 provides a framework for practitioners to improve their 
assessment of control risk in two respects. First, it establishes a requirement 
to assess control risk in relation to the financial statement assertions identified 
in SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter [AICPA, 1980]. This helps with the age-old 
linkage problem that has confronted auditors in the past because it fuses a bond 
among the internal control structure, assessing control risk, and obtaining 
evidential matter about financial statement assertions. 
Focusing the auditor's attention on control risk at the assertion level is 
particularly important in today's audit environment. Modern computer systems 
have dramatically increased the reliability of financial data on which manage­
ment makes valuation judgments, and presentation and disclosure decisions. 
The valuation and the presentation and disclosure assertions, which involve 
management judgment applied to financial data after they have been processed 
by the accounting system, often represent relatively high risks to the auditor. 
For example, after assessing control risk, the auditor may conclude that the 
completeness, mechanical accuracy, and existence of accounts receivable are 
low risks and may adjust the nature and extent of substantive tests accordingly 
for these audit objectives. However, the auditor may conclude that the control 
environment is not conducive to reducing control risk to a low level for the 
audit objectives relating to the valuation, and the presentation and disclosure 
assertions. 
Section 320 and SAS No. 55 remind us that the fundamental reasons for not 
permitting complete reliance on controls are the inherent limitations on the 
effectiveness of accounting control, namely, human error caused by misunder­
standing of instructions, mistakes of judgment, carelessness, distraction, or 
fatigue; collusion; management override of controls; and the ineffectiveness of 
controls in preventing wrong estimates and judgments that enter into the 
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financial statements. These are all valid points about the limitations on the 
effectiveness of controls. But these limitations may not be relevant to the 
conclusion that there is a low level of audit risk with respect to certain 
assertions regarding specific accounts, e.g., those assertions about rights and 
obligations, presentation and disclosure, and the measurement of accounting 
estimates. 
SAS No. 55 acknowledges that when audit risk is appropriately low as a 
result of the auditor's judgment about control risk together with inherent risk 
for a specific assertion or related audit objective, the auditor need not apply 
specific tests to an account balance or class of transactions to reduce detection 
risk for that specific assertion. One of the problems with Section 320 was that it 
was unclear on the issue of complete reliance on controls at the assertion level. 
The auditor was told not to place complete reliance on internal control to the 
exclusion of other auditing procedures with respect to particular account 
balances and classes of transactions, but no guidance was given about complete 
reliance at the individual assertion and audit objective levels. It is difficult to 
fathom the original intent of the framers of Section 320, simply because the 
notion of assertions and their relation to audit objectives was not explicitly 
addressed in the literature at that time. Many auditors, and obviously the ASB, 
now believe it is appropriate to permit complete reliance on controls at the 
individual assertion level. 
Moreover, substantive tests do not provide evidence about a single 
assertion only. For example, most analytical procedures provide evidence 
about all assertions relevant to an account balance. Confirmations of accounts 
receivable balances, while directed primarily at obtaining evidence about the 
existence assertion, also provide evidence about mechanical accuracy. 
The second way in which SAS No. 55 improves the auditor's assessment of 
control risk is that it replaces an "all or nothing," "rely or don't rely," 
approach with one that recognizes that the auditor's assessed level of control 
risk may vary from the maximum level to the minimum level for an assertion. 
The level assessed may be expressed in quantitative terms, such as percent­
ages, or qualitative terms such as maximum, moderate, or low. 
SAS No. 55 does not require the auditor to undertake procedures to assess 
control risk at below the maximum level for any assertion. However, when the 
auditor identifies potentially effective policies and procedures relevant to 
assertions, he or she may decide that it would be efficient to test the 
effectiveness of their design and operation. The tests used, which are referred 
to as tests of controls in SAS No. 55, include procedures such as inquiry, 
observation, inspection of documents, or reperformance of a policy or a 
procedure. The auditor then assesses the evidence obtained from these tests 
to make judgments about the level of control risk. 
SAS No. 55 acknowledges that in many audits the minimum required 
understanding of control structure policies and procedures will provide the 
auditor with knowledge about their effectiveness. This will often be so whether 
or not the auditor's procedures were designed to obtain evidence about the 
effectiveness of control structure policies and procedures as well as to obtain 
the required understanding. Thus, after obtaining the minimum understanding 
required by SAS No. 55, the auditor may conclude that control risk is below the 
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maximum level for some assertions because of evidence obtained about the 
effectiveness of specific policies or procedures. 
For example, in obtaining an understanding of the control environment, the 
auditor may examine evidence of management's cash forecasting and treasury 
operations. This may include inspecting management reports, as well as 
tracking actual cash receipts and collection of accounts receivable and compar­
ing them with forecasted amounts. This understanding may provide the auditor 
with knowledge about management's investigation of variances and other 
controls established over cash collections. In this scenario, even though the 
auditor's intention was to obtain an understanding about the treasury and cash 
forecasting systems used by management, the procedures may also provide 
evidence about the valuation of accounts receivable. 
Thus, the auditor is encouraged by SAS No. 55 to consider all evidence, 
whether obtained as part of understanding the control structure or from 
planned tests of controls, in reaching a judgment about the effectiveness of 
control policies and procedures. 
Conclusion 
At a recent meeting held to consider the implications of pervasive 
deficiencies noted in peer reviews conducted during the past year, eight 
matters were identified that indicated the possible need for guidance in auditing 
standards. Four of the eight matters related to performance deficiencies 
involving Section 320, and it can be argued that a fifth one is also associated 
with that section. This suggests that a disproportionately high percentage of 
audit performance problems relate to the evaluation of the client's internal 
control structure. While the implementation of SAS No. 55 has yet to stand the 
test of peer review, the standard establishes a framework that will significantly 
improve audit quality and the public perception of auditor performance. 
Chairman Dingell of the Congressional Oversight and Investigations Subcom­
mittee has often asked how auditors can examine financial statements and not 
know about their clients' internal controls. The answer "I didn't rely on 
internal controls" doesn't play very well. 
References 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an 
Audit," Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47 (December 1983). 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Audit Sampling," Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 39 (June 1981). 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Evidential Matter," Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 31 (August 1980). 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Codification of Auditing Standards and 
Procedures," Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 (November 1972). 
54 
Discussant's Response to "Why the Auditing 
Standards on Evaluating Internal Control 
Needed to be Replaced" 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
University of Texas at Austin 
In a way, I feel that I should apologize for not joining Jerry and the AICPA 
Auditing Division leadership in supporting their response to the alleged 
expectations gap. One would like to support the profession that one studies and 
about which one teaches. However, it is traditional for a scholarly discussant to 
take a position contrary to that of the author. That will be easy for me to do 
since, as most of you know, I hold a contrary view on the need to replace AU 
320. 
It is also traditional to critically discuss a paper on the basis of its own 
criteria and to discuss the topic of the paper from an alternative perspective. I 
will follow the traditional approach, but in reverse order. I will begin by giving a 
little background on the role of Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs) in 
general, and the role and importance of AU 320 or Statement of Auditing 
Procedure (SAP) No. 54. 
GAAS and SASs 
As we all know, SASs are codified interpretations of Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS). They are quasi-legal in nature and help define 
acceptable practice under the securities acts as well as within the ethical rules 
of the profession. Codified professional standards play two important and 
related roles. They serve a before-the-fact educational role of guiding the 
auditor as to what should be done to conduct a "standard quality" audit under 
GAAS. They also serve an after-the-fact enforcement role in determining 
whether an auditor has been guilty of "malpractice." The first helps the 
profession by facilitating uniform, high quality audits and the second helps the 
profession by making it easier to disassociate itself from low quality audits. 
Thus, the SASs are important and they should be clearly worded and be readily 
interpretable. 
Traditionally, SASs have related almost exclusively to the effectiveness of 
audits—that is, regulation to make sure that audits are effective in achieving 
appropriately low audit risk that error might exceed material limits. Some 
practitioners read the SASs as providing minimum requirements for a legal 
defense, and the minimum is their target. Without auditor quality differentia­
tion, the SASs may also provide the maximum service in a competitive market. 
Therefore, it is important to have the effectiveness minimum clearly stated. 
Efficiency, or the achievement of a given level of audit risk at minimum cost, 
has, with rare exception, been left unregulated or left without comment by the 
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Auditing Standards Board (ASB) for two reasons. First, in a competitive 
market, practitioners can be expected to be efficient on their own. Second, 
there is no long-run danger to the public of inefficient auditing—the market will 
discipline inefficient auditors. 
SAP No. 54 (now AU 320) has had a revolutionary, and I believe salutary, 
effect on auditing practice, education, and research. Several generations of 
professors, textbook writers, students, and regulators have learned about the 
inherent limitations of internal control and the related necessity of substantive 
testing, the reasons behind segregation of duties, the necessity of compliance 
testing if controls are to be relied upon, the logical basis for evidence 
integration, and the basic concepts of control of audit risk. It has stood the test 
of time in practice and in research—many professors have tried to shoot holes 
in it and could not. Perhaps most important to us here, it gave a conceptual 
evidence model of auditing that has provided the basis for respect for auditing 
professors on campus. Many of us in this room are here due, in part, to SAP 
No. 54. 
Certainly AU 320 is not perfect and it could use some updating and editing. 
In that regard, many of you are aware of my controversial letter of March 26, 
1987 to Alan Winters. It was a response to his invitation to comment on the 
exposure draft (ED) of SAS No. 55. I read the ED with the view that, I 
believed, a skeptical, ''minimum requirements-seeking" practitioner or ac­
countant's defense attorney might take. Since AU 320 would be eliminated by 
the ED, I tried to read the ED without reliance on what I knew was in AU 320 
because the next generation of students, auditors, and "enforcers" will have 
to read, understand, and apply SAS No. 55 cold! 
In his response to the planning subcommittee (May 15, 1987), and the 
entire ASB (June 2, 1987), Al stated that there was little problem with the 
exposure draft but that I simply didn't read the words as he had meant them. 
The latter is true, of course. Both letters are in the public record if you wish to 
study the issues for yourself. I encourage you to try to read SAS No. 55 from 
the perspective of one who doesn't already know about AU 320. 
I am pleased to say that I believe the current draft of SAS No. 55 is a 
considerable improvement over the exposure draft of last year. This is 
because, in effect, it adds back a number of the AU 320 concepts. Whether the 
present draft of SAS No. 55 is a net improvement over AU 320, or indeed, if 
the benefits of its passage outweigh its costs, is not at all clear to me. 
The net benefits of SAS No. 55 are also not clear to others as evidenced by 
the fact that six ASB members had dissents or qualified assents to its issuance. 
Their number includes partners from five national accounting firms and the 
accounting professor, Jim Loebbecke. The audit firms are Ernst and Whinney, 
Grant Thornton, Laventhol & Horwath, Peat Marwick Main, and Price 
Waterhouse. Their stated concerns include illogical reasoning, confusing 
exposition that is likely to lead to over-reliance on controls, unnecessary 
changes of wording with no change in concept, and the need for stronger 
procedures to support the auditor's "understanding" of the control structure. 
That is, the dissenters are asking for more rigor as to effectiveness and more 
clarity! 
This reception by a substantial minority of Board members can be 
contrasted with that of SAS No. 47 on Audit Risk and Materiality. SAS No. 47 
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was peculiar in that it added "structure" to the official literature, but its task 
force chairman (a Big-Eight partner and ASB member) wanted a 15-0 vote and 
held up a ballot draft until all objections by all parties were accommodated. A 
required 60% majority supported a more structured SAS but structure was 
diluted in order to get unanimity. For example, a requirement for "preliminary 
estimates" of materiality was replaced by the more vague "judgments about" 
materiality. Also, in an attempt to make the SAS "less quantitative in tone," 
the title was changed from "Materiality and Audit Risk" to "Audit Risk and 
Materiality." 
SAS No. 55 is peculiar in that it is arguable whether it adds more structure 
than it removes. It is also peculiar in that its task force is the first to be chaired 
by a member of the AICPA staff. In contrast to SAS No. 47, the SAS No. 55 
chairman apparently did not try to accommodate all suggestions for improve­
ment. Ironically, if the chairman had achieved unanimity, then SAS No. 55 
would have been a stronger document since the dissenters were asking for 
more guidance or clarity rather than less. In fairness to the task force 
chairman, political expediency may have necessitated foregoing further rigor 
and clarity. 
SAS No. 55 and the "Expectations Gap" 
Now, I'll discuss specifics of the Sullivan paper. I'll be very specific as to 
references so that you can verify my statements. On page 47, Jerry states that 
the nine new SASs were developed to "narrow what has been referred to as 
the 'expectations gap.'" Among the new standards is SAS No. 55 that 
"dramatically changes" the auditor's responsibility for considering internal 
control. 
If we accept Jerry's premise, then we would reasonably expect to see the 
following in a discussion of "why" AU 320 needed to be replaced: 
a. First, we would expect to see a description, listing, or citation of a 
number of highly visible audit failures due to the application of 
guidance in AU 320—that is, audits for which the auditor had properly 
applied the guidance and yet failed to detect material error. 
b. Second, we would expect to see a focus in SAS No. 55 on audit 
effectiveness. The SAS would provide means of increasing audit 
effectiveness through guidance to prevent the abuses noted. 
c. Third, we would not expect to see extensive discussion of efficiency 
or how to do an audit more cheaply or with less work since Dingell 
hasn't criticized the profession for being inefficient. 
How well does Jerry's paper and SAS No. 55 meet these three expectations? 
First, let us consider the evidence on audit failures due to following AU 320. 
On page 48, Jerry cites a "growing number" of practitioners who use 
preprinted memorandums proclaiming "no reliance on controls" yet rely on 
"effectively operating internal controls." We don't know if "growing" means 
from one to two or from 10,000 to 11,000 auditors, and Jerry doesn't claim that 
these audits were improper or ineffective. 
On pages 48 and 49 he states that AU 320 and SAS No. 47 direct the 
auditor's attention toward internal control procedures related to account 
balances and transactions and not to the accounting system or control 
environment "which most practitioners believe reduce control risk.'' Now, if 
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auditors don't rely on controls that they don't study or evaluate, then by not 
looking at the accounting system and control environment the audit may be 
inefficient. However, the audit would not necessarily be ineffective! 
On pages 49 and 50, Jerry cites research conducted at Coopers and 
Lybrand. No reference is given so apparently this is secret research about 
which one can't determine the methods used, the data examined, or whether 
there were flaws in their application or alternative interpretations of the results. 
According to the secret C&L research [Sullivan, 1988, page 49] "the problem 
is not with specific internal control procedures; rather it is related to the 
attitude, awareness and actions of management related to financial reporting." 
[emphasis added] 
Therefore, Jerry concludes that, we ought to audit management's attitude 
and awareness more and audit transactions and balances less. This is 
consistent with the views expressed in his 1984 Kansas paper [Sullivan, 1984] 
in which he championed reliance on supervisory controls verified by observa­
tion and inquiry over reliance on transaction and balance controls verified by re-
performance. 
The idea that, because few errors are discovered in tests of transactions 
and balances, we can deemphasize or even eliminate them is bothersome for 
two reasons. First, the auditor contracts to do an audit. The public expects that 
an auditor has audited transactions and balances, not just verified that 
management has a good attitude and awareness. Second, auditing behavior is 
dynamic or strategic—an analogy will suffice as explanation. There are very few 
guns detected at Kansas City International Airport. Yet, if gun control were 
reduced or eliminated, I believe that there would be many more guns leaving 
the jetway. Anticipation of detection yields prevention. 
If the official audit literature is to emphasize management's good attitude 
and awareness as a basis for assessing low control risk, then I believe that the 
ASB should tell us how much the auditor can rely on management's general 
good "attitude and awareness" to reduce substantive testing across particular 
accounts and balances. Is it a lot? Can it be 100%? Or is it a very small amount? 
There are repeated efficiency reminders in SAS No. 55. For example, 
paragraphs 31, 40-42, and 43-45 remind the auditor that results from testing 
one assertion for one account may be useful in reducing testing in another. 
Paragraph 48 and 50-52 give compliance tests as options for reliance. The 
auditor is also encouraged to rely on favorable audit results from last year 
[para. 23, 53]. It is not that the auditor should not consider such evidence, it is 
just peculiar that a document designed to increase audit effectiveness is directed 
at being efficient or, perhaps, the ex post legal protection of the auditor. There is 
only one warning and no examples that evidence from varied sources may 
conflict with or "disconfirm'' each other. Such examples and warnings would 
likely increase effectiveness. 
Finally, I'm very troubled by the suggestion, in paragraph 63, that the 
auditor try to figure out means of placing complete reliance on an assessment of 
low control risk. That is, the auditor would conduct no substantive tests for an 
assertion. The auditor is warned that "ordinarily" one cannot do this for all 
assertions on a significant account, but there is no guidance as to whether 
substantive testing should be the exception or whether complete reliance on 
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controls is the exception. (It should be noted that the new SAS on Analytical 
Review reduces this risk.) 
According to Sullivan [1988], SAS No. 55 provides a framework to improve 
control risk assessment in two respects: 
1. It establishes a requirement to assess controls in relation to financial 
statement assertions (presumably all five assertions for each financial 
statement caption). 
2. It replaces an "all or nothing," "rely or don't rely" approach with a 
more continuous approach such as percentages, or "maximum, 
moderate or minimum.'' 
Now, does anyone really believe that we needed a new SAS to explain that 
AU 320 applies to assertions? I doubt it. Second, I cannot find any statement in 
AU 320 that dictates an "all or nothing" approach. In fact, paragraphs 72 and 
73 of the original SAP No. 54 (now AU 320, 81-82) are explicit in discussing a 
variable extent of reliance and Appendix B [paragraph 35] illustrates reliance as 
being 30%, 50%, 70%, or 90%! That hardly sounds like all or nothing/rely or 
don't rely. Something is wrong here. 
Overall, I'm not sure what is going on. There is a political problem for the 
profession. Is there an expectations gap (an effectiveness problem)? Is AU 320 
part of it? Is SAS No. 55 more than the product of political-economic actions by 
the ASB? 
As we have seen, if the Sullivan explanation is correct, there are some 
surprises in the data. There are no specific abuses listed nor locatable 
references to abuses. There is little, if any, increase in effectiveness of SAS 
No. 55 over AU 320 and there is a concentration on efficiency. None of those 
supports the claim that SAS No. 55 is needed to close the alleged expectations 
gap. 
If you follow the ASB's activities, you know that the Sullivan paper is the 
fourth in a series of papers that "explain," "sell," or "excuse" SAS No. 55. 
One is by Dan Guy and Jerry Sullivan in the April, 1988 issue of Journal of 
Accountancy [Guy and Sullivan, 1988], a second is by ASB member Bob 
Temkin and Al Winters in the May, 1988 issue of Journal of Accountancy 
[Temkin and Winters, 1988], and a third will appear in the June, 1988 issue of 
Journal of Accountancy and will explain how one should apply SAS No. 55 to 
small firms. With an apparent lack of "effectiveness'' differences from AU 320, 
these papers seem to be much like advertising for "new and improved" 
laundry soap. 
Closing Statement 
In his closing statement, Jerry states that Congressman Dingell has often 
asked how auditors can examine financial statements and not know about their 
clients' internal controls. Further, he states that the answer, "I didn't rely on 
internal controls" doesn't play very well. 
I am very concerned that the answers given in SAS No. 55 won't play very 
well. That is, in defense of an audit failure, I would not like to hear: 
"I didn't do much substantive testing because management had such a 
good attitude toward controls." or, 
59 
"I didn't do much substantive testing because management had such 
a good system last year." 
Now these responses seem silly to the uninitiated. But you, Jerry, and Al 
Winters, and Dan Guy, and anyone else who has reviewed the files know that 
such responses will be observed in future peer reviews and perhaps in court 
cases. I, for one, would be hard-pressed to say that the particular words in SAS 
No. 55 don't lend some support to that position. 
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AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT: A Knowledge 
Engineering Tool For Audit Decisions* 
Glenn Shafer, 
Prakash P. Shenoy, 
Rajendra P. Srivastava 
University of Kansas 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been significant interest in developing expert 
systems for assistance in audit decisions [see e.g, Boritz and Wensley, 1988; 
Chandler, 1985; Hansen and Messier, 1986a, and 1986b; Leslie et al., 1986]. It 
is believed that use of such systems will facilitate audit decisions and make 
audits more efficient and effective. This appears to be the reason that major 
accounting firms are committing increasingly greater resources to developing 
such systems [see e.g., Boritz and Brown, 1986; Kelly, 1987; Shpilberg and 
Graham, 1986]. 
Most of the expert systems being developed are rule-based. While such 
systems have many attractive features such as modularity of knowledge-base, 
ease of updating knowledge-base, etc., they are not well-suited for coherent 
reasoning under uncertainty. This is because in rule-based systems, the user 
has no control over the chain of inference whereas, coherent reasoning under 
uncertainty requires controlled firing of rules [Shafer, 1987]. Because of this 
difficulty, some developers of expert systems have avoided dealing with 
uncertainties altogether [Kelly et al., 1986]. In domains where uncertain 
reasoning is unavoidable, heuristic approaches have been attempted with little 
success [Shortliffe and Buchanan, 1975; Duda et al., 1976]. In recent years, 
considerable theoretical work has been done on the subject of coherent 
uncertain inference using Bayesian probabilities and belief-functions [see e.g., 
Pearl, 1986; Kong, 1986; Shenoy and Shafer, 1986; Mellouli, 1987; Shafer, 
Shenoy and Mellouli, 1987; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988; Shafer and 
Shenoy, 1988]. The expert system described in this article represents one of 
the first practical applications of these new techniques. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe an interactive tool called 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT (AA). The system, when fully developed, should 
* This research has been supported in part by grants from the Peat Marwick Foundation, the 
National Science Foundation grant No. IST-8610293 and General Research Fund of the University 
of Kansas. The authors are grateful for discussions and assistance with programming from Yen-Teh 
Hsia, Debra Zarley and Ragu Srinivasan. 
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enable its users (auditors) to construct a network of variables and evidence. 
The system will automatically aggregate all evidence that is entered and display 
the resulting beliefs in all variables in the network. The system will have the 
capability of using both the Bayesian and the belief-function formalisms for 
managing uncertainties. It will provide a graphic interface for constructing a 
network of variables and evidence and it will automatically revise beliefs in all 
variables as new pieces of evidence are entered. 
This paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides a detailed 
discussion of AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT. Section 3 discusses an example 
demonstrating the process of constructing a network of variables and evidence 
and aggregation of evidence using the belief-function calculus. The final section 
summarizes the results. A brief introduction to the theory of belief-functions is 
given in Appendix A. 
2. Auditor's Assistant 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT is an interactive system for assisting auditors in 
making audit decisions. AA's theoretical foundation is based on coherent 
management of uncertain inference. With this system, an auditor can graphi­
cally create a network of variables and evidence, input judgments about the 
degree of support provided by a piece of evidence to the variable it is linked to, 
and evaluate the resulting total belief in all variables in the network. An auditor 
can also use the system to decide which procedure or test to perform next and 
also to decide when sufficient evidence has been obtained to issue an opinion. 
In auditing the financial statements of a firm, there are two major 
conceptual tasks. First, an argument needs to be constructed. This is the 
process of organizing different pieces of evidence and the variables which they 
support. One formal result of this process is a network of variables and 
evidence. We shall refer to this network as a design [see Shafer and Cohen, 
1987]. The process of constructing a design cannot be easily automated. It has 
to be done by a human expert, i.e., an experienced auditor. However, we can 
assist the auditor in this process by providing examples in the form of templates 
and by checking certain technical conditions, e.g., the Markov property 
[Shafer, Shenoy and Mellouli, 1987; Shafer and Shenoy, 1988], that have to be 
satisfied. 
Second, once an argument is in place, evidence has to be collected, 
judgments about the degree of support provided by such evidence to variables 
have to be made, and these judgments have to be aggregated and evaluated for 
all variables in the tree. The collection of evidence and judgments of degree of 
support are tasks that have to be done by the auditor. However, the 
aggregation and evaluation of evidence can be automated. 
The process of collecting evidence, making judgments, and aggregating 
judgments is iterative. Items of evidence are evaluated as they are collected, 
and this evaluation influences what evidence is collected next. The decisions 
about what evidence to seek next is one aspect of control [Cohen, 1987; Shafer 
and Cohen, 1987]. Again, this is not easy to automate. The experienced auditor 
makes these decisions. However, an interactive system should assist the 
auditor in these decisions in two ways. First, the system should automatically 
aggregate evidence as it is obtained and entered into the system, and the 
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system should display the net effect of all evidence on all variables in the 
network. Second, the system should allow a what-if analysis by allowing its user 
to enter a hypothetical piece of evidence and displaying its effect on all the 
variables. The user should then be able to retract this hypothetical evidence. 
In general, as discussed in the professional standards [AICPA, 1987] and 
also in the academic literature [see, e.g., Graham 1985a-1985e], auditors 
gather three types of evidence. One type comes from reviews of the external 
and internal environments in which the business is operating. External 
environments include economic, social and political environments. Internal 
environments include management integrity, quality of management, structure 
of management, and the general business awareness of the management. A 
second type deals with the strength of internal accounting controls. A strong 
set of internal accounting controls may mean more reliable accounting data and, 
therefore, less need for substantive tests. The third type comes from 
performing substantive tests to determine directly whether account balances 
are fairly stated in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Such tests include analytical review procedures and direct tests of balances 
such as confirmations of receivables from customers. 
There are several formalisms to aggregate uncertain evidence, including 
the Bayesian probability calculus [Pearl, 1986; Shenoy and Shafer, 1986; 
Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988; Shafer and Shenoy, 1988] and Shafer's 
theory of belief-functions [Shafer, 1976; Shenoy and Shafer, 1986; Kong, 1986; 
Shafer, Shenoy and Mellouli, 1987; Mellouli, 1987]. These calculi differ in their 
need for structure, inputs, flexibility and computational complexity. The 
Bayesian probability calculus demands structure in the form of conditional 
independence, and it demands numerous inputs in the form of priors and 
conditional probabilities, but it is relatively efficient computationally. The belief-
function calculus offers more flexibility and demands less inputs, but it can be 
computationally more intensive than the Bayesian calculus. 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT uses the belief-function calculus to represent 
and aggregate evidence. Shafer and Srivastava [1989] have demonstrated the 
importance and relevance of belief-functions for audit decisions based on the 
structure of audit evidence. Since the belief-function calculus reduces to the 
Bayesian calculus when all inputs demanded by the Bayesian calculus are 
available, AA can also work with probabilities. 
Once a network is in place, the auditor conducts procedures and, on the 
basis of the results, he or she provides numerical degrees of support for the 
variable the evidence is linked to. Then, AA aggregates the evidence and 
maintains a display of the degrees of support provided by all evidence collected 
so far to all variables in the network. 
As it exists today, AA allows an auditor to construct only a tree of variables 
and evidence. No loops are allowed. However, AA is currently being updated to 
include arbitrary networks. The user creates the tree visually and interactively 
using a mouse as an input device. The nodes of the tree represent variables and 
the links between nodes represent relations between variables. The user has 
many options for manipulating the tree on the screen: moving a node by 
dragging it, collapsing a sub-tree into a node, etc. 
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3. An Example 
In this section we will describe the use of AA in a simple audit engage­
ment.1 
Suppose ABC Hardware Co. is a small wholesale distributor of hardware 
located in the Midwest. Most of ABC's customers are retail hardware stores. 
Srifer & Co. has been asked to perform an annual audit of ABC's financial 
statements. 
3.1. Constructing a Network of Variables and Evidence 
Srifer & Co. has audited ABC Hardware's financial statements for the last 
four years. After reviewing the previous years' working papers and under­
standing the client's business environment, the audit team (consisting of a 
senior, manager and partner) constructs a network of variables and evidence 
related to accounts receivables (AR) and allowance for bad debts (ABD). For 
simplicity of exposition, we assume that the audit team has decided not to 
depend on the internal accounting controls in the sales and collection cycle. 
Thus, the audit team will depend only on the environmental factors, analytical 
review results, and some direct tests of balances. This network is shown in 
Figure 1. 
The rounded rectangular nodes represent variables that are of interest to 
the auditor. For example, the main variable in Figure 1 is whether net accounts 
receivable is fairly stated. Associated with each variable is a collection of 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive values. For example, the values 
associated with the net accounts receivable variable are nar (denoting that net 
accounts receivable is fairly stated) and —nar (denoting that net accounts 
receivable is not fairly stated). All variables in Figure 1 are binary-valued. A 
brief description of each variable is indicated inside the node. 
The circular nodes represent relations between the variables they are 
linked to. For example, net accounts receivable is fairly stated if and only if both 
accounts receivable and allowance for bad debts are fairly stated. Also, 
accounts receivable is fairly stated if and only the following objectives have 
been met: completeness, ownership, adequate disclosure, proper classification, 
validity and valuation (see, e.g., Arens and Loebbecke [1988], for further 
discussion of these objectives). Formally, a relation is modeled as a belief-
function. For example, the relation between net accounts receivable, accounts 
receivable and allowance for bad debts can be represented in terms of a basic 
probability assignment function m as follows (see Appendix A for a definition of 
m): 
m({(nar,ar,abd), (~ nar,ar, ~abd),(~ nar, ~ ar,abd),(~ nar, ~ar, ~ abd)}) = 1. 
The rectangular nodes represent evidence. A description of the procedures 
and tests leading to the evidence shown in Figure 1 is given in Table 1. The 
links between evidence nodes and variable nodes indicate that the evidence 
provides some support for the variables it is linked to. For example, in Figure 1 
1 The main purpose of this example is to illustrate the use of AA in planning and evaluation 
decisions. The numerical inputs used in the example are purely for illustration purposes. 
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Figure 1. A network of variables and evidence for ABC Hardware. 
evidence Env. 1.1 provides support directly to the net accounts receivable 
variable. 
Formally, each piece of evidence is modeled as a belief-function on the set 
of possible values of the variables it is linked to. For example, if the outcome of 
the Env. 1.1 procedure results in a 60% degree of support for nar, then this 
piece of evidence is represented in the system as follows: 
m({nar}) = 0.60, m({nar, ~ nar}) = 0.40. 
Functions of this type (where a certain degree is committed to one value of a 
variable and the rest is uncommitted) are called simple support functions. We 
expect most of the evidence to be of this type. Thus, in order to make a 
judgment about a piece of evidence, an auditor needs to decide whether the 
evidence supports the affirmative or negative value of a variable, and the 
degree (a number between 0 and 1) to which it does so. 
At the outset of the engagement (before any tests or procedures have been 
performed), a network of variables and evidence, such as the one shown in 
Figure 1, serves as a plan for performing the audit. Before a procedure is 
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TABLE 1. Description of procedures and tests leading to evidence shown in 
Figure 1. 
An. Rev. 1.1 Review AR journal for unusual items and compare individual 
customer balances over a stated amount with previous years. 
An. Rev. 1.2 a. Compare allowance for bad debt as a percentage of 
accounts receivable with previous years. 
b. Compare number of days accounts receivable outstanding 
with previous years. 
c. Compare bad debt expense as a percentage of gross sales 
with previous years. 
Env. 1.1 Review the competence and trustworthiness of the account­
ing personnel working in sales transactions. 
Env. 1.2 Review management's credit policy. 
ST 1.1 Trace a sample of accounts from the subsidiary ledger to the 
aged trial balance. 
ST 1.2 Review the minutes of the board of directors' meetings for any 
pledged or factored accounts receivable. Also inquire of man­
agement whether any receivables are pledged or factored. 
ST 1.3 Review the receivables listed on the aged trial balance for 
notes and related party receivables. 
ST 1.4 Trace a sample of accounts from the trial balance to the 
related subsidiary ledger. 
ST 1.5 Confirm accounts receivables from customers. 
ST 1.6 Discuss with credit manager the likelihood of collecting older 
accounts over 120 days and evaluate whether the receivables 
are collectible. 
performed, it is represented in the system as a vacuous belief-function (see 
Appendix A for the definition of a vacuous belief-function). Propagating all these 
belief-functions results in zero belief for each value for all variables in the 
network. In other words, before collecting any evidence, the auditor is 
completely ignorant about whether the financial statements are fairly presented 
or contain a material error. However, once a test is performed, the auditor 
makes a numerical judgment about the degree of support provided by the test 
to the variable the evidence is linked to in the network. After this is entered 
into the system, the system propagates the evidence to all variables in the 
network and the revised beliefs for all variables are then displayed. 
At any stage of the audit, the auditor has to decide which procedures he or 
she is going to perform next. Of course, at any stage of the audit, depending on 
the results of the tests already conducted, an auditor may decide that certain 
procedures are unnecessary. On the other hand, an auditor may need to change 
his or her plan to include more tests because the tests planned for do not 
provide the necessary evidence to issue an opinion. 
66 
3.2. Planning and Aggregation of Evidence 
To illustrate the planning of the audit and the aggregation of evidence, we 
will further simplify the example. Assume that the audit team has concluded 
that the objectives of completeness, ownership, adequate disclosure, and proper 
classification have been met without any reservations. The objectives yet to be 
verified are validity and valuation for AR. The network relevant to this 
situation is shown in Figure 2. The rectangular nodes are shown with a dotted 
fill in Figure 2 to indicate that none of these procedures has been performed 
yet. Since no procedures have been performed yet, no support is available to 
any of the values of the variables as shown in Figure 2. For each variable in the 
network, there are two numbers shown inside the rectangular box at the 
bottom. The first of these two numbers indicates the total belief for the 
affirmative value of the variable. For example, for the NAR variable, 
Bel({nar}) = 0 in Figure 2. The second number indicates the total belief for the 
negative value of the variable. For example, for the NAR variable, 
Bel({ ~ nar}) = 0 in Figure 2. 
We will consider two different scenarios and the resulting evaluations about 
the fairness of NAR. 
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3.2.1. Scenario One 
Suppose that the audit team finds the management and accounting person­
nel to be competent and trustworthy (Env. 1.1). The audit team decides that 
this evidence supports nar to degree 0.60. Also, the results of the analytical 
review procedures (An. Rev. 1.1) show no unusual items and no apparent 
problems in AR balance. The team makes a judgment that this supports 'ar' to 
degree 0.60. These judgments are propagated through the network resulting in 
the beliefs shown in Figure 3. Notice that there is now an overall support of 
0.60 for the assertion that NAR is fairly presented and no support for the 
assertion that NAR is materially misstated (i.e., Bel({nar}) = 0.60, 
Bel({ ~nar}) = 0). Although there is no support for the assertion that NAR is 
materially misstated, there is a maximum 40% risk based on the two pieces of 
evidence that NAR could be materially misstated (i.e., Pl({~nar}) = 0.40 
where PI is a plausibility function related to the belief-function Bel by the 
relation Pl({ ~ nar}) = 1 - Bel({nar}). 
Let us assume that the audit team plans to conduct the audit so that they 
obtain at least 90% overall support for nar, i.e., targeted Bel({nar}) is 0.90. 
Note that the evidence from An. Rev. 1.1 provides no support yet to nar since 
no support for abd has yet been obtained from procedures, ST 1.6, An. Rev. 
1.2, and Env. 1.2 (remember that NAR is fairly stated only when AR and ABD 
Figure 3. The network of variables after performing Env. 1.1 and An. Rev. 1.1 in 
Scenario One. 
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are fairly stated). It should be noted that ar and the two objectives of ar (validity 
and valuation) in Figure 4 have 84% support from Env. 1.1 and An. Rev. 1.1. 
The 0.60 support for nar is entirely due to Env. 1.1. Therefore, the team 
decides to perform analytical review procedures for allowance for bad debts 
(An. Rev. 1.2) next. 
Suppose they find that the allowance is reasonable given the accounts 
receivable balance. Also, certain ratio analyses suggest that ABD is fairly 
presented. The team makes a conservative judgment that a 60% degree of 
support is obtained from this evidence for abd. The resulting network is shown 
in Figure 4. Thus, propagating the three judgments through the network 
results in an overall support for nar of 0.74 and no support for ~nar (i.e., 
Bel({nar}) = 0.74, Bel({~nar}) = 0). 
Next, since not enough support is available yet for nar, the team decides to 
perform substantive test procedures for validity and valuation of AR. (Of 
course, the team recognizes that certain substantive test procedures are 
required by the AICPA. For example, confirmations of AR from the customers 
is a requirement [AICPA, 1987, AU331]). The extent of testing would depend 
on the level of support desired by the team. Let us assume that they plan on 
achieving 80% support for validity of AR by tracing a sample of accounts from 
the aged trial balance to the related subsidiary ledger. The senior performs the 
Figure 4. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1 and An. Rev. 1.2 in 
Scenario One. 
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test and finds no exceptions. The team makes a judgment that an 80% degree 
of support is obtained by the evidence for the validity objective. This evidence 
is entered into the system and the resulting network is shown in Figure 5. The 
overall support for nar is still 0.74. The reason for no change in the overall 
support for nar is that the evidence from ST 1.4 supports only the validity 
objective. There is no direct support yet for the valuation objective. Since both 
objectives have to be met for AR to be fairly presented, ST 1.4 provides no 
support by itself to the fair presentation of AR. However, the level of support 
shown in Figure 5 represents the overall support when all the items of 
evidence have been aggregated. 
As discussed earlier, AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT would have the capability 
of performing a what-if analysis for deciding the nature, timing, and extent of 
tests. In principle, the auditor can assume a certain level of support that he or 
she plans to obtain from a test procedure and see its impact on the overall 
support for the main assertion of interest. Of course, the decision about what 
test to perform next, and the extent of the test, depends on the auditor. The 
cost of performing a test has to be balanced with the level of support desired. 
Usually, analytical review procedures do not provide a high level of support 
unless the test involves statistical analyses. Similarly, making inquiries of the 
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Figure 5. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.2 and ST 
1.4 in Scenario One. 
client provides a lower level of support. However, confirmation from third 
parties is considered to be reliable and it provides a higher level of support. 
Now suppose that the team decides to send a sample of positive confirma­
tions to the client's customers in order to achieve a 90% degree of support for 
the validity of AR. The confirmation test also provides support for the valuation 
objective to a great extent because the customer usually checks the account 
balance for accuracy. The audit staff analyzes the returned confirmations and 
finds no exceptions. The team, having reviewed the staffs work, makes a 
judgment that the confirmation test provides a 90% degree of support for the 
validity objective and an 85% degree of support for the valuation objective. For 
simplicity of exposition, we will assume that the above two judgments are 
independent. The resulting beliefs of all variables are shown in Figure 6. The 
overall support for nar is now 0.83 and there is still no support for ~nar (i.e., 
Bel({nar}) = 0.83, Bel({ ~nar}) = 0). 
Since the overall support for nar is still below the target level of 0.90, the 
team plans to perform some further tests. Since the support for ar is already 
quite high (Bel({ar}) = 0.98), they conclude that there is no need for further 
evidence that supports ar. However, support for abd is still low 
(Bel({abd}) = 0.84). Thus, they decide to meet with the credit manager to 
discuss whether the firm has any collectibility problems with their accounts (ST 
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Figure 6. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.2, ST 1.4, 
and ST 1.5 in Scenario One. 
1.6). They find that there is no account that is more than 120 days overdue. 
Furthermore, all accounts seem to be quite good. The team makes a judgment 
that this evidence supports abd to degree 0.60. The resulting beliefs for the 
variables are shown in Figure 7. The overall support for nar is now 0.92 and 
there is no evidence to support ~nar (i.e., Bel({nar}) = 0.92, 
Bel({~nar}) = 0). 
At this stage, the audit team decides to conclude the audit since they have 
sufficient evidence to issue an opinion about the fairness of NAR. The audit 
team also knows that given the evidence, the maximum risk that NAR is 
materially misstated is only 8%. 
Although the audit team had initially planned to review ABC's credit policy 
(Env. 1.2), they do not perform this test since, on the basis of tests already 
conducted, they have a sufficiently high belief that NAR is fairly stated. Without 
a formal analysis of the type shown above, perhaps an audit team may end up 
doing more tests than necessary. AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT, when fully 
developed, should provide assistance to auditors in deciding when sufficient 
evidence has been collected to issue an opinion. 
3.2.2. Scenario Two 
In this case, assume that the results of Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, ST 1.4, and 
Figure 7. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.2, ST 1.4, 
ST 1.5, and ST 1.6 in Scenario One. 
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ST 1.5 are the same as in Scenario One. The results of An. Rev. 1.2 and ST 1.6 
are different from the ones described above. 
Suppose that the analytical review procedure An. Rev. 1.2 performed by 
the senior has revealed that the allowance for bad debts may be understated in 
relation to this year's accounts receivable balance. Also the AR balance has 
increased significantly compared to the credit sales, implying that a more liberal 
credit policy has been adopted this year, compared to the past. Furthermore, 
the collection of receivables is slow. Based on this evidence, the audit team 
makes a judgment that ABD is understated to degree 0.25. The aggregate 
beliefs in all variables are now shown in Figure 8. The overall beliefs in nar and 
~nar are 0.53 and 0.12, respectively. The maximum risk of NAR being 
materially misstated is 0.47 (i.e., Pl({~nar}) = 1 -Bel({nar}) = 0.47). 
The audit team now decides to review the client's credit policy (Env. 1.2). 
The senior performs the review and finds that this year, the client has been 
quite liberal in granting credit. He attributes the increase in AR balance this 
year to the firm's liberal credit policy. The team makes a judgment that the 
evidence supports ~abd to degree 0.40. 
The senior also meets with the credit manger to discuss the firm's credit 
policy (ST 1.6). The credit manager agrees with the senior's assessment that 
allowance for bad debts may be understated. Based on this evidence, the audit 
Figure 8. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, ST 1.4, ST 1.5, and 
An. Rev. 1.2 in Scenario Two. 
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team makes a judgment that supports ~abd to degree 0.80. This judgment, 
when combined with the previous findings, yields an overall support of 0.80 for 
~abd (see Figure 9). Therefore, the audit team decides at this point to 
propose an adjustment for ABD. No adjustment need be proposed for AR since 
the overall support for ar is 0.95, which is above their target level. 
4. Summary 
AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT is not a rule-based system. The knowledge-base 
of AA is a network of variables and evidence. Since each auditing engagement 
is unique, a network of variables and evidence has to be constructed by the 
user. There are several ways in which the system assists the user with this 
task. First, the graphics user interface of AA is designed to make the task of 
constructing a network as easy and intuitive as possible. Second, the user does 
not have to start from scratch. Instead, (s)he can start with a template and 
modify it to fit the engagement at hand. The system automatically handles 
technical aspects of network construction such as ensuring that the network 
satisfies the Markov property. Also, the system (when fully developed) should 
automatically reduce a non-tree network to a tree by clustering variables and 
using the resulting clustered tree to propagate the evidence. At this time, the 
Figure 9. The network after performing Env. 1.1, An. Rev. 1.1, ST 1.4, ST 1.5, 
An. Rev. 1.2, Env. 1.2 and ST 1.6 in Scenario Two.  
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system is only capable of propagating belief-functions in networks that are 
already trees. 
The user can use the network of variables and evidence as a planning 
device. At each stage, AA will display the beliefs for each variable in the 
network as a function of the evidence that has been collected and entered into 
the system. At each stage, the user needs to decide what test or procedure to 
perform next. AA can assist in this decision by performing a what-if analysis 
and indicating the degree of belief provided to the main variable of interest as a 
function of the test results. The auditor can then choose between different 
tests and sample sizes based on cost of test and increase in degree of belief for 
the main variable of interest. 
When there is sufficient belief for the main variable of interest, the auditor 
can issue an appropriate opinion. 
In summary, it is useful to think of AUDITOR'S ASSISTANT as a 
knowledge engineering tool instead of as an expert system. Coherent reasoning 
under uncertainty requires construction of an argument. Once an argument is 
in place, aggregation of evidence is easily automated. 
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Appendix A 
A Primer on The Theory of Belief Functions 
Here we shall present the basics of the theory of belief-functions. See 
Shafer [1976] for details. 
Let X denote a variable with possible values x1, . . . ,xn. We shall refer to 
the set of all possible values of a variable (exactly one of which is true) as a 
frame of discernment. A basic probability assignment (bpa) function on a frame 0 
is a function m : 2 Ө - [0,1] such that 
m(A)≥0 for all Aε2 Ө , m(ø) = 0, and Σ{m(A)|Aε2Ө} = 1 
Intuitively, m(A) represents the degree of belief assigned exactly to A (the 
proposition that the true value of X is in the set A). A basic probability 
assignment function corresponds to a probability mass function in Bayesian 
probability theory. Whereas a probability mass function is restricted to 
assigning probability masses only to singleton values of variables, a bpa 
function is allowed to assign masses to sets of values without assigning any 
mass to the individual values contained in the sets. For example, if we have 
absolutely no knowledge about the true value of a variable, we can represent 
this situation by a bpa function as follows: 
m(Ө) = 1, m(A) = 0 for all other Aε2 Ө . 
Such a function is called a vacuous bpa function. Note that in Bayesian 
probability theory, the only way to express total ignorance is to assign a mass of 
1/n to each value where n is the total number of possible values. Thus, in 
Bayesian probability theory we are unable to distinguish between equally likely 
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values and total ignorance. The theory of belief-functions offers a richer 
semantics. 
Associated with a bpa function are two related functions called belief and 
plausibility. A belief-function is a function Bel:2Ө—[0,1] such that 
Bel(A) = Σ{m(B)|B A}. 
Whereas m(A) represented the belief assigned exactly to A, Bel(A) 
represents the total belief assigned to A. Note that Bel(ø) = 0 and Bel(Ө) = 1 
for any bpa function. For the vacuous bpa function m, the corresponding belief-
function Bel is given by 
Bel(Ө) = 1, and Bel(A) = 0 for all other Aε2 Ө . 
A plausibility function is a function P1:2Ө—[0,1] such that 
Pl(A) = Σ{m(B)|B A ≠ ø } 
P1(A) represents the total degree of belief that could be assigned to A. Note 
that P1(A) = 1 -Bel( ~A) where ~A represents the complement of A in Ө, 
i.e., ~ A = Ө - A. Also note that Pl(A) ≥ Bel(A). For the vacuous bpa function, 
the corresponding plausibility function is 
P1(ø) = 0, and Pl(A) = 1 for all AεӨ. 
If a bpa function m is also a probability mass function (i.e., all the probability 
masses are assigned only to singleton subsets), then Bel(A) = Pl(A) = 
Σ{m({xi}|xiεA} = probability of proposition A. 
If m1 and m 2 are bpa functions representing two independent pieces of 
evidence, then we can combine them using Dempster's rule of combination and 
obtain a new bpa function, denoted by m1 m2, representing the aggregated 
evidence as follows: 
m1 m2(A) = K - 1 Σ{m 1 (B 1 )m 2 (B 2 ) |B 1 B 2 = A} if A≠ø, and m 1 m2(ø) = 0 
where K =1l-Σ{m 1 (B 1 )m 2 (B 2 ) |B 1 B 2 = ø}. The above definition assumes 
that K≠0. If K = 0, then the two pieces of evidence contradict each other 
completely, and it is not possible to combine such evidence. 
Let us illustrate Dempster's rule of combination by means of two examples. 
Example 1 
Suppose that the variable under consideration is the validity of accounts 
receivable with frame {v, ~ v}. The results of substantive test 1.4 lead to the 
bpa function m1 as follows: 
m1({v}) = .8, m1({v,~v}) = .2 
Furthermore, results of substantive test 1.5 lead to the bpa function m 2 as 
follows: 
m2({v}) = 0.9, m2({v, ~v}) = . l 
Combining m1 and m 2 by Dempster's rule leads to the bpa function mxv 
m 2 as follows: 
m1 m2({v}) = .72 + .08 + .18 = .98, 
m1 m2({v, ~v}) = .02. 
The details of Dempster's rule are shown in Figure 10. In this example, 
there is no conflict between the two pieces of evidence, i.e., K = 1. 
77 






Suppose that the variable under consideration is the fairness of allowance 
for bad debts with frame {abd, — abd}. The results of an analytical review test 
lead to a bpa function m1 as follows. 
m1({abd}) = 0.8, m1({abd, ~abd}) = 0.2 
However, an environmental review uncovers the fact that one of the 
client's major customers has filed for Chapter 11 and may not be in a position to 
pay its bills. Let us represent this evidence as follows: 
m2({~abd}) = 0.1, m2({abd, ~abd}) = 0.9 
Combining these two pieces of evidence leads to the aggregated bpa 
function: 
m1 m2({abd}) = .72/0.92= .78 
m1 m2({~ abd}) = .02/0.92 = .02 
m1 m2({abd, ~abd}) = .18/0.92= .20 
The details of Dempster's rule are shown in Figure 11. Note that in this 
case the evidence is conflicting (K = 1- .08 = 0.92) and so we end up 
renormalizing the bpa function so that the values add to 1. 
In general, Dempster's rule of combination has the following properties: 
(i) Commutativity: m 1 m 2 = m 2 m 1 
(ii) Associativity: (m1 m2) m 3 = m 1 (m2 m3) 
(iii) In general, m 1 m1≠m1. The bpa m 1 m 1 will favor the same subsets as 
m1, but it will do so with twice the weight of evidence, as it were. 
(iv) If m1 is vacuous, then m 1 m 2 = m 2. 
In Bayesian probability theory, evidence is aggregated using Bayes's rule. It 
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In general, Dempster rule of combination has the following properties: 
(i) Commutativity: m1 m 2 = m2 m1 
(ii) Associativity: (m1 m2) m 3 = m1 (m2 m3) 
(iii) In general, m1 m 1 ≠m 1 . The bpa m1 m1 will favor the same subsets as m^ but it 
will do so with twice the weight of evidence, as it were. 
(iv) If m1 is vacuous, then m1 m 2 = m2. 
In Bayesian probability theory, evidence is aggregated using Bayes's rule. It is easy to show 





Discussant's Response to "AUDITOR'S 
ASSISTANT: A Knowledge Engineering Tool 
for Audit Decisions" 
John B. Sullivan 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
There is much about this article that I like. The focus of this article is on the 
development of an expert system designed to help the field auditor make more 
efficient decisions about the level of audit testing required. Both these topics 
are high on the list of priorities of all of the national accounting firms. A 
significant portion of the budgets of most major firms is being directed toward 
the development of personal computer-based expert systems to increase audit 
efficiency. 
The authors recognize the need for the active interaction of the field auditor 
in the use of an expert system. Too many articles fail to give proper credit to 
the level of knowledge which resides in the audit engagement team. Firms 
attempt to keep turnover at the partner, manager and senior levels to a 
minimum. As a result, audit engagements are frequently staffed by an 
engagement team with ten or eleven years of total client experience. I believe 
this paper attempts to give proper recognition to the benefits to be gained by 
tapping into that experience. The authors stress the importance of understand­
ing the client's business environment. In our firm's approach, we list 
"Understanding the Business" as the first step of the business review. 
Although this differs slightly from the authors' "understanding the client's 
business environment," I believe they both recognize this area as the first and 
most important step in an audit. 
The article is also one of the few which focus on the audit team and the 
decisions which must be made by that audit team. We need more articles on 
and research in this important area of audit practice. 
Unfortunately, I believe that my negative comments outweigh my positive 
comments. In summary, I do not believe that the authors are on the right track 
yet. My general impression of the knowledge engineering tool described in the 
paper is that it will not be widely endorsed in practice and it may be flawed in 
theory. 
In my view, some of the fatal theoretical flaws of the tool involve a failure to 
appreciate the complexity of the audit process. Individual pieces of audit 
evidence frequently impact more than one assertion, and indeed may impact 
other areas or the entire audit. For example, one piece of audit evidence which 
indicts the integrity of management may lead either to a qualification or a 
disclaimer of opinion. 
In addition, I do not believe that the authors' system, as described in this 
paper, gives enough weight to the importance and interaction of individual audit 
procedures. In Scenario One, the authors indicate revision of the nar from 0.83 
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to 0.92 based upon discussions with the credit manager on collectibility 
problems. As a result of this increase, an additional audit procedure which had 
been planned is not performed. This is even more distressing as the paper does 
not discuss whether or not any objective evidence other than discussions was 
used to put the team over the target level of 0.90. 
The additional audit procedure not performed is a review of ABC's credit 
policy. There have been so many instances of audit problems created by 
changes in a company's credit policy that not to perform such a basic procedure 
would lead me to question whether the engagement team had obtained an 
understanding of the business. 
From a practical point of view, this type of question would generally not 
represent any significant time savings. The engagement team did have access 
to the credit manager. How much longer would the conversation have lasted if 
the team had asked the credit manager if there were any changes in credit 
policy? The only way this could represent a significant time savings would be if 
there had been significant changes in policy. In that case, time savings should 
not be the driving force because a radical change in credit policy could mean a 
significant increase in potential uncollectible accounts. This could be true 
without regard to whether or not the accounts are over 120 days past due. 
Also in Scenario One, "the audit team finds the management and account­
ing personnel to be competent and trustworthy and decides that this evidence 
supports nar to degree 0.60." Where are the SAS 47 [AICPA, 1983] concepts 
of inherent and control risk in the authors' equation? I am sure we have all dealt 
with competent and trustworthy accounting personnel who, because of the 
existence of significant inherent risk, delivered to the auditors an accounts 
receivable section which contained a material error. This has frequently been 
the case where the industry has experienced rapid change such as the oil and 
gas industry or the savings and loan industry. By neglecting to assess the risk 
that the balance contains errors that could be material to the financial 
statements, the authors' belief functions could also be misstated. The article 
states "the audit team also knows that the maximum risk that nar is materially 
misstated is only 8%." This would appear to be a very bold statement, given 
the fact that the allowance for doubtful accounts has not been reviewed. 
However, even if this statement were true, SAS 39 [AICPA, 1981] would 
appear to set the limit of audit risk at about 0.05. 
The authors appear to either ignore, or fail to understand, the practical role 
of an audit program. One of the authors' statements is that "at any stage of the 
audit the auditor has to decide which procedures he or she is going to perform 
next." This question is generally answered, in practice, by the audit program. 
The authors' statement that the decision on what to do is taking place during 
the performance of the audit is simply not true for most audit engagements. 
AU Section 311.05 states that "the author should prepare a written audit 
program (or a set of written audit programs)." The audit programs are 
generally prepared during the planning stage of an engagement. The auditing 
literature also states that "as the examination progresses, changed conditions 
may make it necessary to modify the planned audit procedures." I assume that 
the elimination of planned audit procedures, as a result of changes in the actual 
versus planned strength of audit evidence represents the core of the authors' 
"engineering tool." 
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However, in an actual audit, I believe there would be significant practical 
problems with the system described by the authors. The system generally 
requires an assignment of degrees of support to each piece of audit evidence by 
the audit team. The audit team is described as comprising the audit senior, 
manager and partner. I know of no present audit engagements which require 
this much team decision making. On most medium-sized audit engagements, 
the audit team is not together on a daily basis, or even a weekly basis. Most 
decisions on the extent of audit procedures are made during the planning and 
review stages of the engagement. While I agree with the authors that this may 
lead to a slight degree of overauditing for new clients, for old established clients 
or for clients in specialized industries, there is probably very little overauditing. 
There is certainly not enough overauditing to justify the system described in 
this paper. 
Additional comments concerning the "automation of evaluation of evi­
dence" also trouble me. I believe that the degree to which we remove the 
auditor from the active association with the evaluation of evidence we create 
audit risk. It is great to see that each piece of evidence, gathered mathe­
matically, increases our degree of confidence. However, such techniques may 
create the "halo" effect that has been noted in previous academic studies. 
How questioning will an auditor be if he is examining a piece of audit evidence 
when his nar equals 0.80? Will he still have the same degree of professional 
skepticism required? 
Many firms presently require an auditor to sign off each program step as it 
is completed. Each step is separate and distinct, and represents a concrete 
individual audit unit. Although I recognize that some of the steps give us more 
audit comfort, each step is important and generally must be performed 
diligently. 
In the paper, statements are made concerning analytical review, client 
inquiries and confirmation procedures that are very judgmental and unsup­
ported. SAS No. 56, dated April 1988, will require the application of analytical 
procedures in the planning and overall review stages of all audits [AICPA, 
1988]. The required use of analytical procedures was also recommended in the 
report by the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 
October 1987. Client inquiries and confirmations vary in effectiveness depend­
ing upon the circumstances of the individual client. 
Another practical problem created by this article is illustrated by the 
comment: "The team having reviewed the staff's work makes a judgment that 
the confirmation provides a 90 percent degree of support for validity and an 85 
percent degree of support for the valuation objective." The paper does not 
address how a team would be able to distinguish such a fine degree of 
percentage support for each objective. I believe such a fine distinction would 
not be possible in practice. 
Scenario Two provides even more examples of impractical mathematical 
calculations. In Scenario Two, the engagement team believes that the allow­
ance for bad debts may be understated. They discuss the situation with the 
credit manager, who also agrees with the assessment that the allowance may 
be understated. Based upon this information, the support is calculated at 0.80. 
In my experience, if the client were to agree with the auditor's assessment, 
82 
the support would be much higher than 0.80. Clients generally do not agree 
unless there is a problem. 
In summary, I believe that the system described in this article will not be 
practicable. The team concept envisioned by this article is not a workable 
concept in practice. The system basically ignores the role of the audit program 
in an audit process and the requirement for preparation of such a program 
during the planning phase of an engagement. Finally, the system provides far 
too many chances for an aggressive litigation counsel to question the firm's 
judgment in the event of an audit failure, and does very little to prevent such a 
failure. 
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5 
Reports on the Application of Accounting 
Principles—A Review of SAS 50 
James A. Johnson 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Introduction 
Like most other professionals, a Certified Public Accountant is often asked 
to air views on matters within his or her ken. When the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants issued the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 
50, "Reports on the Application of Accounting Principles," professional stand­
ards applied to the accountant's response to many of these requests. 
Background 
SAS 50, issued in July, 1986, was the work product of the Generic Letter 
Task Force of the Auditing Standards Board. The original charge to the Task 
Force, in 1984, was relatively benign: "to monitor the issuance of, and prepare 
issues papers on the technical aspects of, generic letters." 
In reality, the atmosphere was highly charged. In June, 1984, Don Kirk, the 
Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board at the time, asked a 
number of pointed questions when commenting on professionalism in account­
ing: 
• Does heightened competition among CPA firms encourage a search 
for ways around the spirit of accounting standards? 
• Are not investment bankers fulfilling their essential role in developing 
innovative financing arrangements which may, in fact, tend to frustrate 
the spirit of accounting standards? 
He also recommended, among other things, that each CPA firm focus on the 
problem of "advising non-clients on accounting matters." 
In short, the profession, the standard setters, the regulators and others 
were, and continue to be, concerned with the application of "cute" accounting 
principles and "shopping" for accounting opinions. 
Does SAS 50 help halt either of these practices? Sadly not, in the opinion of 
the author. On the other hand, the author believes that the reports themselves 
are a positive development in the accounting principles process. This paper 
explains these conclusions, examines the guidance contained in SAS 50, and 
discusses the reasons financial intermediaries and other "non-auditing'' clients 
ask CPAs for reports on the application of accounting principles. 
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SAS 50: Reports on the Application of 
Accounting Principles 
Terms Used 
A variety of parties interested in the "outcome" of an SAS 50 report are 
identified in the standard: 
• Reporting Accountant—An accountant in public practice who issues a 
written report or other form of communication covered by SAS 50; 
• Continuing Accountant—An accountant engaged to report on financial 
statements. Simply put, the continuing accountant is usually the 
auditor for a company contemplating, or having completed, a transac­
tion of the type dealt with by the reporting accountant; and 
• Intermediary—Most often an investment banker, but anyone advising 
a principal to a transaction, including attorneys and commercial 
bankers. 
The standards for the conduct and reporting of an SAS 50 engagement are 
straightforward. However, determining when these standards apply to a 
particular request are more complex. The sections below examine each of 
these aspects of SAS 50. 
Performance and Reporting Standards 
Consultation with the Continuing Accountant 
A significant provision of SAS 50 requires the "reporting accountant" to 
sometimes consult with the "continuing accountant." Consultation is required 
if a written report and, in some cases, other forms of response, including oral 
answers, will cover a specific transaction or relate to a specific entity's financial 
statements. 
SAS 50 contrasts specific and hypothetical transactions. The former includes 
"specified transactions, either completed or proposed,'' and the latter includes 
transactions "not involving facts or circumstances of a particular principal." 
This is, at best, a vague distinction and one that causes some difficulty in 
implementing SAS 50, as discussed later. 
SAS 50 justifies the consultation requirement because the continuing 
accountant may have knowledge which is not available to the reporting 
accountant, and which is crucial to reaching a professional conclusion, e.g., 
understanding of the form and substance of the transaction, the entity's past 
accounting principles for similar transactions, differing views on the matter 
between the reporting and continuing accountants or management, and so on. 
Before the release of SAS 50, Ethics Interpretation 201-3 covered 
"Shopping for Accounting or Auditing Standards.'' The Interpretation required 
similar consultation, but only when (translated to the parlance of SAS 50) a 
principal to a transaction retained a "reporting accountant" to provide 
professional advice in connection with the principal's financial statements. 
The consultation requirements of SAS 50 differ subtly from the Ethics 
Interpretation as given below: 
• The accountant may need to consult, even in the absence of being 
"engaged" or "retained," 
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• The accountant may need to consult, even if the advice is given to 
third parties, such as intermediaries, and 
• Consultation, when required, is a step to take while performing the 
work. The ethics interpretation requires consultation "before giving 
such advice." 
The reference to "shopping" in the title of the Ethics Interpretation also 
caused accountants to limit its application. "Shopping'' suggests that a principal 
is seeking a beneficial ruling on an accounting or auditing issue not available 
from its continuing accountant. When a principal had not previously sought the 
opinion of its auditors on a matter, accountants argued that "opinion shopping" 
was not involved. Hence, the Ethics Interpretation did not apply and consulta­
tion was unnecessary. 
Other Performance Standards of SAS 50 
Due Professional Care 
In addition to performance standards derived from ET 201 [AICPA, 1987] 
(requiring competence, professional care, planning and supervision, and ac­
cumulation of supporting information), SAS 50 requires the reporting account­
ant to consider the identity of the requester of the report and the 
circumstances in which the request arises. The last requirement is especially 
important. The reporting accountant must be alert to the possibility that a 
company is actually using its financial advisor to "shop" for a favorable 
accounting decision. If the seemingly hypothetical situation is actually a specific 
transaction, the provisions of SAS 50 apply and consultation may well be 
required. 
Procedures in Addition to Consultation 
The reporting accountant should (i) obtain an understanding of the form and 
substance of the transactions, (ii) review applicable generally accepted ac­
counting principles, (iii) consult with experts, if necessary, and (iv) perform 
research or otherwise find appropriate precedents or analogies, if necessary. 
Reporting Standards 
SAS 50 contains an illustrative report (Exhibit 1) which includes the 
contents required for a written report by the standard. SAS 50 does not 
prescribe the "contents" of oral advice, although the statement suggests that 
accountants might find the guidance for written reports useful. 
Applicability (see Exhibit 2) 
Exempt Situations 
SAS 50 does not apply if the advice is proferred to an audit client or to 
another accountant in public practice, or when the advice is proferred in 
connection with litigation support or expert testimony work. 
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Exhibit 1 
A Written Report on the Application 
of Accounting Principles 
Introduction 
We have been engaged to report on the appropriate application of generally 
accepted accounting principles to the specific (hypothetical) transaction de­
scribed below. This report is being issued to the ABC Company (XYZ 
Intermediaries) for assistance in evaluating accounting principles for the 
described specific (hypothetical) transaction. Our engagement has been con­
ducted in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants. 
Description of Transaction 
The facts, circumstances, and assumptions relevant to the specific (hypo­
thetical) transaction as provided to us by the management of the ABC 
Company (XYZ Intermediaries) are as follows: 
Appropriate Accounting Principles 
[Text discussing principles] 
Concluding Comments 
The ultimate responsibility for the decision on the appropriate application of 
generally accepted accounting principles for an actual transaction rests with the 
preparers of financial statements, who should consult with their continuing 
accountants. Our judgment on the appropriate application of generally accepted 
accounting principles for the described specific (hypothetical) transaction is 
based solely on the facts provided to us as described above; should these facts 
and circumstances differ, our conclusion may change. 





Applicability of SAS 50 to Requests for Opinions on Accounting Principles 
S T A R T 
1 
Written Reports 
Except in the above circumstances, SAS 50 applies to preparation of the 
following written reports: 
• Regarding the application of accounting principles to specified transac-
tions, 
• Addressed to intermediaries, regarding the accounting principles of 
hypothetical transactions, and 
• Regarding the type of opinion that may be rendered on a specific 
entity's financial statements. 
Other Means of Prof erring Advice 
Potentially, SAS 50 applies to the broad spectrum of ways accountants 
communicate—from formal written reports to casual conversation. Speeches, 
newsletters, letters to regulators, external training seminars, all fall some­
where in the spectrum. However, SAS 50 excludes these "intermediate" 
forms of communication unless the accountant intends to provide specific 
guidance on the application of accounting principles to a "specific transaction" 
or on the type of opinion that may be rendered on a specific entity's financial 
statements ("covered guidance"). 
The following examples will clarify the applicability of SAS 50. Suppose a 
commercial bank engages in interest rate swaps as a "product line" for 
customers. The bank has used cash securities, long or short positions in US 
Treasury notes, to hedge the swap inventory's exposure to changes in interest 
rates. The accounting is controversial; should gains and losses on the cash 
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securities be recorded when realized or can "hedge accounting" be applied 
with gains or losses deferred? Consider the scenario where the CFO tells his 
old college roommate, a partner at a major accounting firm (not the bank's 
auditors), that the bank has to formalize its accounting policies in this area 
because the transactions are getting more significant. The partner tells the 
CFO that he can help, and sends a brochure prepared by his firm containing the 
firm's conclusion that hedge accounting is appropriate for similar cash positions 
if certain correlation requirements are satisfied. Does SAS 50 apply to the 
partner's response? 
The author believes that SAS 50 does not apply because the partner has no 
idea whether the bank's securities meet or fail the brochure's correlation 
requirements and he has not been asked to evaluate the bank's portfolio. 
Suppose now that the bank CFO tells the partner that a recent business 
combination failed the pooling of interest criteria of APB 16 because of the 
magnitude of the bank's treasury stock transactions in the past few years. The 
partner uses the facts about the merger to illustrate a speech on business 
combinations. A key point of the speech is that his organization views the 
calculation of "tainted treasury shares" differently than most other accounting 
firms. After the speech, he sends the transcript to the CFO with a "buck slip" 
attached saying, "Thought you'd be interested in our views on permissible 
treasury shares!" Does SAS 50 apply to the speech transcript? 
The answer is yes. It may even apply to the speech (as opposed to the 
transcript of the speech) if the partner knew the CFO was in the audience. The 
partner intended the transcript "to provide guidance on the application of 
accounting principles to a specific transaction" and he should apply the 
performance standards of SAS 50. 
In the above case, would SAS 50 require the partner to consult with the 
bank's continuing accountants before he sends the transcript? Possibly. The 
standard requires consultation "when evaluating accounting principles at the 
request of a principal, or an intermediary acting for a principal, that relate to a 
specific transaction . . . [emphasis added]." So if the CFO had attended the 
speech and asked for a transcript, the partner should first consult with the 
continuing accountants. 
Oral Advice 
SAS 50 can also apply to oral advice. Although some accountants are 
troubled by the notion that they might violate professional standards in idle 
conversation on a golf course, the Auditing Standards Board had a much more 
common situation in mind. 
Many investment bankers and other intermediaries routinely check with 
accountants as they work on transactions. Very often the check is informal; for 
whatever reasons, the intermediary does not believe the request warrants the 
time and expense of a formal written reply. SAS 50 covers oral advice when (i) 
it is in response to a covered guidance (defined earlier) and (ii) the reporting 
accountant "concludes that the advice is intended to be used by a principal to 
the transaction as an important factor considered in reaching a decision 
[emphasis added]." 
Suppose an investment banker asks a reporting accountant about the 
earnings per share consequences of a newly devised common stock purchase 
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warrant. The banker mentions that a large defense contractor has just issued 
the security. Financial statements for periods following the date the security 
was issued have not been published. The accountants could be justified in 
concluding that the question falls outside of the scope of SAS 50 by using the 
following line of reasoning. Principals would only rarely consider an intermedi­
ary's representation of an accountant's views to be an important factor in 
reaching a decision. Further, the question at hand involved an understandable 
request by the investment banker to be educated in the complexities of an 
earnings per share calculation for a new financial instrument. 
However, to be prudent, the reporting accountant probes a bit further. Is 
the defense contractor a client of your firm? Will you report my views on this 
question to someone at the contractor's firm with financial reporting responsi­
bilities? Has the contractor asked you to solicit my views? 
The investment banker answers "no" to all of these questions. However, 
he tells the reporting accountant that he is preparing an unsolicited proposal 
suggesting that the contractor issue a convertible debt security. As part of his 
proposal, he will generally describe the incremental dilution of convertible 
securities and illustrate the pro forma effects on earnings per share. He knows 
how to treat convertibles, but the banker needs the accountant's advice on the 
previously issued warrants. Finally, he mentions that he will offer his client the 
reporting accountant's phone number if any questions come up with regard to 
the general treatment of convertible debt. 
Do the additional facts now require the reporting accountant to conclude 
that SAS 50 governs his response? Arguably, SAS 50 still does not cover the 
response to the banker because it will be relayed via the investment banker, 
and the reporting accountant continues to believe that the advice will not be 
considered an important factor the principal will use in reaching a decision. 
Later, the contractor's assistant treasurer calls the reporting accountant. 
He questions the reporting accountant about the general earnings per share 
consequences of convertible debt, no actual terms having yet been decided. Is 
this a "covered request?" Possibly yes. Assume the principal tells the 
reporting accountant that he finds conversations such as these very helpful and 
that his own auditors take much too long to respond to questions on difficult 
financial instruments. Do SAS 50's performance standards require the report­
ing accountant to consult with the continuing accountant before responding? 
Surprisingly, the answer is no. The transaction is still hypothetical because 
the terms of the security have not been established and consultation with the 
continuing accountants is required only with respect to specific situations. 
However, if the assistant CFO reviews the pro forma earnings per share 
calculation and asks the reporting accountant if he agrees with the way the 
warrants have been treated, the reporting accountant should consider whether 
this request is covered by SAS 50. If the reporting accountant concludes that 
his advice will be an important factor in reaching a decision, consultation on the 
warrants (rather than on the proposed convertible securities) is required. 
Unscrambling the Scope Question—Why Bother? 
The above illustrations point out the difficulties in literally applying SAS 50. 
However, a legalistic interpretation of the document is rarely worth the effort. 
It is difficult for the author to imagine that the performance standards of SAS 50 
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changed the steps CPAs took when answering questions on the application of 
accounting principles. Put another way, a CPA that had been cavalier enough to 
respond to pre-SAS 50 requests without taking the steps called for by the 
standard, would probably not feel constrained by its publication anyway. 
At most, SAS 50 spotlighted on the "stage" of a formal standard, a 
requirement to consult that had been always in the profession's "wings" as an 
ethics interpretation. 
Why Accountants Receive Requests Regarding 
the Application of Accounting Principles 
Requests From Intermediaries 
Intermediaries make many, if not most, requests for SAS 50-type reports 
on the application of accounting principles. The reasons are explained below. 
Innovative Financial Instruments 
During the last decade or so, Wall Street has developed a stunning array of 
financial instruments to help clients deal with volatile interest and currency 
rates and streamline leverage-sensitive balance sheets. According to a recent 
tally, over four out of every ten Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) problems 
have dealt with financial instruments and off balance sheet financing [FASB, 
1988]. Listed below are a few examples: 
• Interest Rate Swaps—First employed in 1983, the notional amount of 
interest rate swaps aggregated $139 billion at mid-year 1987, accord­
ing to a survey conducted by the International Swap Dealers Associa­
tion. 
• Convertible debt with a premium put—During its term, holders of this 
debt have a one-time opportunity to redeem it in excess of the debt's 
face amount. 
• Put options on an issuer's stock—A mirror of stock purchase 
warrants, these put options enable investors to sell stock to the 
company at a stipulated price during the options' term. 
• Interest only certificates (IO)—An investment in only the interest 
stream of a pool of mortgages; an IO's value can radically change 
based on market rates of interest and prepayment assumptions. 
Financial intermediaries are virtually forced to seek an expert's advice 
when devising many of these instruments because generally accepted account­
ing principles are silent on their proper treatment. As a result, reporting 
accountants responding to these requests consider instruments with analogous 
features, e.g., the FASB's concepts statements and the accounting treatment 
followed by other companies, if discernible. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board is in the process of examining 
accounting principles for financial instruments. Any conclusions are several 
years away. In the meantime, accountants will likely continue to receive 
unending requests covering innovative instruments. 
Routine Requests 
Frequently, advice (usually oral) is sought on matters explicitly covered in 
the authoritative literature. Many investment bankers and attorneys have an 
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overall understanding of financial accounting. However, intermediaries often 
find it cost justified to consult with a CPA on the specific application of generally 
accepted accounting principles in areas such as lease accounting, earnings per 
share, pooling of interests criteria, and so on. 
Education 
CPAs struggle to remain current on financial accounting developments 
while intermediaries have even less opportunity to stay abreast. As a result, 
CPAs can teach intermediaries about emerging accounting standards such as 
income taxes, loan fees and so on, at times and locations convenient to the 
intermediary. 
The publication of a new accounting standard forces intermediaries to 
revise the advice they have been giving to clients. Soon to be issued, for 
example, is a Financial Accounting Standard amending SFAS 13, "Accounting 
for Leases." Reporting accountants will receive many requests to help 
intermediaries understand the types of conditions that constitute a "penalty" 
at lease renewal dates. 
Enhanced Credibility 
In convincing a client to engage in a recommended transaction, investment 
bankers must overcome many obstacles. Is the transaction economically 
justified, do its advantages outweigh its disadvantages? If the company is 
unfamiliar with the transaction, the proper financial accounting treatment is 
another uncertainty. A reporting accountant's written report, accompanying 
the investment banker's proposal, can allay or reduce the "accounting 
uncertainty" and provide a starting point for the company's analysis of the 
accounting consequences. 
Confidentiality 
Investment bankers and other intermediaries place a high premium on the 
confidentiality of their advice, a premium that extends beyond the recent 
insider trading scandals. Advisory fees for newly innovated financial products 
are higher than those related to the so-called commodity products or "vanilla" 
transactions. Intermediaries seek to extend the proprietary nature of their 
ideas by restricting access only to trusted consultants, including a reporting 
accountant sensitive to their concerns. 
Requests from Principals 
Accounting Disagreements 
The most sensitive request covered by SAS 50 occurs when a principal and 
its auditors disagree on the appropriate accounting treatment for a transaction. 
Occasionally, in such a situation the principal turns to another CPA for his or her 
views. Sometimes the cause of the disagreement is understandable. Au­
thoritative standards do not eliminate alternative accounting principles for 
familiar topics; the development of new situations provides an ample oppor­
tunity for divergent views. 
A good example occurs in a leveraged buyout (LBO). The threshold 
question is whether a highly leveraged takeover by a shell acquisition company 
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results in a purchase business combination, at fair value, or in a recapitalization 
of the target company, usually with a devastating effect on stockholders' equity. 
The question was debated for over one year at eight different meetings of 
the EITF, indicating how difficult this fundamental issue is. Until the Task 
Force reached a consensus, a principal to an LBO and its auditors could 
legitimately disagree on the appropriate accounting treatment. 
Shopping for Accounting Principles 
Of course, accounting disagreements occur in other less "legitimate" 
circumstances. A company may seek a favorable accounting outcome not 
justified by a transaction's particular facts and circumstances—either by 
stretching its interpretation of authoritative standards or identifying inappropri­
ate analogies. The danger is obvious; a threat that a company intends to seek 
other views may cause its auditors to acquiesce, or a reporting accountant may 
agree with the principal's views in an attempt to "curry favor" (usually hoping 
to win a client relationship). In either case, another step towards "lowest 
common denominator" accounting principles occurs. Understandably, account­
ants, regulators—particularly the SEC—Congress and others are concerned 
with reports on accounting principles that are responses to "shopping" 
requests. 
SAS 50 will do little to alleviate the shopping problem, although other 
initiatives, discussed below, should be more effective. If the reporting account­
ant views the request as an opportunity to win a client, and this perception 
affects his conclusion, then the accountant's objectivity and independence are 
at question. However, as a result of its consultation provisions, SAS 50 should 
force a reporting accountant to consider the continuing accountant's reasoning 
process and prevent the reporting accountant from overlooking a fact pattern 
peculiar to the situation. 
Other Initiatives 
Audit Committee—The audit committee, with oversight responsibility for a 
company's financial statements, may provide a check on an aggressive 
management's view of accounting principles. As a result, firms that are 
members of the AICPA SEC Practice Section must regularly communicate with 
the audit committee or its equivalent. Among the topics the continuing 
accountant must cover are (i) accounting and auditing disagreements between 
the CPA and management (even if satisfactorily resolved) and (ii) SAS 50 
opinions which the management obtained from the reporting accountants of 
which the continuing accountant is aware. Similar requirements are contained 
in a recently released statement on auditing standards (SAS 61). 
Form 8-K Disclosures—Recently, the SEC strengthened the disclosure 
requirements in Form 8-K, filed when registrants change accountants. After 
the new rules take effect, companies will have to reveal accounting consulta­
tions that occurred in the two years preceding its auditor change. 
The Contributions of SAS 50 Reports 
It was noted earlier that the performance standards of SAS 50 only 
formalized the procedures that diligent reporting accountants employ in 
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responding to requests for non-audit clients. In the preceding section, it was 
observed that SAS 50, taken alone, will do little to prevent shopping for 
accounting opinions. What, then, do these reports contribute to the accounting 
principles process? 
The answers to these questions, especially those dealing with hypothetical 
transactions, lie outside of the standard and in the SAS 50 report itself. 
Unarguably, financial instruments and complex transactions transcend promul­
gated guidance and strain the limits of the existing accounting framework. In 
this setting, a hypothetical report has the following advantages: 
• Conclusions are reached without a materiality guideline. Because the 
discussion is hypothetical, the reporting accountant cannot dismiss an 
effect as "immaterial." A principal or its continuing accountants often 
focus on only significant items for accounting scrutiny. 
• Incorrect advice is reduced. Financial intermediaries, with more 
expertise in financial or economic analysis, occasionally err in evaluat­
ing the reporting consequences of proposed transactions. Reports on 
hypothetical transactions serve as a screening mechanism. 
• Objectivity. A report on a hypothetical transaction is usually prepared 
in the absence of a continuing audit relationship without the economic 
pressure perceived to influence the objectivity of the conclusions. 
• Focused expertise is brought to bear. Many financial instruments, 
especially mortgage-related products and complex swaps, can only be 
developed by research and development teams incorporating com­
puter modeling, financial analysis, tax, security law, regulatory and 
financial reporting expertise. 
In short, SAS 50 reports are an inevitable feature of a volatile financial 
environment. They can serve as a helpful stopgap between financial intermedi­
aries under intense competitive pressure to develop something new, some­
thing different, and the standard setters facing an equal pressure to deliberate 
carefully, prudently, and with extensive due process. 
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Discussant's Response to "Reports on 
the Application of Accounting Principles— 
A Review of SAS 50" 
Gary L. Holstrum 
University of Central Florida 
I thoroughly enjoyed reading this paper. It is well organized and clearly 
written. The author's extensive experience on Wall Street evaluating the 
accounting implications of often-exotic financial instruments makes him well-
qualified to discuss the background and implications of SAS 50. The paper does 
a good job of illustrating how accountants may have difficulty determining 
whether the provisions of SAS 50 apply in various circumstances. I generally 
agree with the positions expressed in the paper, but disagree somewhat with 
respect to the likely significance of SAS 50. 
Determining When SAS 50 Applies 
A major portion of the paper is devoted to the issue of deciding whether the 
provisions of SAS 50 apply to various circumstances. The author provides 
some basic examples and a somewhat elaborate decision tree for making this 
determination. The paper gives an impression that the criteria for deciding 
whether SAS 50 applies are highly complex and non-intuitive. 
On the contrary, I believe that the criteria for determining whether SAS 50 
applies are rather simple, straightforward, and intuitively logical. In determin-
ing whether and how SAS 50 applies, the accountant needs to evaluate the 
following factors: 
1. specificity of the communication (i.e., whether it addresses a specific 
situation or a hypothetical one); 
2. whether the communication is a written report, oral advice, or a 
position paper (or speech), and 
3. whether the communication is an important decision factor. 
These factors are discussed below and shown in Table 1. 
Specificity—One of the major provisions of SAS 50, which was described in 
the paper, is the requirement for an accountant who is not the financial 
statement auditor, but who issues a written or oral communication on the 
application of an accounting principle, to consult with the financial statement 
auditor under certain circumstances. An accountant's responsibility to consult 
with the financial statement auditor differs depending on whether the communi­
cation addresses a specific transaction (or a specific entity's financial state­
ments) as distinguished from a hypothetical transaction. Quite understandably, 
if the communication relates to a "hypothetical transaction," which is defined 
as "not involving facts or circumstances of a particular principal," communica-
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tion with the financial statement auditor would not be meaningful and is not 
required by SAS 50. 
Oral Advice—For oral advice regarding a specific transaction or financial 
statements of a specific entity, SAS 50 applies and consultation with the auditor 
is required. However, if the oral advice relates only to a hypothetical 
transaction, consultation is not required, and SAS 50 applies only if the 
accountant is aware that his oral advice is intended to be used by a principal to a 
transaction as an important decision factor. 
Position Papers and Speeches—SAS 50 does not apply to position papers or 
speeches unless they address specific transactions or financial statements of a 
specific entity audited by another accountant. Furthermore, consultation with 
the auditor is required if the position taken in the paper or speech is intended to 
be used by a principal to a transaction as an important decision factor. 
Applying Table 1 to the Examples in the Paper 
The author presents four illustrative examples and discusses how an 
accountant should decide whether SAS 50 applies and whether consultation 
with the current financial statement auditor is required. In the section of the 
paper with the heading, "Other Means of Proffering Advice," the author first 
describes a situation (I'll call it Situation A) in which an accountant forwards a 
position paper that addresses only hypothetical transactions. This situation fits 
in cell #6 of Table 1 and SAS 50 does not apply. 
TABLE 1 
DOES SAS 50 APPLY? 
SPECIFICITY 
SPECIFIC HYPOTHETICAL 














SAS 50 applies only if advice 
is an important decision 




Yes—SAS 50 applies. 
Consultation required 
only if position is an 
important decision 





In the following situation (Situation B), the accountant uses facts of a 
specific transaction to illustrate a speech and apparently is aware that the 
position taken in the speech is likely to be an important decision factor for a 
principal of the transaction. This situation fits in cell #5 of Table 1, so SAS 50 
applies and consultation with the financial statement auditor is required. 
The next section of the paper, headed "Oral Advice," first describes a 
situation (Situation C) in which an intermediary (investment banker) asks for 
oral advice about a hypothetical transaction. This situation fits in cell #4 of Table 
1 and SAS 50 applies only if the accountant concludes that a principal to a 
transaction would likely use the oral advice to the intermediary as an important 
decision factor. 
Situation C is then modified to indicate that the advice is sought directly by 
the principal rather than the intermediary. This new situation (Situation D) 
would be treated in the same way as Situation C and not require consultation if 
the transaction being addressed is still hypothetical. However, consultation 
with the auditor would be required if the advice addresses either a specific 
transaction (completed or proposed) or the type of audit report to be issued on 
a specific entity's financial statements (cell #3). 
I am not arguing that the judgments required by SAS 50 are easy, but only 
that the conceptual framework for making such judgments, as shown in Table 1, 
is in my opinion clear, reasonable, and logically consistent. 
Related Research on Auditor Changes 
Since SAS 50 addresses the issue of potential opinion shopping, a question 
arises as to the nature and extent of existing opinion shopping. Although 
definitive research is not available on this topic, a number of studies have 
addressed the topic and four recent studies seem particularly relevant. 
McConnell [1984] conducted a study concerning auditor changes and audit-
related disagreements between management and the auditors. The study 
reported on the "relevant disagreement involvement rates experienced by 
both Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms as predecessors and successors to 748 
auditor changes." The study showed that Big Eight firms had higher relative 
disagreement involvement rates and that statistically significant differences 
existed between Big Eight firms with respect to disagreement rates as both 
predecessor and successor auditors. The study may possibly signal potential 
opinion shopping situations, but the rate of disagreement involvement of 
particular firms as either predecessor or successor auditor, though interesting, 
does not provide conclusive evidence that a particular firm is more (or less) 
susceptible to opinion shopping. The results do provide promising hypotheses 
for further research on the topic. 
Schwartz and Menon [1985] conducted a study of auditor switches by failing 
firms that gathered data for a sample of 132 failing (bankrupt) firms and a 
matched-pair sample of non-failing firms. Results indicated that failing firms had 
a greater tendency to switch auditors but that qualifications of audit opinions 
were not statistically associated with auditor displacement by the failing firms. 
Chow and Rice [1982] studied the association between auditor "subject to'' 
qualifications and auditor changes. Although their results implied an association 
between qualified opinions and auditor changes, they found that companies that 
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switched auditors were more likely to receive a qualified opinion in the 
subsequent year than those that did not switch. 
In a follow-up to the research of Chow and Rice, Smith [1986] conducted a 
study that addressed the potential for opinion shopping related to one type of 
audit opinion, the "subject to" qualification related to continuation as a going 
concern. The study reported on 139 cases in which an auditor change followed 
a "subject to" opinion being issued the previous year. The successor also 
issued a qualified opinion in the subsequent year in 100 of the 139 cases. In 20 
of the remaining 39 cases, the predecessor auditor subsequently reissued its 
report as being unqualified. Smith studied the remaining 19 cases and found 
that an apparent disagreement existed between the predecessor and successor 
auditor in five of the cases. Consequently, the study demonstrates the 
possibility that "successful" opinion shopping may have occurred in five of the 
139 cases. 
Conclusions Regarding the Contribution of SAS 50 
I generally agree with most of the conclusions of the paper, but have a 
somewhat different assessment of the need for SAS 50 and its overall 
contribution. I agree with the author that providing reports and oral advice on 
complex accounting matters serves a useful function and that SAS 50 quite 
appropriately still allows these services. 
I disagree with the author about the significance of SAS 50. The author 
implies that SAS 50 is perhaps of little significance, stating (page 92): "At most, 
SAS 50 spotlighted on the 'stage' of a formal standard, a requirement to 
consult that had been always in the profession's 'wings' as an ethics 
interpretation." I disagree on this point. First, addressing an important 
professional issue as a standard (SAS), rather than an interpretation, may in 
itself be appropriate and significant. Second, and more importantly, SAS 50 is 
much more explicit and complete than the superseded ethics interpretation in 
identifying specific performance, consultation, and reporting standards for 
reports on the application of accounting principles. 
The topic of potential opinion shopping is an important issue that has been 
addressed by various SEC Commissioners, the Chief Accountant of the 
Enforcement Division of the SEC, the Treadway Commission, and numerous 
other speakers and writers who are concerned with the role of the auditor. 
Although the actual frequency of opinion shopping may be very low, the public 
perception that it may occur in certain marginal cases and not be disclosed 
could have a highly debilitating effect on capital markets. 
Consequently, I regard as significant any action taken to control potential 
opinion shopping, to require disclosure of activities that could signal its 
occurrence, while at the same time allowing a healthy communication between 
the profession and the business and investment communities regarding 
emerging accounting and economic issues. 
Finally, the issuance of SAS 50 should not be evaluated in isolation from 
recent related pronouncements. Such related pronouncements include (1) the 
SEC ruling (which became effective the day this paper was delivered) requiring 
disclosure of SAS 50 communications occurring within two years of an auditor 
change, and (2) the FASB proposed standard on financial instruments. 
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In summary, I believe that SAS 50 is a crucial and necessary element in the 
whole package of recent related actions of the Auditing Standards Board, the 
SEC, and the FASB that collectively provide a reasonable and cost-effective 
move toward controlling opinion shopping or at least disclosing actions that 
could signal its potential occurrence. 
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Auditor Evidential Planning Judgments 
Arnold Wright 
Northeastern University 
Theodore J . Mock 
University of Southern California 
Abstract 
The effectiveness and efficiency of an audit rests largely on the nature and 
extent of evidence gathered, yet there is little research on how auditors make 
such complex judgments required to plan audits. This study examines the 
evidential planning decisions of 21 experienced auditors in an experimental 
setting. The Analytical Hierarchy Process is employed to explicitly investigate 
the multi-attribute trade-offs made in such judgments. 
The results indicate that auditors displayed strong consensus as to the 
relative importance of key criteria suggested in the professional literature to 
weigh evidential alternatives. Specifically, competence was considered of 
greatest concern, followed by sufficiency and costs of gathering the evidence. 
But in applying criteria to an audit case, the auditors reached quite different 
conclusions regarding the relative superiority of alternative procedures when 
evaluated along the various criteria. Differences were also observed concern­
ing the appropriate allocation of audit time, suggesting substantial variations 
among auditors in the planned portfolio of procedures across engagements. 
Introduction 
Evidential planning regarding the nature, extent, and timing of procedures 
entails critical judgments that greatly impact audit effectiveness and efficiency. 
The audit planning process should result in a cost-effective portfolio of 
procedures which are likely to identify material errors at an acceptably low level 
of audit risk.1 In deciding upon an appropriate plan, a number of broad 
categories of procedures, such as detailed tests, analytical review, and 
observation are normally available. These procedures vary qualitatively and 
quantitatively along a number of criteria such as competency, sufficiency and 
cost [SAS 31, AICPA, 1987]. The auditor's task is to select a combination of 
these procedures to conduct in order to gather sufficient, competent evidence 
to support an overall opinion on the financial statements. Therefore, evidential 
planning judgments represent complex, multiple-criteria decisions. 
1 Audit risk is the risk that the financial statements are materially misstated without the auditor's 
knowledge (SAS 47). 
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Despite the importance of these decisions, there has been little empirical 
evidence of how such judgments are made in practice. As a result, there are 
many unanswered questions, including: Do auditors explicitly consider and 
weigh evidential criteria? If so, how? What is the relative importance attached 
to various criteria? How are common procedures evaluated along criteria? 
What is the level of consensus among auditors in planning judgments? Research 
into these types of questions may suggest useful decision tools to assist the 
audit judgment process. 
The purpose of this paper is to acquire a better understanding of the multi-
attribute trade-offs made in evidential planning decisions. Specifically, the study 
addresses three implicit/explicit auditor judgments embodied in the planning 
process: (1) the weighting placed on widely-cited evidential criteria; (2) the 
evaluation of alternative audit procedures along these criteria; and (3) the 
resulting allocation of audit hours to the procedures. The level of consensus of 
each of these judgments is also explored. 
To illustrate, assume an auditor considers three criteria to be important in 
selecting audit procedures: competency, sufficiency, and cost. The relative 
importance (weightings) of each of these criteria in a given situation will 
significantly impact the final evidential choices made. If competency is consid­
ered of primary importance, with sufficiency and cost of little concern, the 
auditor is likely to search for the evidence of highest quality (competence) with 
little regard for availability or costs. After evaluating competing procedures 
along each pertinent criterion, the final decision is to allocate available 
resources (e.g., audit hours) among the various procedures. 
The next section of the paper contains an overview of evidential planning 
and the prior research in this area. The methodology and results of this study 
are then described, with the final section devoted to a discussion of the major 
results and their implications for future research and practice. 
An Overview of Evidential Planning 
Figure 1 provides a model of evidential planning factors and considerations. 
The auditor's overriding goal is to gather evidence through tests to address 
various audit objectives and thus be able to express opinions for both the 
accounts (micro-level) and for the overall financial statements (macro-level). As 
depicted in Figure 1, there are frequently several evidence sources to achieve 
a given audit objective. For example, the "existence" assertion of an accounts 
receivable may be tested by sending confirmations, examining subsequent cash 
receipts, or looking at shipping/sales documents. Auditors must decide which 
of these procedures to conduct, i.e., the "nature" of the tests. Of course, any 
or all of the procedures may be planned, since often some degree of 
corroborating evidence is sought. Once the choice of procedures is established, 
the auditor must determine the extent and timing of tests. 
The choice of procedures is implicitly a multi-attribute judgment. Based on 
a review of SAS 31, a number of salient criteria for selecting audit procedures 
are given in Figure 1. There are a few required procedures from the 
professional standards, such as inventory observation and receivable confirma­
tions. Such requirements are, however, minimal and most audit procedures 
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Audit Effectiveness & Efficiency Criteria 
Choice of a Portfolio of Procedures 
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procedures that may be available.2 Further, even for required procedures, the 
auditor can vary the extent and/or timing of such tests. 
Alternative procedures differ qualitatively, quantitatively, and in terms of 
cost. For example, several factors impinge on the cost of performing a 
procedure. Differing levels of skill are necessary to properly perform certain 
procedures, and staff availability is a consideration. There are also the direct 
costs of gathering and evaluating the evidence, as well as the indirect costs of 
supervising and reviewing the work. All of these factors come into play in 
evaluating the relative costs of performing alternative procedures. In addition 
to cost differences, procedures may differ in terms of their relevance to certain 
audit assertions and in terms of their reliability, bias, and sufficiency. In 
2 Procedures mandated by the particular CPA firm further constrain the choice of procedures on a 
given audit. However, it appears that auditors still have wide discretion in deciding upon the extent 
of such procedures as well as in tailoring procedures to particular client situations [Cushing and 
Loebbecke, 1986]. 
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summary, in planning the nature, and subsequently the extent of procedures, 
the auditor is implicitly or explicitly weighing a number of multiple criteria.3 
As discussed earlier, there has been limited empirical research on evidential 
planning. Lewis et al. [1983] asked auditors to allocate budgeted hours to 
various procedures. An experimental group was provided with a decision aid 
(Analytical Hierarchy Process—AHP) as a means of structuring the judgment 
process. The results indicated that the decision aid significantly affected 
planning decisions. The experimental (decision aid) group allocated more hours 
to analytical review and less to detailed tests than the unaided control group. 
This greater focus towards analytical review is consistent with the current 
trend in the auditing profession towards such tests as a cost-effective means of 
detecting material errors [Hylas and Ashton, 1982; SAS 56 Analytical Pro-
cedures, AICPA, 1988; Tabor and Willis, 1985]. 
Arrington et al. [1984] examined the choice of analytical review pro­
cedures, given explicit consideration of five criteria: effectiveness attributes-
statistical performance, model robustness, and understandability; and effi­
ciency attributes—cost and ease of application. Using AHP, three academicians 
who had published research in the area, and three experienced auditors 
evaluated five alternative analytical review approaches along these criteria. The 
attributes considered of greatest importance were statistical performance and 
model robustness. Subjects differed a great deal in their evaluations of each 
analytical review approach on several of the criteria, resulting in a lack of 
consensus as to preferences of approaches. In general, the practitioner 
preferences displayed a narrower range than those of academicians with a 
random-walk model favored overall. In contrast, academicians preferred a 
regression approach with random-walk being the second choice. Despite the 
small sample size employed, the lack of consensus in evidential preferences 
was perhaps the key finding of this study, and one of concern. 
Other studies have examined evidential planning judgments in response to 
changes in risks. However, such studies have focused on the extent of testing 
judgments and have not explored the underlying multi-attribute considerations 
of such judgments. For example, Mock and Turner [1981] examined the 
sample size (extent) decisions of auditors in a realistic case for four procedures 
in the revenue cycle. They found a low level of consensus among subjects and 
the existence of a significant anchoring effect on the initial, planned sample size. 
Auditors were responsive to changes in the internal controls, planning larger 
samples when controls deteriorated. Joyce and Biddle [1981] also studied 
sample size decisions when controls varied. Consistent with Mock and Turner, 
the results indicated that auditors adapt samples to the controls. However, a 
significant control by order effect was present, suggesting that auditors 
recognize trends in controls and apply other heuristics from experience. For 
3 In many situations, the choice of tests may seem automatic or obvious given the audit objective. 
For example, to determine the existence of petty cash, a count of the fund is normally done by the 
auditor. Even though this procedure appears to be evident, various criteria are implicitly 
considered. That is, why even conduct the test unless it meets minimal standards as to relevance, 
reliability, etc.? Also, there usually are alternative tests that could be conducted; e.g., the 
custodian of the fund could be asked to sign a representation letter attesting to the fact that the 
petty cash fund in question does exist or merely be asked (inquiry) whether it exists. 
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example, when controls become stronger, there is a reluctance to reduce 
samples. However, deteriorating controls led to substantial increases in 
samples. Joyce and Biddle also found significant variation among participants in 
the planned levels of testing. 
Although the research to date suggests that the evidential planning 
decisions of auditors are responsive to client and other risk changes, a concern 
is the low level of observed consensus in such judgments. Importantly, few of 
the prior studies examined the multi-attribute nature of these decisions, which 
is the focus here. 
Methodology 
Task 
Twenty-one practicing auditors were presented with a comprehensive, 
realistic case ("Modern Appliances Manufacturing Co.") and were asked to 
evaluate alternative evidential sources along various key criteria for the 
inventory account.4 Subjects then decided which evidence to focus on by 
allocating 150 available audit hours to three broad evidential areas: analytical 
review, physical observation, and detailed tests. 
As a common frame of reference, the case provided illustrative audit 
programs for each evidential area. Since there are numerous procedures that 
may fall under each of these areas, it was believed that a benchmark program 
was necessary to reduce confusion and avoid serious confounding of the 
results. For example, what is ''analytical review"? Different auditors may have 
various images about what constitutes necessary analytical review procedures 
for this case, e.g., ratios, regression, and/or industry comparisons. The 
programs provided were developed with the consultation of practicing auditors 
and were later pilot tested. The procedures appear to be representative of 
widely-used tests for a manufacturing client with strong controls, as in the case 
here. To maintain task simplicity and minimize required subject time, the study 
examined audit planning judgments for these major evidence areas rather than 
the selection of detailed individual audit procedures. 
The Modern Appliances case contained extensive background information 
necessary to plan substantive tests. First, information on the client, including 
product lines and comparative financial statements, was provided. Second, the 
inventory/purchases internal control system was described in detail, reflecting 
an environment of strong controls. Compliance tests further revealed that 
controls were functioning properly.5 
4 Due to the exploratory nature of this study, auditors evaluated evidence for each criterion as 
related to the overall audit objective that the inventory account was "fairly presented." In practice, 
evidence may be evaluated along these criteria for each detailed audit objective such as existence 
and valuation. As will be described later, incorporating specific audit objectives would have 
geometrically expanded the subject time needed and resulted in having to significantly narrow the 
scope of the research, perhaps to addressing only one detailed objective. Given the early state of 
our knowledge here, it was decided that a broader focus was appropriate. However, future 
research is needed to address specific audit objectives and verify the generalizability of the major 
results. 
5 A copy of the complete case may be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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The initial evaluation of evidence alternatives was based upon criteria cited 
in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 31. Specifically, subjects were 
randomly assigned to two experimental groups, varying as to the number of 
criteria considered. The first group focused on three criteria (cost, sufficiency, 
and competence), while the second group examined five criteria (cost, 
sufficiency, relevance, reliability, and bias). The last three criteria are a finer 
partitioning of "competence." Placing the subjects into two groups provided 
the opportunity to examine whether evidential choices are affected by the 
number of criteria considered. Definitions of each criterion were provided to 
subjects from SAS 31, as indicated in Table 1. 
In considering the criteria, auditors made two sets of judgments for the 
case: (1) establishing the relative importance of each criterion, and (2) 
evaluating the three evidential choices along the various criteria. For example, 




1. Cost: The additional cost of obtaining the audit evidence which is being 
evaluated 
2. Competency: The overall quality of audit evidence, which is based on two general 
factors: 
a) accurate measurement (valuation) resulting from lack of bias 
(preparer influence) and reliability (accurate accounting system), 
and 
b) relevance: the pertinence of the evidence to the audit objective 
examined. 
The quantity or "weight'' of evidence relative to what is needed to 
satisfy audit objectives. Audit evidence is usually considered sufficient 
if it is persuasive rather than convincing. 
SET B 
The additional cost of obtaining the audit evidence which is being 
evaluated. 
The amount of error or misstatement in audit evidence which may 
result from preparer influence (e.g., management) 
The amount of error in audit evidence which is a result of inaccuracies 
in measuring and compiling data. 
The pertinence of the evidence to the audit objective examined. 
The quantity or "weight" of evidence relative to what is needed to 
satisfy audit objectives. Audit evidence is usually considered sufficient 








gathering the evidence" as compared to other criteria. Then, he would evaluate 
the merits of the audit procedures for each criterion. "In terms of cost, which 
evidence (analytical review, observation, or detailed tests) is preferable?" As will 
be described in a later section, subjects used the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
[Saaty, 1980] to arrive at both of these judgments. 
Evidential planning decisions are, thus, viewed as a function of the relative 
weighting placed on key criteria and the judged superiority of alternative 
sources of evidence on each of these criteria. Finally, subjects planned the 
allocation of efforts (audit hours) for the three alternative procedure areas 
(evidence sources). Auditors were allowed to take whatever time was needed 
to complete the task and anonymity was guaranteed. 
Subjects 
Participants were from three of the Big Eight firms. Subjects were 
provided on the basis of time availability and, thus, do not represent a random 
sample. Table 2 reports demographic data on the participants. As indicated, 
auditors had, on average, over five years of public accounting experience and 
were primarily at the supervisory and managerial levels. Therefore, subjects 
had the extensive experience and background necessary for the tasks exam­
ined—the planning of substantive procedures and allocation of audit time. A 
one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences (p < 0.10) between experi­
mental groups as to years of audit experience. A Chi-square test also did not 
reflect significant differences in staff level. 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
Subjects made evidential judgments on a computer terminal in an interac­
tive mode, utilizing the AHP developed by Saaty [1984, 1980, 1978]. AHP is a 
systematic, multiple criteria method for making unstructured decisions. A 
judgment is decomposed into a hierarchical framework—from the most general 
level to specific choices. The decision maker then evaluates criteria/alter­
natives at each level through a series of pairwise comparisons. For example, at 
the most general level the subject would be asked, "Which criterion is more 
Table 2 
Demographic Data on Subjects 
Experimental Group n Mean Experience Staff Level Frequency 
Three Criteria 11 5.4 Years Seniors 9% 
(3-10 Years) Supervisors 36% 
Managers 55% 
Five Criteria 10 5.5 Years Seniors 10% 
(3-10 Years) Supervisors 20% 
Managers 70% 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate range of experience. 
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important—cost or competence?" The individual then indicates his or her 
degree of preference (weights) on a scale of one to nine (equal importance-
absolute importance). The number of pairwise comparisons represents every 
combination of criteria. Thus, the three criteria group made six comparisons 
(three criteria taken two at a time) and the five criteria group made ten 
comparisons. Once these sets of comparisons were completed, subjects were 
asked to evaluate pairwise comparisons of the three evidence sources along 
each criterion; e.g., "In evaluating cost, which procedure is cheaper-
analytical review or detailed tests?" A measure of the strength of preference 
was then obtained on a scale of one to nine, where one indicates very little 
preference and nine represents absolute preference. 
Using matrix algebra, a maximum eigenvalue is calculated and a normalized 
eigenvector is derived from the weights. This eigenvector sums to 1.00 and 
measures the auditor's relative trade-offs at each level of the hierarchy on an 
interval scale. The approach entails a linear, additive, compensatory model. 
AHP has been used in many decision settings and has several advantages: 
ease of understanding, high test/retest reliability, and ability to deal with 
complex decisions [Saaty, 1980]. A number of recent auditing studies have 
employed AHP [Lewis et al., 1983; Arrington et al., 1984; Lin et al., 1984; 
Boritz and Jensen, 1985]. The principal disadvantages of the approach are that 
AHP: (i) does not consider heuristics; (ii) it is a linear, additive model, while 
judgment may not be so; and (iii) although it provides adjustments, AHP does 
not present a normative way to deal with inconsistent responses.6 
This study focuses on multi-attribute decision making and thus the pairwise 
comparisons made during the decision process are of greatest concern. The 
Analytical Hierarchy Process is, therefore, useful here as a vehicle to structure 
the decision process. 
Results 
Relative Importance of Evidential Criteria 
Table 3 reports the frequency of preferences in pairwise criteria comparisons, 
suggesting the relative importance of each criterion. A frequency near 50 percent 
indicates wide disagreement in choice among auditors, while 100 percent reflects 
unanimity. The results suggest reasonably clear choices as to desired evidential 
criteria. For subjects in the three criteria group, the order of importance was 
competency, sufficiency, and (a distant third) cost. These preferences are in 
agreement with the professional literature (SAS 31); i.e., competence and 
sufficiency are paramount, with cost a secondary consideration.7 
6 See Jensen [1983, 1984] for a review of the literature on AHP, and a critical analysis. The AHP 
program used in this study checks for consistency of responses and adjusts the values of the 
normalized eigenvector for inconsistent weights employing a method developed by Lusk [1976]. 
The data were further examined for the level of transitivity logic errors. The level of such errors 
was found to be quite low (9% for the three criteria group and 3% for the five criteria group), 
suggesting that consistency was not a problem for the auditors in the experiment. 
7 The low weighting of the cost criterion found also may be because auditors are aware that SAS 31 
indicates that cost should be of lower importance, and they are responding in a normative manner, 
whereas on actual audits cost plays a more dominant role. Future empirical research would be 
needed to address the validity of this plausible alternative explanation. 
108 
Table 3 
Pairwise Rankings of Evidential Criteria 
Comparison Criterion % of auditors Strength of 
Preferred with Indicated Preference* 
Preference (Mean) 
Three Criteria Group: 
Cost vs. Sufficiency Sufficiency 82 4.9 
Cost vs. Competence Competence 100 6.3 
Stiff, vs. Competence Competence 82 5.2 
Five Criteria Group: 
Cost vs. Sufficiency Sufficiency 90 5.7 
Cost vs. Bias Bias 80 5.1 
Cost vs. Reliability Reliability 100 4.5 
Cost vs. Relevance Relevance 90 6.8 
Sufficiency vs. Bias Sufficiency 80 3.4 
Suff. vs. Reliability Sufficiency 60 3.0 
Suff. vs. Relevance Relevance 70 6.4 
Bias vs. Reliability Reliability 60 3.8 
Bias vs. Relevance Relevance 80 4.8 
Reliability vs. Relevance Relevance 70 6.1 
* Scale of one (equal importance) to nine (absolute importance). 
The order of significance for the five criteria group was: relevance, 
sufficiency, reliability, bias, and cost. Cost was again seen as least important. 
Sufficiency, reliability and bias were close choices, all perceived as of about 
equal, intermediate importance when compared to relevance. Therefore, the 
two groups displayed consistent responses reflecting relevance/competency as 
the most important evidential quality, while cost of gathering evidence was 
considered a secondary factor. Sufficiency fell in the middle. 
AHP weightings in Table 4 also reflect this ordering. Competence was the 
primary criterion (mean weighting .63), with sufficiency (.26) and cost (.11) as 
secondary factors (three criteria group). For the five criteria group, relevance 
(.37) and sufficiency (.24) were considered the most important criteria; 
reliability (.19) and bias (.15) followed in importance. Cost (.05) was judged as a 
distant minor factor. 
Evaluation of Evidential Alternatives 
After judging the relative importance of evidential criteria, auditors were 
asked to evaluate the three procedure areas along each of the criteria studied. 
The results of these choices are shown in Table 5. For example, when auditors 
in the three criteria group compared analytical review to observation in terms 
of cost, 100 percent felt that analytical review was less costly. 
However, in general, Table 5 reveals a lack of consensus among partici­
pants in applying the criteria to judge the quality of alternative evidence 
sources. This occurred despite the reasonably strong consensus described 
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Table 4 
Relative Importance of Evidential Criteria 
Measured by AHP Weightings 
Three Critieria Group Five Criteria Group 
Criterion Mean* Standard Criterion Mean* Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
Cost .11 .09 Cost .05 .03 
Sufficiency .26 .14 Sufficiency .24 .16 
Competence .63 .17 Bias .15 .12 
Reliability .19 .15 
Relevance .37 .18 
* Represents AHP normalized weightings of relative importance; Scale zero to one. 
earlier regarding the relative importance of the various evidential criteria. This 
lack of consensus is reflected in many of the pairwise comparisons. For 
example, for the three criteria group, four out of the nine comparisons indicated 
a lower than 65 percent level of agreement, while the five criteria group had 
nine out of 15 comparisons below 65 percent. In contrast, in evaluating the 
criteria, only one of 13 comparisons fell below 65 percent. 
The overall ranking of evidential alternatives for the various criteria (Tables 
5 and 6) also reflects the difficulties in achieving consensus. While both groups 
felt analytical review was the least costly to obtain, contradictory results 
appear in evaluating sufficiency. The three criteria group chose analytical 
review as superior regarding sufficiency, while subjects in the five criteria 
group ranked analytical review as of lowest quality along this criterion. The five 
criteria group could not reach any meaningful consensus in two cases 
(evaluating cost and relevance for observation and detailed tests) and demon­
strated a lack of clear consensus on analyzing all evidence sources as to 
reliability and relevance. Recall that relevance was considered of greatest 
importance and yet an evaluation of procedures on this dimension produced 
great disagreement. 
Table 6 indicates the AHP normalized weights for each of the three 
evidential sources as judged for the various evidential criteria. Both groups 
considered analytical review to be the least costly procedure to conduct. 
However, beyond this evaluation, a clear consensus is not present on all other 
evidential judgments. For example, for the five criteria group, the three forms 
of evidence are viewed as essentially equal in terms of relevance as measured 
by the mean weightings. Observation and detailed tests are ranked closely 
together on all five criteria. Further, the standard deviations of weightings 
evaluating analytical review are close to, or exceed, the mean on all criteria 
except cost for both groups, suggesting wide disagreement on the relative 
merits of this source of evidence. 
In summary, despite strong agreement on the relative importance of 
various evidential criteria, auditors displayed low consensus in applying these 
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Table 5 
Evaluation of Audit Procedures 
Pairwise % of % of 
Criterion Comparison Choice Subjects Mean* S.D Choice Subjects Mean* S.D 
Three Criteria Group 
Cost AR vs. OB AR** 100% 5.9 3.0 OB 0% 
AR vs. DT AR** 91 6.2 2.5 DT 9 5.0 0 
OB vs. DT OB** 82 3.7 2.0 DT 18 3.0 2.8 
Sufficiency AR vs. OB AR** 55 2.7 1.5 OB 45 6.2 2.7 
AR vs. DT AR** 82 3.1 2.1 DT 18 5.0 0 
OB vs. DT OB** 73 3.9 2.4 DT 27 3.3 0.6 
Compe-
tence AR vs. OB AR 36 5.8 2.5 OB** 64 5.0 2.0 
AR vs. DT AR 36 3.0 1.8 DT** 64 3.6 2.2 
OB vs. DT OB** 55 4.0 2.8 DT 45 5.2 2.0 
Five Criteria Group 
Cost AR vs. OB AR** 90% 5.9 2.0 OB 10% 5.0 0 
AR vs. DT AR** 100 5.0 2.6 DT 0 — — 
OB vs. DT OB 50 4.8 1.5 DT 50 2.8 1.1 
Sufficiency AR vs. OB AR 20 6.5 2.1 OB** 80 5.5 2.0 
AR vs. DT AR 20 3.5 0.7 DT** 80 5.4 2.1 
OB vs. DT OB** 60 4.8 2.2 DT 40 4.3 2.5 
Bias AR vs. OB AR 10 3.0 0 OB** 90 5.1 1.8 
AR vs. DT AR 10 3.0 0 DT** 90 4.8 1.1 
OB vs. DT OB 40 4.3 1.3 DT 60 4.7 2.0 
Reliability AR vs. OB AR 40 3.8 1.0 OB** 60 5.3 1.6 
AR vs. DT AR 40 3.8 2.5 DT** 60 5.2 1.8 
OB vs. DT OB 40 3.3 1.7 DT** 60 3.3 2.1 
Relevance AR vs. OB AR 40 4.3 2.5 OB** 60 4.0 2.8 
AR vs. DT AR 40 2.5 1.3 DT** 60 4.3 2.9 
OB vs. DT OB 50 2.6 1.7 DT 50 3.0 0.7 
* Scale one (Equal Importance) to nine (Absolute Importance) 
** Majority Preference 
Note: Evidential Choices—AR - Analytical Review 
OB - Observation 
DT - Detailed Tests 
criteria to evaluate the illustrative audit programs. Such disagreement is of 
concern since this result may suggest that, given the same facts, two auditors 
may plan a widely varying portfolio of audit procedures. This concern is 
111 
Table 6 
Relative Quality of Evidential Sources 
Criterion 
Analytical Review Observation Detailed Tests 
Mean* S.D. Mean* S.D. Mean* S.D. 
Three Criteria Group 
Cost .65 .18 .21 .11 .14 .10 
Sufficiency .36 .25 .40 .22 .24 .20 
Competence .28 .25 .37 .26 .35 .24 
Five Criteria Group 
Cost .64 .19 .20 .18 .16 .12 
Sufficiency .20 .25 .43 .23 .37 .25 
Bias .15 .16 .39 .26 .46 .23 
Reliability .27 .23 .36 .24 .37 .18 
Relevance .29 .21 .34 .21 .37 .17 
* Represents AHP normalized weightings of relative importance; scale zero to one. 
addressed in the next section where the final planned allocations of audit hours 
are examined. 
Allocation of Audit Hours—Final Evidential Judgment 
After making criteria evaluations, auditors decided on the allocation of audit 
hours. Table 7 provides summary data on these judgments. A one-way ANOVA 
indicated no significant differences (p<0.10) in the allocation of audit hours 
between the three and five criteria groups. The results here, however, reflect 
a relatively low level of consensus, consistent with prior studies of evidential 
planning (e.g., Mock and Turner, [1981]). This low consensus may be the 
result of the earlier findings, indicating that auditors displayed a high level of 
disagreement in applying evidential criteria to actually evaluate alternative 
evidential sources. This finding will be explored further in the final section of 
the paper. 
Discussion 
A significant finding in this study was that, although auditors were in close 
agreement as to the relative importance of various evidential criteria, there 
was not a strong consensus in applying these criteria to evaluate the merits of 
alternative procedures or in planning the allocation of audit hours. For example, 
subjects had widely disparate judgments regarding the effectiveness and 
sufficiency of analytical review. 
The divergent allocation of audit hours among procedures found here is 
disturbing, since such widely varying audit plans suggest that, in practice, 
engagements may differ substantially in efficiency and/or effectiveness. Future 
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Table 7 
Allocation of Audit Hours 
Mean Response (Audit Hours—150 total hours) 
Experimental Group Analytical Review Observation Detailed Tests 
Three Criteria 46 hours 38 hours 64 hours 
(19) (14) (29) 
Five Criteria 39 hours 39 hours 72 hours 
(20) (19) (31) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviation. 
research might consider the efficacy of various decision aids to assist auditors 
in program planning. For example, perhaps continued use of a multi-attribute 
method such as AHP may result in explicit consideration of evidence trade-offs 
and lead to greater consensus. 
An additional extension to the current study is to focus on various audit 
objectives. Given the early state of the research in this area, this study looked 
at audit planning for the inventory account overall. The number of paired 
comparisons required, and hence subject time, grows very rapidly as additional 
audit objectives are considered. However, planning in practice is more complex 
and should explicitly consider needed evidence to address all the relevant audit 
objectives pertaining to an account. Are auditors evaluating alternative pro­
cedures to obtain cost-effective evidence for each objective? Is there a 
redundancy of tests on some objective(s) while little or no evidence on others? 
The auditors in this study assessed evidential criteria and weighted 
alternative procedures along these criteria with respect to a specific audit case. 
Thus, corroborating findings, perhaps examining different account areas, 
evidence alternatives, and/or risk situations are needed to enhance the validity 
of the results. 
The weak consensus in evaluating alternative procedures as to relevance, 
the criterion considered of greatest importance, is of concern. Perhaps auditors 
in practice have great difficulty, as suggested here, in appropriately considering 
this criterion. The evaluation of relevance is further complicated by the fact that 
audit procedures may address multiple objectives. For example, receivable 
confirmations provide evidence as to existence, valuation, and cut-off. Thus, 
future research may address how auditors can and do operationalize this 
important, yet difficult criterion in practice. For example, some accounting 
firms have developed program planning materials where various common 
procedures are ranked (e.g., strong, moderate, weak) with respect to 
relevance for each key audit objective for the account examined. 
These questions illustrate the fact that, as noted earlier, we have little 
understanding of how evidential planning occurs in practice. Certainly, much 
more work is needed to begin to evaluate current practices and to identify tools 
to aid auditors in arriving at such complex, vital judgments. The results 
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reported here suggest that such tools appear needed for evidential planning and 
potentially offer significant returns in improving audit efficiency and effective­
ness. 
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Discussant's Response to "Auditor Evidential 
Planning Judgments" 
Robert H. Temkin 
Arthur Young & Co. 
It is indeed an honor for me to participate in this symposium as a discussant 
and a special pleasure to follow Professor Wright. Dr. Wright is Harold A. 
Mock Professor at The Northeastern University, which is, of course, located in 
Boston, my once and, I'm glad to say, future home. 
Harold Mock was the managing partner of the Boston office of Arthur 
Young when I joined the firm in 1964. He was the consummate professional, an 
astute manager, a superb technician, and a man of the greatest personal and 
professional integrity. He was very good to this junior auditor and I remember 
him with great affection. It is good to see the professorship that carries 
Harold's name in the hands of so distinguished an academician. 
This is my first experience as a discussant at an academic conference, so I 
have chosen to approach this assignment in a manner similar to that of a 
concurring partner on an audit, something with which I am familiar. As a result, 
however, my remarks focus more on the problems I had with the paper and the 
case study rather than on the good things accomplished and presented by the 
researchers in the paper. Actually, I really want to talk about only a few things 
related to this case study and paper. I want to discuss some possible causes of 
the results as well as the conclusions of the research. 
Designing a case study to deal with as complex a matter as an inventory 
audit is a difficult task and Drs. Wright and Mock have done an excellent job. 
Nonetheless, the information is not, and probably could not be, complete. 
Accordingly, the auditor must answer a number of questions on his or her own, 
and these questions are not unimportant. 
For example, why does a client with perpetual records and strong controls 
take a physical inventory every year? What has been the experience with the 
physical inventory? Are "book to physical" differences common or uncom­
mon? How reliable are the perpetual records? How often are they reconciled to 
the financial records? Further, the case study does not address in detail how 
the physical inventory is to be compiled and priced, or provide the ability, 
except intuitively, to assess the risk of errors in compiling the inventory, errors 
in extension or footing, or the risk in incorrect prices being used. The auditor 
also needs to guess, in this case, how labor and overhead are applied to the 
inventory and whether the case includes auditing these components of the 
inventory. 
As I said, the case study is excellent. If all the information were to be 
provided, the case would be unreadable. Nonetheless, when auditors need to 
make assumptions about the risks of certain types of errors (stated otherwise, 
about certain financial statement assertions), the auditors will, of course, differ 
and produce different audit approaches. 
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The Arthur Young audit decision support program, which has been in our 
practice for two years, contains numerous questions to help the auditor decide 
how to approach the determination of inventory quantities, from the purpose of 
the physical inventory to an assessment of risk of error in compiling, pricing 
and valuing the inventory. In fact, we approach a physical inventory as a "non-
routine data process," our term for an activity that has many of the same 
attributes as a routine data processing activity, but that happens relatively 
infrequently. As a further complication, the audit program for inventory that is 
included in the case does not contain procedures that would appear to address 
the "net valuation" assertion. 
Auditors would, in completing the case, have to either not approach that 
assertion or use one of the procedures provided to deal with the valuation 
assertion. The resultant audit programs could very well be very different. 
I cannot resist talking about the 150 hour budget provided in the case for 
the audit. We CPAs in public practice are continually criticized for over­
emphasizing budgets, and letting the budget dictate the procedures. Now I 
don't know whether the participants viewed 150 hours as a lot of, or a little, 
time to audit the inventories in the case study, but their view of the 150 hours 
would necessarily influence the procedures, and how the time is allocated. 
Would the allocation have been different if a fixed time budget had not been 
provided? I expect it would. 
Of course, the lack of consensus in the procedures applied was predictable 
when considered with the inconsistent and inconclusive results of the pairwise 
comparisons of auditing procedures. Look at the difference between the views 
of the sufficiency of evidence provided by analytical procedures as opposed to 
observation and detailed tests! In one group, 82 percent believed that analytical 
review provided more sufficient evidence than detailed tests, while in the other 
group 80 percent believed detailed tests better met the sufficiency criterion. 
Now, how could something like that happen? 
The fact is that all auditors solve planning problems and approach planning 
based on their education and their experience. Over the years, we pick up 
biases as a result of what we've been taught and our experience in other client 
situations. It's no secret that firms differ in their view of the usefulness of 
analytical review procedures. Some firms place great weight on the results of 
analytical review in deciding whether they have sufficient competent evidential 
matter, others will not. Of course, in almost every case the answer is 
situationally determined, depending on the risk of error and the results of the 
analytical review. 
It is also interesting to note that there is no consensus of view between 
observation and detailed tests as to competence and sufficiency. This probably 
results from auditors' inability to check "it depends" on the account and the 
assertion; how somebody views this problem will also depend on the column in 
which one puts confirmation. However, I want to take the most issue with the 
authors' conclusion that the divergent allocation of audit hours among pro­
cedures is disturbing, since such widely varying audit plans suggest that 
engagements in practice may differ substantially in efficiency and/or effective­
ness. While I agree that further refinement of a multi-attribute method such as 
Analytical Hierarchy Process may lead to greater consensus, I cannot agree 
that lack of consensus is necessarily bad. 
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In 1983, we at Arthur Young began the development of an expert system 
for audit planning as part of what has become known as AY/ASQ. The result is 
that AY/Decision Support has been in general use in our firm since 1986, and 
has been joined by a version tailored to the banking and thrift industries. In 
developing AY/DS, we had to address up front precisely what our objective 
would be. And while improved consistency was an objective, it was much less 
important than improved efficiency and better correlation of substantive 
procedures to the assessment of risk, especially control risk. Auditors need to 
feel free to develop an audit approach that they believe will be responsive to the 
needs of the particular audit engagement. We must recognize that engagement 
needs are driven not only by the characteristics of the account (or client) being 
audited, but by factors such as availability of evidence, reporting deadlines, and 
the people available to do the work. 
For example, we might agree that application of analytical review pro­
cedures as substantive tests is enhanced if the person applying the procedures 
has more experience, in general, and more experience with the client and its 
industry, in particular. I submit that there is more than one audit approach in 
almost every situation that will produce an acceptable audit; that is, one that will 
reduce audit risk to an acceptable level, assuming, of course, that we could 
agree on that acceptable level of risk. So then, why worry if research confirms 
that different auditors would pick different approaches? After all, who cares 
which road the auditor takes, as long as the auditor arrives at his destination? It 
is also possible that there is more than one approach that is effective and is also 
efficient. In the case study, each auditor presumably believed that he or she had 
arrived at an effective audit approach that could be completed in 150 hours! 
The Talmud states that there is more than one way to righteousness, and 
that each man must choose his own path. So it is for the auditor who sets out to 
do the best audit. He must choose his own path based on his knowledge, his 
experience, and the needs of the engagement. Of course, in the real world, his 
views will be subject to, and be tempered by, the review of others, generally 
with more experience. This review tends to have a leveling effect, bringing 
somewhat more consistency to audit plans. 
This does not mean that audit planning is not a fertile ground for ongoing 
research. As the authors indicate, there is much that can be done in addressing 
how auditors relate procedures picked for one objective when considering 
approaches for other objectives. We can also consider further how auditors 
begin the planning process—the "jumping off point." In developing AY/ 
Decision Support, we quickly learned that there were, for most accounts, 
certain procedures (for example, confirmation of receivables) that auditors 
almost always use, and often serve as the principal source of assurance for the 
data related assertions. When the auditor assesses control risk as low, and has 
tested controls accordingly, these principal procedures may be all the substan­
tive procedures required for the data-related assertions. 
This type of research can be invaluable not only in developing decision aids 
but also in helping train the auditors of tomorrow. We have much to learn about 
how audit judgments are made. Drs. Wright and Mock have moved this process 




The Relative Importance of Auditing 
to the Accounting Profession: 
Is Auditing a Profit Center? 
Norman R. Walker 
Michael D. Doll 
Price Waterhouse 
This paper deals with certain aggregated financial, statistical, and other 
information relating to the US operations of the Big Eight firms—Arthur 
Andersen & Co., Arthur Young & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte 
Haskins + Sells, Ernst & Whinney, Peat Marwick Main & Co., Price Water-
house, and Touche Ross & Co.—primarily their accounting and auditing 
components. The Big Eight segment of the accounting profession was chosen 
because of its dominance in auditing publicly-held companies and because 
information concerning these firms was the most readily available. 
Introduction 
If you were to read the myriad of articles which have recently appeared in 
business publications and professional accounting and auditing journals, you 
might be led to believe that the outlook for the future and profitability of the 
auditing profession is rather dim. For example: 
• The standard audit report is often viewed as a commodity. There are 
those who believe that there are few means to distinguish between 
auditing firms except on the basis of price. 
• So-called competitive pricing for audit engagements is often punctu­
ated by underbidding, or "low-balling.'' The perception is that an 
accounting firm "buys" the audit of a company in an attempt to obtain 
lucrative tax and management consulting work. 
• Merger/acquisition activity has reduced the number of major publicly-
traded companies. The recurring audit of these giant companies had 
been considered by many to be the "bread and butter" of the Big 
Eight firms. 
• Firms in financial services and other commercial activities, often 
paying higher salaries, increasingly seem to attract the more capable 
undergraduate and MBA students who might otherwise choose 
auditing as a career. Many of these students view the work done by 
staff accountants (at least in their first several years) as repetitive and 
uninteresting. These prospective auditors do not relish the thought of 
sitting for a difficult examination after graduation in order to obtain a 
license as a CPA. At the same time, they perceive the work done in 
the arenas of finance and investment banking as both challenging and 
rewarding (mentally and financially). 
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• The supply of students who do choose accounting and auditing seems 
to be dwindling. From 1984 to 1986 (the most recent year for which 
we have information), the supply of accounting graduates from four 
major universities (which have traditionally been important recruiting 
sources for our firm and which are widely recognized for having 
outstanding accounting programs) declined, on average, fourteen 
percent. 
• As shown in Table 1, accounting and auditing (A&A) revenue as a 
percentage of total revenue has been declining for the past five years 
for the Big Eight firms. This is a continuation of a trend that has been 
occurring for at least the past decade. On a percentage basis, average 
annual revenue growth for the Big Eight firms over the last several 
years has increased in tax and management consulting services 
(MCS) at significantly higher rates than in accounting and auditing 
(Table 2). 
• Some observers argue that A&A is no longer the major profit center 
for the Big Eight (or at least will no longer be in the near future) and 
that tax and, especially, MCS have become the major profit centers. 
Others have gone so far as to predict that some of the Big Eight firms 
will eventually get out of the auditing market altogether, concentrating 
instead (they claim) on the more profitable tax and management 
consulting segments of the profession. 
Despite the impact of these and other challenging issues, we believe 
auditing remains a significant, robust segment of the accounting profession. 
This paper discusses some recent statistics concerning auditing and gives our 
views on its future. 
Problems/Issues Affecting the Relative 
Importance of Auditing 
This section provides background data and additional information on several 
of the problems/issues affecting the relative importance of auditing to the 
accounting profession which were raised in the introduction. 
Table 1 
Average Fee Distribution* for 
the Big Eight Firms: 1983-1987 
Activity 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Accounting & Auditing 63 62 59 58 56 
Tax 22 22 23 23 24 
Management Consulting 
Services 15 16 18 19 20 
* Data were derived from Annual Reports to the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA 
Division for CPA Firms 
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Table 2 
Average Percentage Increase in Revenue 
for the Big Eight Firms: 1983-1987 
(Except for inflation rate, data were derived from the International 











Accounting & Auditing 8.8 9.0 8.8 10.6 13.9 
Tax 15.2 13.6 13.3 12.3 21.5 
Management Consulting 
Services 12.9 21.2 23.7 19.8 23.9 
Total 10.8 12.0 12.5 12.8 17.6 
Inflation Rate* 3.8 3.9 3.8 1.1 4.4 
* Inflation rate is the Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers (Source: US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics) 
Repeal of Ban on Solicitation and Advertising 
In the late 1970s, under threat of anti-trust action from the Justice 
Department and the Federal Trade Commission, the AICPA eliminated, from 
its Code of Ethics the prohibitions against competitive fee bidding, solicitation 
of clients, advertising, and promotion of specialities. This effectively deregu­
lated the accounting profession and led to increased competition among all 
accounting firms (especially the Big Eight). 
The competition for audit clients in the US market has increased signifi­
cantly since the ban was lifted, particularly so in the past five years. The 
market is now characterized by pervasive use of public relations and advertis­
ing. Each of the Big Eight firms has adopted advertising campaigns, many of 
which feature "tag lines" aimed at capturing the public's attention and 
increasing awareness of the sponsoring firm, both generally and in specific 
industries and services. For example, while Arthur Young & Company explains 
that "We take business personally" and Ernst & Whinney boasts "Ernst & 
Whinney . . . and results. They go together," our firm, Price Waterhouse, 
proclaims "Expect more from us." Some of the advertisements are audit-
related in a broad sense, but many are aimed at special industries (e.g., health 
care, insurance, law firms, manufacturing) or special services (e.g., financial 
planning, budgeting, tax planning). For example, Deloitte Haskins + Sells 
features the slogan "The Competitive Edge in Health Care" in their advertise­
ments to that industry. 
Who is the target of all this marketing effort? Not surprisingly, to a 
significant degree there is vigorous pursuit of largely the same target markets 
in which many Big Eight firms see the greatest opportunity for profitable 
practice growth and development—in addition to those industries previously 
mentioned, in high technology, smaller businesses in high growth industries, 
and financial services. 
A significant amount of direct solicitation of existing clients now occurs in 
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the form of telephone, direct mail campaigns, free seminars, and call programs. 
Software products, free consulting time, training aids, lower fees for current 
services—you name it—all are being offered by various Big Eight firms, 
sometimes with, but sometimes without, specific knowledge of the company's 
business operations and its possible needs. 
The changes which have occurred in the auditing profession as a result of 
lifting the AICPA prohibitions against advertising and solicitation have forever 
altered the way public accounting is practiced in the US. One of the most 
significant changes—so-called "competitive pricing"—is discussed below. 
"Competitive Pricing" of Audit Services 
The U.S. market is characterized by deep discounting of fees—particularly 
for audit services. A recent article in The Wall Street Journal [Berton, 1985] 
contained the following introduction: "Attention, Corporate Treasurers: Think 
your outside audit is too expensive? Now may be a good time to get a bargain.'' 
The article went on to recite numerous examples of companies which had 
reduced their audit fees through competitive proposals. Discounts to existing 
clients, "low-balling" fees to gain new clients (in some instances with fees at 
less than 50% of standard billing rates), fixed fees covering three to five years, 
free work and the like are examples of the intensity of the competition which 
currently exists among the Big Eight firms in the US. 
Some believe an accounting firm may have many justifications for bidding 
below standard billing rates to engage a client. An initial low bid may be justified 
on the grounds that a new client should not be charged for the high start-up 
costs that occur as the accounting team learns about the new client company 
and its industry. In addition, the marginal cost of serving a client during the off­
season is very low and may justify a lower-than-normal bid. Other reasons for a 
significantly low bid may be the desire to gain industry experience, to attract a 
prestigious client that would be a good source of referrals, or to market other 
services such as tax planning or consulting [Dykes and Hermanson, 1985]. 
The economic decline experienced by the US economy in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s forced companies to critically review all discretionary and non-
discretionary expenditures in their efforts to sustain financial well-being and 
ensure cost-effectiveness. Fees for professional services became a target for 
negotiation. Many companies began requesting multiple bids for their outside 
audits in an effort to cut costs. Accounting firms hoping to secure new work 
were increasingly willing to discount their fees; the incumbent firm often found 
it necessary to lower its fee to remain competitive. Once the "waters were 
tested," so to speak, and many companies found that fee concessions could be 
gained, the era of uncontested fees for quality services—if it ever really 
existed—was gone. The disconcerting element introduced, however, was that 
even where superior services were rendered at a fair price, companies were 
aware that services similar in name could most likely be obtained elsewhere at a 
lower price—the idea of the audit as a commodity. 
The view that the audit is a commodity was institutionalized with the 
publication of the Cohen Commission Report in 1978. It stated (in part) that 
(Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 1978, p. 111) "When a product or 
service offered by different suppliers differs significantly to the user, or appears 
to differ significantly, it is easier for one of its producers to maintain a higher, 
122 
noncompetitive price. Public accounting firms go to considerable length to 
develop superior services for their clients, but there is little effective product 
differentiation from the viewpoint of the present buyer of the service, that is the 
management of the corporation." Thus, if a prospective client views profes­
sional accounting services—such as an audit opinion—primarily as a commodity, 
it will generally attempt to obtain the commodity at the lowest possible price. 
Many executives view the Big Eight firms as essentially identical. Their 
view appears to spring from observable similarities among the Big Eight: 
depth of personnel sufficient for all practical purposes; domestic and foreign 
offices blanketing the globe; claims of special industry expertise tailored to 
the company's interests; availability of a full range of services in accounting, 
tax and management consulting; and auditing approaches said to promote 
optimum efficiency and effectiveness. All of the firms must comply with 
auditing standards set by the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts 
(AICPA), financial reporting standards set by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). As members of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for 
CPA firms, each of the Big Eight firms must undergo triennial peer reviews 
and comply with numerous other requirements designed to promote high-
quality practices. Therefore, the argument goes, a "clean" opinion ex­
pressed by any of the Big Eight would be acceptable. Using this reasoning, 
the "best" opinion is the one that costs the least. Many observers within the 
profession, and among our clientele, note that the basic attest function—the 
audit—is currently being bought and sold like a commodity, with price being 
the dominant factor. 
Severe price competition has caused the audit function to become less 
profitable for the Big Eight firms, other things being equal. Bids below cost to 
attract new business have become fairly common. The audit is seen by some 
primarily as a "foot in the door" or "loss leader" to sell other services. 
Auditor Changes Related to Fees 
As reported in the Public Accounting Report, one of several publications 
which keeps track of changes in independent accountants of publicly-traded 
companies, there were 194 public companies that changed auditors in 1978. 
Over 700 publicly-traded companies changed auditors in 1987, a nearly 
400% increase in the decade. Table 3 presents a summary of publicly-
traded companies with auditor changes for each of the five years in the 
period from 1983 through 1987 and provides the most often cited reasons 
for the change.1 
As can be seen from Table 3, the most often cited factor for the increase in 
auditor changes over the past three years—when nearly two thousand publicly-
traded companies changed independent accountants—was fees. The next most 
often cited factor was service. 
1 The statistics for publicly-traded companies with auditor-changes presented in Table 3 should be 
viewed with "a grain of salt." Each company changing auditors is presented in Table 3 as an equal 
unit, no matter what the level of audit fees. Obviously, the loss of a single Fortune 500 client with 
$500,000-plus audit fee is of much greater concern than the loss of several clients each with an 
audit fee of $10,000. 
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Table 3 
Number of Publicly-Traded Companies 
with Auditor Changes: 1983-1987 
1983 1984 
Year 
1985 1986 1987 
Number of publicly-traded 
companies with auditor 
changes 480 523 542 737 719 
Percentage of companies 














Note: Source of data is the Public Accounting Report (PAR). 
Sharing of Fee Knowledge Among Multiple Parties 
Over the last fifteen years or so, the contributions and responsibilities of 
audit committees have attracted an ever-increasing amount of attention. Audit 
committees typically are composed of outside directors. One of the commit­
tee's responsibilities is the selection of auditors for the company. (The actual 
selection generally is proposed by management, with the audit committee and 
the board of directors confirming management's selection. In many instances, 
the selection is ratified by the shareholders during the proxy process.) Many 
outside directors serve on multiple boards of directors and audit committees as 
well as on the board of directors of their own company. Thus, a three- or four-
member audit committee may collectively have "fee knowledge" relating to 
the audits of many other companies. The sharing of this knowledge has 
frequently increased audit fee pressures on the Big Eight. 
Sophistication of the Audit User Base 
The audit user base has become much more sophisticated. Due to (i) 
increased public awareness of the accounting profession through the media, (ii) 
the large number of alumni of Big Eight firms employed by commercial 
enterprises, (iii) information obtained through service on audit committees, 
boards of directors and a variety of other sources, and (iv) the greater use of in-
house personnel and internal auditors, the potential users of audit services 
have become far more sophisticated and discriminating in understanding what 
audit services are, how they are priced, and how they are performed. Although 
this can work in favor of the accounting profession, it has nevertheless 
contributed to opening up the audit market to competitive forces. 
Maturing Demand for Audit Services 
Another significant factor in the competitive evolution has been an indicated 
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reduction in the client population base itself. The last five years have seen a 
tremendous upsurge in the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among 
U.S. companies, many of them occurring in the Fortune 1000 market, 
considered one of the primary markets for services among the Big Eight and 
other major accounting firms. This rash of mergers spurred additional audit fee 
competition as new parent companies dropped the auditor of one of the merged 
concerns (or decided to seek competitive bids from additional accounting 
firms). Following the merger of two large concerns (or the acquisition of one by 
another), the combined audit effort for future examinations is generally 
significantly less than is required to issue separate reports on the individual 
pre-merged companies. Accordingly, the fee for the post-merged company is 
generally much less than the combined pre-merger fees. 
M&A activity slowed for a while after the October 1987 stock market crash 
but seems to be reviving rapidly. Many are predicting a continuation of this 
trend. The upshot of this activity is that the Big Eight, with basically similar 
strategic goals of growth and profitability, may be pursuing a shrinking base of 
potential service users. Hence, the initiation of vigorous efforts to seek and 
attain competitive advantage. 
Is Auditing a Profit Center? 
Up to this point, the paper has discussed certain problems and issues 
affecting the relative importance of auditing to the accounting profession. This 
section turns to the question of whether or not auditing is a profit center. 
Statistics Available for Analysis 
The easiest way to determine if auditing is a profit center for the Big Eight 
firms would be to have access to each of the firms' financial statements by 
discipline (i.e., accounting and auditing, tax, and management consulting 
services) for the past five or six years. Obviously, we have the Price 
Waterhouse financial statements for each of these years and are pleased to 
report that auditing has been, and remains, a major profit center for us. 
However, current and historical information on the profitability of the US 
operations of the remaining firms in the Big Eight (in the aggregate or by 
discipline) is not readily available. 
The following information is either disclosed annually by each of the Big 
Eight firms or can be derived from other sources: total revenue, total number 
of partners/principals, total number of professional staff, revenue by discipline 
(accounting and auditing, tax, management consulting), number of partners/ 
principals by discipline, and number of professional staff by discipline. This 
information has been used to prepare Tables 2, 4, 5 and 6. 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present selected average revenue data for the Big Eight 
firms as a group.2 As might be expected, there were variances by discipline, 
2 The sources for the 1987 revenue amounts were the International Accounting Bulletin (IAB) and 
the Public Accounting Report (PAR). The revenue of Peat Marwick Main & Co. (resulting from the 
merger of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. and KMG Main Hurdman) is included in 1987. Revenue 
for 1983-86 includes only that of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. The source for 1985 and 1986 
revenue amounts was PAR. Revenue data for previous years was taken from the respective Big 
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sometimes significant, among the various firms. However, the purpose of this 
paper is not to discuss the relative importance or profitability of auditing to any 
particular firm of the Big Eight, but to the Big Eight firms as a group. 
Use of Revenue per Partner or Revenue per Professional Staff 
as Estimators of Profitability 
For purposes of this paper, we have used "revenue per partner" and 
"revenue per professional staff' as estimators of profitability to examine the 
premise of whether or not auditing is a profit center. We acknowledge that 
these are somewhat inexact predictors of profitability but, in our view, these 
are reasonable approximations of profitability. We believe it is not unrealistic to 
use them as estimators of profitability since personnel costs represent the 
largest cost factor for accounting firms. We have assumed that, in general, 
personnel costs do not vary significantly by discipline for similar experience 
levels. (If anything, salary levels for A&A may have been somewhat less than 
those for tax and MCS thereby resulting in a more conservative estimate of 
audit profitability.) 
Other important factors which impact the level of profitability of the Big 
Eight firms include billing rate realization, staff utilization, leverage (i.e., effect 
of the staffing pyramid), expense control, and speed of accounts receivable 
collection. Intuitively, we believe the effect of these factors varies among the 
Big Eight firms. This paper does not attempt to quantify the impact of these 
factors on Big Eight profitability. 
Obviously, we have assumed that each of the Big Eight firms has, in fact, 
been profitable during the past five years. Based upon anecdotal evidence, and 
our own knowledge, this seems to be a reasonable supposition. 
Table 4 illustrates the average revenue per partner for the Big Eight firms 
for each of the five years in the period from 1983 through 1987, in total and by 
discipline. The increase in average A&A revenue per A&A partner was very 
impressive over the five-year period—an increase of $253,000 per partner, or 
38%. While not as great as the $337,000 (or 44%) increase in average MCS 
revenue per MCS partner over the same period, it did exceed the $241,000 (or 
37%) growth in average tax revenue per tax partner. 
Table 5 illustrates the average revenue per professional staff for the Big 
Eight firms for each of the five years in the period from 1983 through 1987, in 
total and by discipline. The comparative growth statistics for average revenue 
Eight firms' Dingell Subcommittee submissions when so disclosed, or prior estimates published by 
PAR as an alternative. (We have found the IAB/PAR revenue "estimates" to be uncannily 
accurate, for Price Waterhouse at least, leading us to believe that sources from inside the Big Eight 
firms supply the information to IAB/PAR.) Revenue by discipline was (1) obtained from Dingell 
Subcommittee filings or (2) derived by applying revenue composition percentages— reported in 
annual information summaries filed with the AICPA—to the total revenue amounts. The sources for 
the total professional staff counts, including partners, were (1) each Big Eight firm's annual 
information filing with the AICPA and (2) an informal staff count data base maintained on each of the 
other Big Eight firms by Price Waterhouse. The AICPA controls provided the control totals; 
personnel statistics by discipline for all years were calculated using relative staff composition 
percentages resident in the Price Waterhouse data base. We acknowledge that the data produced 
by this process is somewhat "soft" since our data base information is probably not completely 




Average Revenue Per Partner for the 
Big Eight Firms: 1983-1987 




1985 1986 1987 
Accounting & Auditing $663 $702 $750 $ 842 $ 916 
Tax 648 711 763 821 889 
Management Consulting 
Services 768 867 980 1009 1105 
Total 670 722 781 863 942 
Note: Sources of the data are the International Accounting Bulletin (IAB) and the 
Public Accounting Report (PAR). 
Table 5 
Average Revenue Per Professional Staff 
for the Big Eight Firms: 1983-1987 




1985 1986 1987 
Accounting & Auditing $74 $78 $80 $ 86 $ 91 
Tax 88 93 92 94 103 
Management Consulting 
Services 83 90 96 101 105 
Total 78 82 84 90 97 
Note: Sources of the data are the International Accounting Bulletin (IAB) and the 
Public Accounting Report (PAR). 
per professional staff are very similar to those for average revenue per partner. 
Average A&A revenue per A&A professional staff increased by $17,000 (or 
23%) over the five-year period. It exceeded the $15,000 (or 17%) increase in 
average tax revenue per tax professional staff but was less than the $22,000 (or 
27%) increase in average MCS revenue per MCS professional staff. 
Although average A&A revenue per A&A partner and average A&A 
revenue per A&A professional staff are both below average total revenue per 
partner and average total revenue per professional staff in each of the five 
years, neither is significantly so (less than 4% for average A&A revenue per 
A&A partner and less than 7% for average A&A revenue per A&A profes­
sional staff in any of the years shown). This indicates that while, on average, 
auditing may not be the most profitable service offered by the Big Eight firms, it 
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does generate significant revenue per partner and per professional staff. The 
charge that the audit is a loss leader, while possibly true in isolated instances, is 
clearly not true in the aggregate. 
Increases in Audit Revenue 
As noted earlier in this paper, the annual percentage growth for A&A 
revenue has been less than the percentage growth for tax, MCS, and total 
revenue for the Big Eight firms. It should be noted, however, that aggregate 
A&A revenue for the Big Eight firms has posted annual increases in absolute 
dollars and, as shown in Table 2, in percentage increases which are significantly 
greater than the corresponding rates of inflation. 
Table 6 shows the average dollar increase in revenue for the Big Eight firms 
for each of the five years in the period from 1983 through 1987, in total and by 
discipline. We acknowledge that the dollar and percentage increases outside 
A&A have been impressive, particularly for MCS. But we also believe it is 
important to point out that A&A has posted significantly higher dollar increases 
in each of the five years than has either tax or MCS. Percentage increases for 
tax and MCS are more impressive partly because they are developed from a 
smaller revenue base than A&A. Further, there was a $25 million "spread" 
between the 1987 audit and MCS revenue increases. In the preceding four 
years, the average spread was $14 million. There was also a $24 million spread 
between audit and tax revenue increases. In the preceding four years, the 
average spread was $17 million. 
One of the most significant aspects of the importance of auditing to the 
accounting profession that cannot be measured in terms of dollars and cents is 
that it allows Big Eight partners and managers direct access to the most 
important executives in corporate America. Proper execution of a difficult 
assignment provides the opportunity to impress those persons who ultimately 
make the decisions concerning the appointment of consultants for a multitude 
of other engagements. Notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, the fact 
Table 6 
Average Dollar Increase in Revenue for 
the Big Eight Firms: 1983-1987 




1985 1986 1987 
Accounting & Auditing $29 $33 $35 $46 $ 66 
Tax 18 18 20 21 42 
Management Consulting 
Services 11 21 27 29 41 
Total 58 72 82 96 149 
Note: Sources of the data are the International Accounting Bulletin (IAB) and the 
Public Accounting Report (PAR). 
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that a Big Eight firm has performed in a quality manner on an audit engagement 
is often the most important reason the same Big Eight firm has been engaged 
to perform tax work and management consulting services. The cross-selling of 
additional services to existing clients is a primary source of new work for the 
Big Eight firms. The audit of a company can almost always be used as a "foot in 
the door," but we believe that foot-in-the-door tactics alone simply will not 
work over the long pull. Promises must be followed by delivery of constructive 
services—services perceived as solid values for the price paid. 
The Audit as a Commodity—a Rebuttal 
Some executives seem to regard auditing services as a commodity because 
the end result—the audit report—is tangible and straightforward. We believe 
this is akin to viewing the outcome of a jury trial—that is, a guilty or not-guilty 
verdict—in a similar fashion. From our perspective, neither the report of 
independent accountants nor the verdict of a jury is a commodity. Both are 
products of processes that are dependent upon people. 
In response to the Cohen Report [1978, p. 111] claim that there is "little 
effective product differentiation from the viewpoint of . . . management of the 
corporation," we believe that it is the men and women representing the 
various Big Eight firms that provide audit product differentiation. The primary 
resources of the Big Eight are its people. Once the buyer of a service has made 
a selection, the spotlight shifts away from a firm with its litany of credentials to 
a handful of individuals with the levels of expertise and experience needed to 
get the job done in accordance with the promised specifications. It is individuals 
who deliver services, and whose actions either preserve and improve upon a 
firm's reputation, or damage it. 
For example, one of the first and most critical success factors to an audit 
engagement is understanding the business and its related inherent risks. This 
understanding is the basis for all subsequent audit work. Obtaining this 
understanding is not a mechanical exercise. It is highly dependent upon 
people—not only the audit staff assigned to the engagement, but the client 
personnel as well. It is through discussions and interaction with client 
personnel, from the CEO on down, that the audit team gains the necessary 
understanding. The effectiveness and efficiency of this process, both from the 
auditor's and client's perspective, is dependent on the quality and expertise of 
the audit team members. 
Is There A Shrinking Audit Market for the Big Eight? 
We previously noted that merger and acquisition activity has reduced the 
number of major publicly-traded companies. In direct contrast, the large 
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in recent years has provided major 
audit practice growth opportunities for the Big Eight firms. Weissburg, editor 
of Going Public: IPO Reporter, has reported (in a private communication) that 
the number of IPOs3 (firm commitments) has ranged from a low of 354 in 1984 
to a high of 719 in 1986. 
3 This information needs to be viewed in the same light as that contained in Table 3. Each initial 
public offering, no matter how large or small, is viewed as an equal unit. Obviously, a larger initial 
public offering implies a larger company and larger recurring audit fees. 
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The Securities Act of 1933 requires that registration statements (including 
those for initial public offerings) contain audited financial statements. Many 
filings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (e.g., annual reports on Form 
10-K) must also include audited financial statements. The importance of these 
requirements to the Big Eight firms cannot be over-emphasized. Public 
accountants have a monopoly on this work; the Acts specify that the financial 
statements be "certified by independent public accountants," without mention 
of the size of the auditing firm to do the work. However, it has been our 
experience that many underwriting firms encourage (often insist) that their 
clients engage one of the Big Eight firms to examine the financial statements 
included in registration statements even though the company going public may 
have had a satisfactory relationship with a non-Big Eight accounting firm until 
that time. The capital markets of the world rely on financial statements which 
have been certified by independent accountants. These markets also recognize 
the integrity and independence of the Big Eight firms. 
Because of potential liability under the 1933 Act, audit examinations 
performed in connection with an initial public offering are generally considered 
to be more than a low level of risk. Accordingly, this type of work is normally 
performed at standard billing rates; these engagements tend to be very 
profitable for the Big Eight firms. Also, certain accounting and auditing fees 
associated with an IPO are generally considered part of the cost of issuance and 
distribution of the securities (along with legal fees and expenses, printing, etc.) 
and are deducted from the proceeds of the offering. Because of this factor, this 
type of work tends not to be as fee sensitive as a recurring audit. 
An aspect of M&A activity which has not yet been discussed in this paper is 
that mergers, acquisitions, restructurings and leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) very 
often spawn additional accounting and auditing work for the Big Eight firms. As 
business units are spun-off or sold to partially repay debt incurred as a result of 
the merger/acquisition/restructuring/LBO, Big Eight firms are often engaged 
to assist in "carve out'' work, opine on historical financial statements of former 
divisions or subsidiaries, etc. Following the transaction, many of these spun-off 
or sold units retain the Big Eight firm to perform their annual financial 
statement examination. 
Although no empirical data are currently available to us, we believe the 
combination of the effects of the IPO market and the positive impact of M&A 
activity have provided significant A&A fees for the Big Eight firms during the 
1983-1987 period. The significant dollar increases in average A&A revenue per 
A&A partner and average dollar increase in A&A revenue for this period would 
also seem to dispel the notion that there is a shrinking A&A market for the Big 
Eight firms. 
Improving the Attractiveness of Auditing as a Career 
In part because of the concerns of current and potential auditing students 
which were noted earlier in this paper, Price Waterhouse made a commitment 
last year to improve the attractiveness of auditing as a career path, both in fact 
and in perception. We made this commitment to enable us to better compete in 
the broad marketplace for the best college graduates. The obvious first step— 
and, by comparison, the simplest one—was increasing the compensation for all 
professional staff, current and prospective, to a level comparable to other 
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leading professional service firms and organizations seeking accounting and 
finance-trained graduates. 
Raising compensation levels was a giant step for Price Waterhouse (as it 
would be for any of the other Big Eight firms). However, it was merely "catch 
up" when we compared ourselves to other alternatives open to graduates and 
as we realized how public accounting had not kept pace with contemporary pay 
scales. We believe it represented a fundamental first step in the right direction. 
It was costly, but the alternative—being non-competitive for quality people-
was, in our view, not an option. 
The task of defining and executing the next steps to raise the attractiveness 
of auditing as a career pursuit requires redoubling efforts in several areas. 
Some specific ones include: 
• Providing information to high school guidance counselors about the 
nature and attractiveness of the accounting profession. As a practical 
matter, the profession does not have a vehicle such as LA Law or St. 
Elsewhere to provide the image of accountants and auditors as 
positive role models; 
• Re-emphasizing to college administrators the importance of having 
talented A&A instructors at the university level to college administra­
tors. In our view, academicians need to do a better job of attracting 
quality students to their A&A programs. The strong emphasis on 
research at some universities seems to have reduced the emphasis on 
teaching. We believe it is important that experienced instructors who 
are dynamic in the classroom teach at least some sections of 
"Principles of Accounting" as well as upper division electives; 
• Fostering professional independence sooner in one's career; 
• Providing early recognition to the best performers; and 
• Loosening the lock step advancement policies evident in the Big Eight 
firms. 
In addition, client expectations and today's business environment call for 
professionals who can be more than strict specialists or deep technical experts. 
Superior accounting and auditing skills alone are clearly insufficient. The 
situation calls for those who can acquire and apply a broader view of the world 
around them. These individuals must possess the ability to adapt, to grow, and 
to develop new skills over the span of their careers. 
These are lofty goals which are somewhat long-term in nature. Three areas 
which we believe will improve the attractiveness of auditing as a career path 
over the short-term are (1) an emphasis on a risk-driven audit approach, which 
emphasizes understanding the business, risk assessment, and selection of 
responsive audit procedures; (2) the positive impact of technology on the audit 
process, and (3) increased use of audit professional assistants (i.e., paraprofes-
sionals). 
As previously stated, the first and most critical success factor to an audit 
engagement is understanding the business and its related risks. This repre­
sents a judgment-based approach proceeding "top-down" which directs the 
audit effort to the most challenging and risky areas. This is in contrast to the 
more traditional and mechanical "bottom-up" detailed approach. We believe 
the top-down approach is far more attractive to young professionals. 
The effects of technology on the audit process should increase its 
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attractiveness as a career pursuit. The effects are multiple and varied—just to 
name a few: 
(1) microcomputers play an increasingly important part in the Big Eight 
audit practice. They have the ability to replace many manual and 
tedious computations; 
(2) expert systems are being developed that will help to audit smarter 
and faster. Expert systems will also result in greater emphasis being 
placed on the auditor's analytical skills—the profession will need 
people who can interpret, analyze and intelligently question the 
output from such systems; and 
(3) micro-mainframe links have the potential to significantly enhance 
audit efficiency in retrieving and analyzing client data. Again, 
auditors will be able to spend more time putting their analytical skills 
to work. 
Professional assistants (PAs) perform various low-risk audit tasks as well 
as certain administrative functions. The audit tasks performed by PAs are 
those which require minimal or no knowledge of accounting and auditing theory 
and practice, and do not require the exercise of audit judgment. The tasks are 
objective in nature, requiring the PA to perform specific procedures which have 
specific results. Of course, to the extent PAs assist in the conduct of an audit, 
their use and work must comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
The tasks typically performed by PAs have been performed by staff account­
ants in the past and were among those tasks viewed by prospective auditors as 
the most repetitive and uninteresting. Assignment of such tasks to PAs frees 
staff accountants for more challenging work. 
The Effects of Competitive Pricing on the Big Eight 
Recent articles in the accounting and auditing journals infer that severe 
price competition, characterized by "low-balling," may be coming to an end. 
We certainly hope so, but retain our professional skepticism. 
To a great extent, we view competition as a healthy development—a 
challenge to be met. It wakes us up and strips away any aura of complacency 
that inhibits progress. Competition forces us to examine critically the market 
for our services and to ensure that services offered are fully in tune with 
market needs. Responding to real-world needs is what professional services 
are all about. In terms of delivery of services, we believe the most important 
aspect—and, unfortunately, the most difficult to manage and guarantee—is 
providing the highest quality people for each and every engagement. 
Whether the audit is perceived as a commodity, or is identified as a highly 
differentiated service, will depend on the skill of the Big Eight firm in making 
explicit the benefits derived by the client from the engagement. While attention 
to style of work, commitments to the task, and similar qualities can, of course, 
differentiate an otherwise standard service, the breakthrough in perception 
requires something more. 
What is required is establishing clearly how the audit contributes to the 
discipline of the total financial information system of the client. The proposals 
contained in our 1985 white paper, Challenge and Opportunity for the Account-
ing Profession: Strengthening the Public's Confidence, suggest the need to 
broaden the focus of the audit. For example, it is suggested that the auditor 
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accept the responsibility to search for management fraud that might be material 
to the financial statements. In meeting this objective, expanding auditing 
standards are identified, including: 
Review and evaluate the system of management controls, including 
conducting an audit process to more adequately address the company's 
financial condition as well as its financial position. Such review and 
evaluation would be made without regard to the question of whether or 
not the auditor intends to rely on the system in developing audit tests. 
[Price Waterhouse, 1985, p. 19] 
The point of this example is not to make a judgment about the proposal, but 
merely to illustrate a recommendation that is identifying a more sharply defined 
contribution that an audit might make to a client's overall effectiveness. 
The integrity of the financial information system in any large organization is 
of critical importance to those who make company policy. No wise chief 
executive fails to appreciate what external auditors can contribute to the 
company. A wise chief executive officer is not going to opt for the cheapest, 
and possibly abbreviated, audit. Too much is at stake [Oliverio, 1986]. 
Peter Scanlon, chairman of Coopers & Lybrand, summed it up this way: 
"CPA firms that do audit work for low fees cannot sustain quality work. If a 
company only wants to pay peanuts, it may get monkeys looking at its business 
instead of thoughtful professionals." [Berton, 1985, p. 33] 
Conclusion 
The auditing segment of the Big Eight firms faces many challenges in the 
future, especially from the effects of competitive pricing. Despite these 
challenges, we believe that auditing continues to be a viable, desirable, and 
necessary business activity. Audits of publicly-held companies (and of those 
about to go public) are one of the keys to the confidence that investors place in 
the capital markets, both here in the US and internationally. Audits are a 
primary means of deterring fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing may or may 
not be the most profitable segment for the Big Eight firms but certainly 
generates significant revenue per partner and per professional staff". The A&A 
research and development work being done by the Big Eight firms (in areas 
such as microcomputers and audit methodologies) indicates that they believe 
auditing is a vibrant activity with a profitable future. Such investments would 
not be made in a declining business or "cash cow." We believe auditing 
remains a rewarding and challenging career path for those individuals choosing 
to pursue it. 
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Discussant's Response to "The Relative 
Importance of Auditing to the Accounting 
Profession: Is Auditing a Profit Center?" 
Zoe-Vonna Palmrose 
University of California at Berkeley 
Oh, we still have a few national institutions of trust left . . . Lawrence 
Welk, Walter Cronkite, Roy Rogers, penicillin, Mary Tyler Moore, 
Price Waterhouse, and hot chicken soup. But everything is under 
scrutiny, including our own existence.1 
The Walker and Doll paper discusses forces behind, and consequences of, 
increased competition in the audit services market, using the question—"Is 
auditing a profit center?" Some might find this question inappropriate, because 
it appears to undermine the profession's reason for existence. Others might 
find it curious to question the viability of a service over which the profession 
has a virtual monopoly. However, I found the question both interesting and 
useful, even before recent events made it timely.2 In my opinion, scrutinizing 
the role of auditing in the Big Eight's scheme of services can enhance our 
understanding of the market. 
My comments focus on two major areas. First, I comment on what appears 
missing or only implied in this discussion of competition, specifically some 
benefits of competition. Here, recognize that I am biased. I view competition as 
generally a good thing. Of course, this view comes easily since I am removed 
from the upheavals and uncertainties of life in the trenches. I sympathize with 
individuals facing difficulties imposed by competitive forces. And, I am curious 
to understand these forces. But I lack empathy towards laments for "the good 
old days of auditing"—days of excess demand and fundamental impediments to 
competition. My comments on the benefits of competition reflect these biases. 
Second, my comments focus on issues raised by Walker and Doll relating to 
quality and pricing of audit services. The profession debates whether auditing is 
a commodity. Extant empirical research encompasses a similar question—"Are 
audit services homogeneous or differentiated?" My comments on quality and 
pricing of audit services reference insights from portions of this research. 
Benefits of Competition 
Increased efficiencies represent a major benefit of competition. Walker and 
Doll mention improvements in audit efficiencies, primarily through use of 
1 Bombeck, E., "Will America Regain Its Trust?" Newsweek (November 19, 1979), p. 138 
2 Berton, L., "Andersen Chief of Consulting Relieved of Role," The Wall Street Journal (May 19, 
1988), p. 2 
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technology. However, their discussion of efficiencies occurs in the context of 
developments strengthening the career attractiveness of accounting and 
auditing. The discussion completely ignores any client benefits, including audit 
fee reductions, from increased efficiencies in auditing. Although Walker and 
Doll bemoan pressures to reduce fees, such pressures entail positive signs. To 
some extent, fee pressures reflect current efficiencies and promote future 
ones. 
Regrettably, Walker and Doll (like others outside Big Eight firms) found 
cost and profit data unavailable for assessing the viability of auditing. Instead, 
the authors use revenue data. Rather than debate the merits of these data, let 
me address several issues not in the paper. First, casual evidence suggests that 
partner reductions in some Big Eight firms during 1983-1987 contributed to 
growth statistics when using an average revenue per partner measure (Table 4 
in Walker and Doll paper). Such partner reductions reflect attempts to enhance 
efficiencies in audit practices because of competitive pressures (see PAR, April 
1985). 
Second, in discussing audit revenue growth, Walker and Doll identify 
segments of the market with expanding demand, particularly initial public 
offerings (IPO's). I realize that the paper focuses on Big Eight firms. 
Nonetheless, from a competitive standpoint, non-Big Eight firms comprise a 
significant portion of the IPO market. For example, based on data from 
approximately 3,600 IPO's, non-Big Eight firms had about 40% of the market 
throughout the period 1970-1985 [Palmrose, 1987]. In addition, both the type 
of underwriter and the terms of offerings seem to influence the choice of 
auditor [Simunic and Stein, 1987]. 
In addition to increased efficiencies, the availability of information on audit 
services and fees represents another benefit from changes in the competitive 
environment. Walker and Doll express some regret that audit committees not 
only have, but actually use this information. Frankly, I am encouraged that audit 
committees exercise their oversight responsibilities. 
In summary, increased efficiencies and information, both beneficial to 
clients, represent consequences of competition in the audit services market. 
However, a fundamental concern regarding any adverse impact on audit quality 
as a by-product of increased competition remains. This leads to my second area 
of comments. 
Quality and Pricing of Audit Services 
Empirical research supports the existence of quality-differentiated audit 
services in the market as a whole. The evidence suggests not only that quality 
differences exist but also that higher quality services translate into higher audit 
fees [Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmrose 1986a]. 
However, evidence becomes problematic when comparing among Big Eight 
firms. Studies have found that market participants perceive differences among 
the Big Eight [Arnett and Danos, 1979; Shockley and Holt, 1983; Simunic and 
Stein, 1987]. Yet, evidence remains weak when using revealed behavior of 
market participants via measures including audit fees and auditor litigation. For 
example, I tested for pricing differentials among Big Eight firms with industry 
specializations and failed to detect any significant audit fee differences between 
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industry specialists and non-specialists [see Palmrose, 1986a]3. Other stud­
ies identify one Big Eight firm [Simunic, 1980], or several Big Eight firms 
[Balachandran and Simon, 1988], with significantly different audit fees, 
although this evidence should be viewed as preliminary. Likewise, examina­
tion of litigation activities among Big Eight firms reveals some significant 
differences. However, results appear sensitive to the measure of litigation 
activities and, therefore, cannot be considered unambiguous [Palmrose, 
1988a]. 
To summarize this area of research, evidence supports quality-differ­
entiation in the audit services market as a whole. However, evidence does not 
provide clear indications of differentiation within the Big Eight. 
Evidence on price cutting behavior represents a somewhat more fruitful 
area of research in terms of insights. Here the literature provides an 
economic explanation for low-balling consistent with competition in the 
market for audit services [see DeAngelo, 1981]. Furthermore, a recent 
study by Simon and Francis [1988, p. 255] contains the following findings on 
pricing with auditor changes: 
• Significant fee reductions occur in the initial year of auditor change 
that average 24% of normal fee levels for ongoing engagements. 
• In each of the next two years, fee reductions average 15%. 
• By the fourth year, fees increase to normal levels for continuing 
engagements. 
Perhaps the central issue in the Walker and Doll paper involves the effect 
of non-audit services on the pricing and quality of audit services. From the 
perspective of empirical research, several studies document that audit fees 
are higher when clients also purchase non-audit services from their auditor 
[Palmrose, 1986b; Simunic, 1984]. Although not the only interpretation for 
this result, higher audit fees are inconsistent with auditing as a loss leader for 
non-audit services. 
Furthermore, in comparing the relative importance of audit and non-audit 
services to the Big Eight, Walker and Doll may be understating the vital role 
of audit clients in generating non-audit service revenues.4 In a study of over 
350 public and closely-held companies, nearly 80% of the companies 
purchased some non-audit services (tax or management consulting services) 
from their incumbent auditors, while only three percent of the companies 
purchased non-audit services exclusively from other public accounting firms 
[Palmrose, 1988b]. It appears that much of the Big Eight's non-audit service 
revenue is derived from services to audit clients. 
However, this begs the question of whether market participants perceive 
auditor independence (quality) problems in conjunction with the growing 
importance of non-audit services to the Big Eight. Certainly, the perception 
of auditors marching to a beat of sell-sell-sell non-audit services while 
conducting audit engagements is troublesome. 
3 Actually, this test involves intra-firm quality-differentiated audit services. 
4 My comments illustrate the economic benefits of joint supply of audit and non-audit services. 
These benefits include auditor reputation or brand name effects. In discussions at the 
Symposium, W. R. Kinney, Jr., emphasized the latter. 
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Concluding Remarks 
There remains one, albeit minor, point made by Walker and Doll that 
requires some attention. It is the following: 
In our view, academicians need to do a better job of attracting quality 
students to their A&A programs. The strong emphasis on research at 
some universities seems to have reduced the emphasis on teaching. We 
believe it is important that experienced instructors who are dynamic in 
the classroom teach at least some sections of "Principles of Account­
ing" as well as upper division electives. 
First, room for debate exists as to whether attracting students to 
accounting and auditing (A&A) careers represents a legitimate role for 
educators. I think not. Next, it is a myth that good researchers are in general 
not good teachers. Frequently, good research and good teaching occur 
together. Furthermore, the profession is mistaken in assuming that because 
good teaching will not guarantee tenure at "research institutions," these 
institutions do not emphasize good teaching. Nonetheless, these comments 
demonstrate that academicians can improve communication with the profession 
regarding the value ascribed to undergraduate education. 
Improved communication between academics and the profession on teach­
ing likewise extends to research. As my comments on Walker and Doll's paper 
scrutinizing the role of auditing in the Big Eight's scheme of services indicate, 
we are trying to understand the same issues. In conclusion, let me emphasize 
how much I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this Symposium to 
discuss some of these issues. 
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8 
Accounting Standards and Professional Ethics 
Arthur R. Wyatt 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Over the years accounting standards and auditing practices have become 
sufficiently divorced that they almost seem to be in separate environments with 
only negligible overlap. While professional auditors continue to need to evaluate 
client applications of accounting standards, those auditors today are also 
frequently involved in seeking loopholes in the standards to exploit for client 
benefit. Auditors continue to be supportive of the accounting standard-setting 
process, but many times that support seems to flow more from a concern about 
the uncertainties associated with any revision to the current mechanism than 
from a residual satisfaction with recent and current FASB standards. 
The increasing complexity of the world in which the auditor operates 
probably means that a separation of the establishment of accounting standards 
from the evaluation of their application was inevitable. Greater specialization 
arises when the environment becomes increasingly complex. Even so, the 
rather marked change in how auditors seem to approach the evaluations of the 
application of standards today, as compared to simpler times, appears to be 
more an attitudinal change than the necessary consequence of greater complex­
ity, better technology, or increased specialization. 
Thus, the relationship between accounting standards and the professional 
auditor may be less direct today than in the past. A brief look at how this 
relationship has changed may sharpen the focus of the current relationship. 
First, it may be useful to consider why accounting standards are developed 
today in the manner in which they are, rather than in some alternative 
procedure. We should recognize that when Congress created the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in 1934 it authorized the Commission to articulate 
accounting standards. Over the next few years, the SEC was fully occupied in 
getting organized and in dealing with many inherited problems flowing from the 
trauma in the stock markets over the preceding four or five years. The need to 
develop accounting standards did not reach a high enough level of priority for 
the SEC to undertake any productive activity. 
At the same time, many of the leaders on the practicing side of the 
accounting profession were concerned about the potential ramifications of 
having accounting standards established by a governmental agency. Leaders of 
the profession, who, at that time, were also generally the top technical partners 
in the several leading firms, approached the SEC through the offices of the 
American Institute of CPAs to offer to assume the authority for the develop­
ment of accounting standards. After considerable discussion, and a very close 
vote within the Commission itself, the Commission authorized the AICPA to 
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proceed with the development of accounting principles. The Commission 
retained both an oversight responsibility and the right to intervene should the 
AICPA develop an inappropriate standard or fail to deal with an issue that the 
Commission felt required attention. 
It is interesting to note that Congress, neither in 1938 nor subsequently, 
has authorized the transfer of the responsibility for the development of 
accounting standards from the SEC to a private sector entity. The reasons for 
the SEC conveying authority to issue accounting standards to the AICPA are 
difficult to glean from the evidence available. However, it is likely that the 
difficulties of the task in relation to the other obligations of the Commission at 
that time, combined with the stature of those professionals who represented 
the AICPA in the discussions that led to the decision, played an important role 
in the SEC decision. While the accounting profession was young at that time, it 
had established a reputation for acting in the public interest. Practicing CPAs 
had consistently emphasized their independence in dealing with client concerns 
as well as their role in assuring users of financial statements that those 
statements, accompanied by an unqualified auditor's report, could be relied 
upon as being fair representations of an entity's results of operations and 
financial condition. 
The AICPA retained jurisdiction over this standard-setting process from 
1938 until 1972. At that time, a number of concerns about the performance of 
the Accounting Principles Board led to a broad review of the standard-setting 
process and a decision to create an independent entity to assume the authority 
that had been delegated to the Accounting Principles Board. The result is that 
for the past 15 years accounting standards have been articulated by an 
independent entity, one that is not a part of the accounting profession, the 
preparer community, nor any other professional, business, or commercial 
group. Recent initiatives by the Financial Executives Institute to have in­
creased representation from within its ranks at the Board level, within the 
Advisory Council, and among the Trustees of the Financial Accounting 
Foundation suggest that the movement of this process away from the 
accounting profession is continuing and may proceed even further. The 
ramifications of an ongoing move in this direction would be interesting to 
speculate upon, but that speculation has to be left for another day. 
With that brief historical background I would like to make some observa­
tions about the perspective of standard setters in undertaking their responsibil­
ities and on the role of practicing CPAs, who are responsible for evaluating how 
the standards that are adopted have been applied by clients. Practicing CPAs 
are also increasingly involved in consulting with investment bankers and others 
on how accounting standards affect proposed transactions. 
Early on, the members of the FASB undertook the development of a 
conceptual framework, in part so that the FASB could develop standards that 
had a logical cohesion and, in part, so that the results of its deliberations could 
be evaluated to assess whether the resulting standards flowed from logical 
premises or may have been the result of lobbying activities or pressure politics. 
While that effort has been less fruitful than many had envisioned, certain parts 
of the framework are likely to stand the test of time. 
Among the qualitative characteristics of the Board's conceptual framework 
was that of neutrality. While one can argue that no one of the qualitative 
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characteristics is more important than any other quality on the Board's 
deliberations, the fact remains that the notion of neutrality is crucial to the 
Board's process and to the widespread acceptability of its resulting standards. 
The notion of neutrality within the Board's conceptual framework is that in 
resolving issues, the Board will attempt to reach conclusions that result in 
reliable and relevant information and not conclusions that favor one segment of 
society to the detriment of one or more of the other segments. Stated 
differently, the Board does not view itself as a resource reallocator in the 
standard-setting process. While it recognizes that resource reallocations may 
flow from the decisions that it reaches, and the applications of the standards 
that it adopts, the notion of neutrality emphasizes that in developing the 
standard the Board is striving to achieve reliable and relevant information and is 
not overtly striving to reallocate resources for the benefit of one group to the 
detriment of others. 
Thus, at an early stage, the Board tried to emphasize that it would deal in a 
fair and equitable manner with various competing interests in its development 
of standards. This policy has a high ethical tone and, in my view, the Board 
deserves high marks for its 15-year history of avoiding allegations that its 
standards are designed to favor any given segment of our society. 
Furthermore, the Board adopted an open process in which to deliberate 
prior to reaching its conclusions. The process is a lengthy one and invites 
contributions from all interested parties both in writing and orally at public 
hearings. Furthermore, decisions on all phases of the Board's projects are 
made only in open public meetings. Board policies preclude decision making of 
any kind behind closed doors. Again, this policy is designed, in part, to prevent 
allegations of improper or unethical behavior. In essence, the standard setters 
created an operating policy that would minimize the potential for allegations that 
its conclusions favored any particular constituency. Each Board member is 
expected to reach his conclusions on the issues under consideration only after a 
careful personal evaluation of the competing alternative views. A Board 
member is expected to assess the extent to which a given possible solution is 
consistent with the conceptual framework and with other standards that may be 
in existence. He is expected to evaluate whether the given alternatives are 
capable of practical application in a fair and evenhanded manner. Finally, the 
Board member is expected to assess whether the results that will flow from the 
practical application of a standard will be sensible and fair depictions of the 
underlying economic phenomena with which the standard is dealing. 
The decisions of the Board would be easier to make if the members were 
immune to any lobbying activities, if the Board could be unconcerned about the 
reactions of constituent groups, or if the decisions could be made in private 
rather than in public. However, standard setting is not that simple and probably 
benefits greatly from the process that is in existence. That process does 
subject the Board members to lobbying activities, does subject the Board 
members to criticism from constituents who prefer alternative solutions, and 
does require Board members to speak up in open public meetings to express 
their conclusions and the reasons for them. 
Given the actual environment in which standards are set, one would expect 
that out of 98 standards, some would reflect the effects of the lobbying and 
bargaining processes. The fact is, of course, that some standards do, but on 
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balance many of the standards fare well when evaluated against the Board's 
conceptual framework. Some examples of standards that appear to have been 
influenced, possibly unduly, by outside forces include Statement No. 13 (and its 
follow-on interpretations and amendments) dealing with leases, Statement No. 
15 dealing with the restructuring of troubled debt, Statement No. 87, dealing 
with the accounting for pension plans, and, no doubt, the standard that will be 
forthcoming within the next few years, dealing with post-retirement benefits. 
My assessment is that, given the imperfections of the world within which 
the FASB operates, its standards reflect more the judgments of seven 
independent individuals than they do the accumulated effect of influences 
brought to bear on those individuals by pressure groups and lobbying activities. 
In fact, it may very well be that current initiatives that would alter the make-up 
of the Board or the manner in which it operates are very much the result of 
frustrations experienced by lobbying groups or special interests, frustrations 
over their inability to have more influence over the process. Some preparers 
have expressed this frustration by suggesting they would do better if the 
standards were set by a governmental agency. After all, they have experience 
in lobbying elected officials and those responsible to elected officials. 
Practicing CPAs have played a significant role in the standard-setting 
process, a role that has changed somewhat over the years. Practicing CPAs are 
in a difficult position insofar as developing positions on accounting standards is 
concerned. On the one hand, they have responsibilities to clients and on the 
other, responsibilities to the public. Public expectations are high that the 
practicing CPA is looking out for the public's interest when reporting on 
financial statements of its clients. To the extent the practicing CPA focuses 
more on one or several clients' special interests in the development or 
application of standards, expectations of other constituencies may not be met. 
In time, those expectations may change, as would also the public perception of 
the practicing CPAs' role. 
From 1938 until 1972, the practicing profession was in the position of 
having to apply standards that were developed by an arm of the profession. The 
standard-setting process was a part of the profession, probably the most visible 
part. It was natural that practitioners would feel a sense of obligation, a sense of 
moral duty, to apply standards in a professional manner since those standards 
had been developed within their own profession's framework. Even so, 
increasing competition within the accounting profession gradually increased 
pressures on auditors to find solutions to accounting issues that were not 
always consistent with the standards adopted. By 1972, many were concerned 
that the standard setters (the APB) were being unduly influenced by particular 
client desires. In fact, the increasing initiatives by practitioners to structure an 
APB Opinion to meet clients' desires or to stretch APB Opinions to meet client 
needs was probably a key factor in the creation of the FASB. 
The move away from professional application of standards accelerated 
further in 1972 when the FASB was created. Now the standard-setting process 
is outside the profession. More and more frequently, we find practicing CPAs 
talking about 'us' and 'them,' with the 'them' being the FASB. Any obligation 
that professional practitioners may have felt prior to 1972 to seek to apply well, 
or fairly, the standards developed by their own professional organization may 
well have been dissipated somewhat, and possibly increasingly so, over the 
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years of FASB involvement. No longer are the standards the profession's 
standards. They are those of an independent entity to which practitioners feel 
no particular loyalty. 
The evidence is substantial and increasing that practitioners today often 
seek to find loopholes in the standards issued by the FASB and try to expand 
upori such loopholes. While 'loopholeism' is not new, it is surely more 
extensive and refined than it was prior to the creation of the FASB. The 
process almost seems to be a game in which the role of the practitioner is to 
seek the shortcomings in the standard and exploit them rather than to seek the 
objectives within the standard and attempt to achieve them. Initiatives to seek 
out loopholes and exploit them most often originate from clients of practitioners 
or other advisers, either attorneys or investment bankers, who may be very 
useful to a practitioner in generating new business. 
Let me give you some examples of matters that have been considered by 
the FASB, or that have been proposed in one form or another either by 
practitioners or preparers, which demonstrate attempts to avoid the application 
of a particular standard. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13, paragraph 15, 
provides that when a rental agreement specifies an increasing level of rentals 
over the period of the lease, the lessee should determine the aggregate lease 
rentals under the agreement and charge those rentals to income on a straight-
line basis over the period involved. Many of the provisions of Statement 13 are 
equivocal in nature, but this particular provision seems to be abundantly clear. 
Even so, for whatever reasons, the practice evolved, particularly in the 
department store industry, of disregarding this provision and accounting for the 
rentals on an increasing rental arrangement on a cash basis. That is, the 
amounts paid under the rental arrangement were expensed as paid, and the 
provision that the rentals were to be expensed on a straight-line basis over the 
period of the lease was ignored. This issue came to the attention of the Board's 
Emerging Issues Task Force, a group comprised mostly of practitioners. That 
group could not agree that paragraph 15 was clear (but also could not identify 
the points of lack of clarity), and the FASB was ultimately forced to issue 
Technical Bulletin 85-3 which took several paragraphs to, in effect, state that 
paragraph 15 of Statement 13 meant what it said. Had the accounting 
profession applied the standard, this issue would never have required the time 
and effort of the Emerging Issues Task Force, the staff at the Board, and the 
Board itself to clarify. 
In 1986, the Board was embroiled in a controversy involving a savings and 
loan association and its financial statements to be filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The association involved needed additional capital. It 
proposed to increase that capital by issuing a kind of certificate that was styled 
as a "permanent income capital certificate." The label clearly was designed to 
lead one to conclude that the certificate was an equity certificate rather than a 
debt-type of obligation. The savings and loan involved was supported by its 
auditors in arguing that this certificate should properly be classified as equity. 
Analysis of the terms of the certificate, however, led the Board to conclude that 
the certificate had more attributes of a liability than it did of equity. It was not, in 
fact, a permanent certificate at all. Resolution of this matter required many 
meetings involving the FASB staff, the various regulatory authorities in 
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Washington, to say nothing of the time and effort of the entity involved and its 
auditors. 
Within that same year, another example arose that was initiated by the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. That Board suggested that when savings and 
loans sold mortgages for less than their carrying amounts, the resulting debit 
should be classified as an asset to be amortized over a period of 10, 15 or 20 
years. Around the FASB, that suggestion became known as creating assets out 
of losses. The argument made was that it was in the best interest of the savings 
and loans, and of our economy, for savings and loans to package and dispose of 
their "underwater" mortgages, but that if they did so and had to recognize 
losses they would have insufficient capital to continue in business under the 
capital adequacy requirements of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The 
Bank Board was proposing to overcome the failure to meet the capital 
adequacy guidelines by redefining the nature of an asset. The FASB concluded, 
however, that entities following such a practice could not classify their losses as 
assets if they expected to get an unqualified auditor's report. 
In 1987, the FASB issued Statement No. 92 that set forth the criteria that 
would have to be met by a rate-regulated company if it were properly to defer 
costs under a phase-in plan adopted by its regulator. A phase-in plan is adopted 
by a rate making agency when the normal approach to rate making would 
require what is perceived to be too great an increase in electric rates in any one 
year. By phasing in that increase over several years, the regulators would 
dampen or delay the impact of the higher rates on electricity consumers. When 
a rate-making agency adopted a phase-in plan after the release of Statement 92 
that did not meet the criteria in that standard, the utility would not be permitted 
to defer the costs in question. Under Statement 92, in that situation, the utility 
would be expected to charge off those costs as incurred, a procedure that 
would have a negative impact on both its earnings and shareholders' equity. 
One utility facing such a phase-in plan, a plan that did not meet the criteria of 
Statement 92, proposed to account for that phase-in plan as if it were a 
qualifying plan. Its auditors agreed to give an unqualified opinion on financial 
statements that embodied that accounting even though such accounting was at 
variance from that provided for in Statement 92. The company then approached 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and obtained an order from it that 
specified that the utility should account for the phase-in plan in its regulatory 
statements as ordered by its regulatory agency rather than as provided for in 
Statement 92. With that regulatory order in hand, the utility approached the 
Securities and Exchange Commission requesting that it accept its financial 
statements with the clean auditor's report. At this point, the resolution of that 
request is unresolved. Should the SEC agree with the position taken by FÉRC, 
Statement 92 would be rendered ineffective.1 
In 1987, the Board issued Statement 94 which provides that an entity that 
prepares consolidated financial statements shall include all subsidiaries within 
those consolidated statements unless it does not have control of the subsidiary 
or expects to hold it only on a temporary basis. Statement 94 is clear in its 
1 The SEC subsequently denied the registrant's request, and Statement 92 appears to be working 
as the FASB intended. 
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intent. That intent was to require the consolidation of all subsidiaries except in 
the very limited instances of temporary control. One accounting firm has 
suggested that a neat way to avoid the requirements of Statement 94 would be 
for a company to change the fiscal year of its subsidiaries so that the fiscal year 
of the subsidiary was more than 93 days away from the fiscal year end of the 
parent company. The time interval is important because the SEC has a rule that 
precludes a subsidiary from being included in a consolidated statement based on 
its year-end results if the fiscal year ends more than 93 days from the fiscal year 
end of the parent company. While this suggestion is unlikely to achieve its 
objective, it demonstrates again that practitioners spend a great deal of time 
attempting to develop loopholes in FASB standards; loopholes that subvert the 
application of the standard from the objective that the Board sought to achieve. 
The overriding question in connection with this type of behavior is whether 
the public interest is being served well by those who are practicing public 
accounting when those practitioners seem more interested in seeking out and 
exploiting loopholes than they do in attempting to achieve accomplishment of 
the objectives articulated by the standard setters. 
This is probably not the time or place to speculate on the reasons why this 
change in attitude has evolved. Some would assert the FASB is at fault because 
it has insisted on writing masses of detailed rules that seem designed more to 
anticipate or cure abuses than to achieve some clearly articulated objective. 
The argument then runs that "cure the abuse" standards simply invite the 
development of new abuses, the seeking of loopholes. Others might argue that 
the principal cause of this change is the increase in commercialism, and the 
consequent reduction in professionalism, that has evolved within the account­
ing profession for a variety of reasons. This view suggests that a practitioner is 
not serving his client well unless he is seeking out loopholes in, and favorable 
interpretations of, the standards issued by the FASB. Regardless of the 
principal cause, searching for loopholes encourages more detailed standards to 
try to circumscribe abuses, and detailed, and often, arbitrary rules issued by 
standard setters virtually invite initiatives to seek out the defects in the 
standard setters. 
One question that arises as a result of this changing behavior is, who is 
looking out for the public interest? Do those in the profession who seek out 
loopholes and approve the embodiment of them in their client's financial 
statement serve the public interest well, or are they serving well only their 
individual clients' interest? The issue is an attitudinal one. It might be 
expressed as follows: With what mind set should a practitioner approach his 
responsibilities in the application of accounting standards? Should he be an 
advocate of his clients in the sense of striving to achieve the most favorable 
interpretation of a given standard insofar as his client's interests are con­
cerned, or should he be mindful of his responsibilities to the public by striving 
to apply the standard in the manner that best meets the objectives articulated in 
the standard? Should the practitioner be independent of the desires of his client 
and strive in his interpretation of the standards to apply them in the manner in 
which he believes the Board intended for those standards to be applied? 
During my somewhat abbreviated tenure on the Board, I suggested, on 
several occasions, the following initiative to try both to improve the quality of 
an FASB standard and to alter the attitudinal behavior of those who were 
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applying it. I suggested that on a given topic, only one and as an experiment, 
the Board decide in advance that it would limit its standard to no more than 
three pages. The first paragraph of the standard would articulate as clearly as 
the Board could, the objective or objectives that the Board felt the given 
standard should achieve. The next several paragraphs would set forth the 
standard, and the final paragraph, prior to the implementation and effective 
date, would specify that the burden was on corporate preparers and independ­
ent auditors to evaluate their applications of the standard to determine whether 
the approach they were contemplating best met the articulated objectives set 
forth in the first paragraph of the standard. I was advised that such an approach 
simply would not work. Of course it will not, especially if it is not even 
attempted. 
At some point, I believe many will come to realize that the FASB will be 
unsuccessful in a dual role of writing accounting standards and preventing 
abusive behavior. Accounting standards should be broad in scope rather than 
detailed as are today's standards. The burden for fair application should rest on 
preparers and their auditors. The changes in attitudes and behavior that would 
be required to implement this notion are enormous and not likely to be 
accomplished over any short period. The alternative, however, is to proceed 
with increasingly detailed rules that invite searching for loopholes and that place 
severe burdens on those practitioners who are motivated by high ethical 
standards. 
One critical question is whether the accounting profession today has met 
sufficiently well its responsibilities for establishing and applying accounting 
standards to warrant continuation of the existing current private sector 
arrangement for setting standards. Surely, the SEC would never have dele­
gated the authority for setting accounting standards in 1938 to a group 
perceived to place one or more special interests above the public interest. It is 
ironic that the public accounting profession today may be better understood 
than it was fifty years ago, may be more highly regarded in our society, and yet 
is meeting less well than it did fifty years ago, the qualities of professionalism 
that are crucial to the retention of its status as a highly regarded profession. 
I hope that by this point, you have an understanding of the general drift of 
my concerns. Before I stop, however, let me pose some questions for your 
consideration. Can accounting standard setting survive in the private sector 
under the present structure? The basis for the existence of standard setting in 
the private sector today is to achieve fairness of financial presentation in the 
public interest. When practicing CPAs approach the application of standards 
issued with the objective to seek out and exploit loopholes, is it not probable 
that initiatives will arise to alter the institutional standard-setting arrange­
ments? Does the accounting profession merit its designation as a profession if 
the central thrust of its application of standards is to exploit loopholes for the 
benefit of special interests and to the detriment of the broader interest? 
These are matters that, I believe, leaders of the profession should be 
considering as we undertake various initiatives designed to minimize the 
expectation gap and enhance understanding of the role of professional auditors 
in our society. 
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